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Over the last two decades, Canadian foreign policy has benefited from an 
exceptionally rich and vigorous, as well as polarized, discussion of Can-
ada’s national interest. The contours of that debate emerged sharply in the 
mid-1990s, when the end of the Cold War still seemed likely to liberate 
global politics in general, and Canadian foreign policy in particular, from 
the traditional constraints of empire, alliance, and power. Canada’s Liberal 
foreign minister at the time, Lloyd Axworthy, certainly thought so, and he 
embraced an ambitious “human security” agenda that placed individual ±  
not state ±  welfare at the centre of the global agenda. His high-profile cam-
paigns against landmines and for an international criminal court inspired 
a generation of progressive Canadians, convinced that their country’s na-
tional interest lay in pursuit of a new world order.1
His critics were legion and vocal. They denounced Axworthy and his 
allies for engaging in a cheap “pulpit diplomacy” and attacked the min-
ister for his “intrusive internationalism.”2 In the aftermath of the terror-
ist attacks of 11 September 2001, his critics wielded realist notions of the 
national interest with considerable effect. In his unlikely bestseller, While 
Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World, Andrew Cohen fret-
ted about Ottawa’s declining foreign policy assets and its fading influence 
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abroad.3 Cohen’s lament echoed among the think-tanks, where defining 
the national interest quickly became an idée fixe,4 and along the corridors of 
power. Liberal prime minister Paul Martin got the message and promised 
in February 2004 to “see Canada’s place of pride and influence in the world 
restored.”5 So too did his successor, Conservative prime minister Stephen 
Harper, who assured the House of Commons in October 2007 that “Can-
adian foreign policy must promote our values and defend our interests.”6
For better or worse, discussions of contemporary Canadian foreign policy 
are firmly centred on frank assessments of competing definitions of the 
national interest.
As the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade con-
templated celebrating its 100th anniversary in 2009, it was difficult to 
avoid the echoes of this debate. Indeed, the Centre for Military and Stra-
tegic Studies at the University of Calgary and the department thought it 
appropriate to convene a conference using the national interest as a theme 
for exploring the evolution of the Canada’s foreign and trade ministry over 
the past century. The workshop brought together former diplomats and 
public servants with scholars from different disciplines and backgrounds to 
explore Canada’s national interests and the department’s changing role in 
defining and pursuing them. This volume, which brings together a variety 
of historical perspectives on the department’s place in the debate over in-
terests and values in Canadian foreign policy, is the result.
When the Department of External Affairs was established in June 
1909, tucked into pokey offices above a barber shop at the corner of Queen 
and Bank streets in downtown Ottawa, few would have predicted its even-
tual importance. “It is not intended it shall be a very numerous depart-
ment,” Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier reassured cost-conscious parlia-
mentarians, or “a very heavy department.”7 Tory to the core and convinced 
that Canada’s national interests were best served within the comforting 
embrace of the British Empire, Sir Joseph Pope, the department’s first 
under-secretary, had only modest ambitions for his new ministry. Under 
Pope and the two Conservative prime ministers he served, Robert Borden 
and Arthur Meighen, the department operated as a colonial “post office” 
and an archive for state papers. When they wanted advice, Borden and 
Meighen turned, not to Pope or his small staff, but to Loring Christie, who 
became the department’s first legal advisor in 1913. With Christie’s help, 
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Borden and Meighen led Canada through the First World War and into 
the new League of Nations, seeking Canada’s advantage in new forms of 
unity within the British connection.8
Meighen’s Liberal successor, Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King, 
had different objectives. Elected in 1921, King was haunted by the mem-
ory of the Conscription Crisis of 1917 and convinced that the preservation 
of Canadian unity was the country’s principal national interest. He was 
suspicious of imperial entanglements that might limit Canada’s freedom to 
manoeuvre and tear at its national unity. Determined to wrest greater free-
dom from London, he recruited the dean of arts at Queen’s University in 
Kingston, O.D. Skelton, to help. Like King, Skelton, as historian Norman 
Hillmer argues in our opening chapter, was sure of the national interest, 
and he set out in the mid-1920s to build a foreign ministry that was both an 
“instrument and expression of Canadian interests.” This meant a depart-
ment that reflected Canada’s bicultural heritage, a theme that reverberates 
through several chapters, and a ministry that provided for distinctive rep-
resentation abroad. Most important, placing “Canada first” meant policies 
that severed its imperial ties with Britain and embraced Canada’s destiny 
as a North American nation.
Canada during the interwar period was a post-colonial state of uncer-
tain identities and fluid loyalties, where the national interest was especially 
tough to define. However compelling in theory, the case for embracing 
Canada’s North American destiny was studded with doubts. The point is 
made forcefully in Galen Perras’s chapter on bilateral defence cooperation 
in the 1930s. American uncertainty about Canada’s very nature and Wash-
ington’s maladroit diplomacy reinforced concerns on both sides of the bor-
der about the value of closer bilateral cooperation. These factors and the 
strong, emotional attachment felt by many Canadians to Britain and its 
imperial values rendered progress along “the American road” slower and 
more uncertain than its supporters might have liked. Seemingly so clear in 
Skelton’s mind and in the department he built in his image, the national 
interest proved indeed, in Hillmer’s phrase, “a slippery beast.”
This ought not to be surprising, and several of the chapters in this col-
lection underline the close but complicated, even treacherous, relationship 
between popular opinion and the national interest. This is especially true 
of the chapter by Heather Metcalfe, who is preoccupied with questions of 
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public opinion and national identity. Armed with the kind of toolkit found 
among cultural historians, she links the national interest with “national” 
identity, a truth that Skelton and many of his younger colleagues in Exter-
nal Affairs intuitively understood. As Metcalfe points out, however, there 
were profound structural barriers to understanding popular opinion and 
knowing how to harness it in prewar Canada, barriers which often left 
elites and intellectuals frustrated by their inability either to understand or 
influence popular sentiment.
The outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 changed 
both the parameters of the debate over Canada’s national interests and 
the department’s role in that discussion. The war swept away the inward-
looking “little Canada” of the pre-war era, replacing it with a more mature 
and united nation that was inclined to define its national interests in more 
international terms. As Lester B. Pearson, who played a vital role in that 
transformation as both civil servant and politician, later recalled, “passive 
isolation and disinterest” gave way to “active participation and commit-
ment.”9
The war also transformed the Department of External Affairs and its 
policy-making capacity. Forced to embrace new allies, to seek markets in 
unfamiliar corners of the world, and to build a system for postwar global 
governance, the department’s reach was suddenly global. By 1946, Can-
ada had 26 missions abroad, up from 7 in 1939; by 1956, the total had 
reached 64.10 At home, the department took on new responsibilities, for 
instance, overseeing trade in strategic goods and intelligence gathering. 
With Skelton’s death in 1941, the way was clear to re-organize the depart-
ment and bring younger and bolder leaders to the top. In 1946, the depart-
ment regained its own minister for the first time since 1912 when Louis 
St. Laurent became secretary of state for external affairs, before becoming 
prime minister in 1948. Serving under him was Pearson, first as under-
secretary and then as secretary of state for external affairs. Both men, and 
the diplomats they managed, were committed to responsible and active 
internationalism.
Striking the right balance between obvious national interests, for in-
stance, Cold War defence or arctic sovereignty, and broader international 
interests and values was rarely easy. Jack Granatstein, who gave the con-
ference’s keynote address, makes this point in his chapter by contrasting 
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Skelton’s focus on advancing ties with the United States with the quixotic 
campaign of his successor, Norman Robertson, for nuclear disarmament 
in the late 1950s. For Granatstein, Robertson had succumbed to the trad-
itional Canadian temptation to play to the house, to be a scolding “moral-
ist.”
Historian Adam Chapnick sounds a similarly cautionary note in his 
chapter on Canada and the United Nations. In the immediate postwar 
period, Chapnick argues, the success and viability of the new international 
organization represented a genuine Canadian interest. Realists and func-
tionalists, almost to a man, Canada’s diplomats exerted an influence pro-
portionate to Canada’s middle-power status. Their diplomacy was profes-
sional, cautious, and moderate, and aimed at small measures designed to 
enhance United Nations operations or administrative efficiencies. Like 
Granatstein’s wayward under-secretary, however, Chapnick’s diplomats 
and politicians were seduced by global acclaim and domestic enthusiasms 
into betraying the conservative principles of the 1940s and early 1950s. A 
decade later, prime ministers John Diefenbaker and Mike Pearson em-
braced the United Nations for its peaceable values and the scope it provided 
for Canada to build East-West and North-South coalitions, forgetting that 
the national interest lay elsewhere.
Other assessments of the department’s capacity to reconcile and bal-
ance competing national interests, a hallmark of Canada’s foreign policy 
since 1945, are more forgiving. In chapter 6, Arctic scholars Whitney 
Lackenbauer and Peter Kirkett combine new archival evidence with an 
extensive reading of the existing literature to probe the department’s role 
in shaping policies that reconciled Canadian claims to sovereignty across 
the Arctic with the country’s close Cold War defence relationship with 
the United States. Like several contributors, Lackenbauer and Kirkett are 
impressed with the professional quality of the postwar department, which 
successfully managed this task by devising policies and tactics to handle 
Washington that were “civil, respectful, and mutually beneficial.”
Chapters by Robin Gendron and Michael Hart explore different post-
war interests, national unity and economic prosperity respectively, and 
endorse this sensible assessment about the capacity of the department to 
identify and manage these interests. Gendron echoes Metcalfe’s observa-
tions on the complex connections between public opinion and definitions 
Greg Donaghy and Michael K. Carroll6
of the national interest. Shifting popular sentiment and expectations in 
Quebec thrust national unity to the top of the foreign policy agenda in the 
early 1960s. More important, this chapter traces the fierce debate between 
the department’s two leading French-Canadians, Jules Léger and Marcel 
Cadieux, over how to respond to that new priority. Their dialogue and the 
policy compromises made along the way remind us that defining the na-
tional interest is rarely a zero-sum game.
Carleton University trade analyst Michael Hart, the only contribu-
tor to bridge the divide between scholar and practitioner, makes a similar 
point in his chapter on the department’s role in shaping Canadian trade 
policy from 1945 to 1982. Like Granatstein and Chapnick, Hart is a frank 
realist; but in his economic world, there has been no great betrayal and 
“interests trump ideals.” Admittedly, the triumph of a liberal, free trade 
order was not quick or smooth. In his long sweeping view of Canadian 
trade policy, Hart explores the competition between specific and general 
interests, wryly concluding that “the conjunction between good policy and 
good politics often proved narrow, difficult to find, and hard to imple-
ment.” Staking out and defending that middle ground is the policy-maker’s 
role, one that the department excelled in from the 1930s to the 1980s. Even 
the 1982 amalgamation of the Department of External Affairs with the 
Trade Commissioner Service and the trade policy units of the Department 
of Industry, Trade and Commerce to create what became the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade did not diminish its contribu-
tion. Foreign and trade policy, Hart concludes, were reconciled through 
“incremental, pragmatic, and cautious” policy adjustments.
For Liberal prime minister Pierre Trudeau, elected in the spring of 
1968, pragmatism and caution were part of the problem. The prime min-
ister doubted both the value of diplomacy and the dull, grey men at Ex-
ternal Affairs, who seemed incapable of responding to Canada’s declining 
international status as postwar recovery in Europe and Japan and the new 
post-colonial powers of Asia and Africa crowded the global stage. Sceptical 
of the country’s recent internationalism and a foreign policy dominated 
by a network of U.S.-led Cold War alliances, Trudeau wanted a foreign 
policy that was more modest and more closely tied to the national interest. 
To get it, he opened up the policy-making process and erected a complex 
set of cabinet and interdepartmental committees that shifted the burden 
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of defining the national interest from the foreign service bureaucracy to 
the politicians.11 The balance of this collection explores how the altered 
policy-making environment has changed the department’s contribution to 
the debate over the national interest.
Tammy Nemeth’s chapter on energy policy constitutes a detailed case 
study of how the Trudeau government defined the national interest and 
pursued it in one vital sector of the Canadian economy. In Nemeth’s view, 
Trudeau’s new policy-making mechanisms shifted control over foreign 
policy towards domestic departments and central Canadian politicians, 
who favoured Ontario and Quebec. He neutered the country’s foreign 
policy specialists, rejected their sound advice, and pursued nationalist poli-
cies that undermined the country’s interests.
And the shift seems permanent. This, at least, is one of the principal 
conclusions reflected in Nelson Michaud’s chapter on the foreign policy-
making role of Canadian prime ministers since Brian Mulroney. Michaud 
insists that the prime minister’s hold on the foreign policy agenda and no-
tions of the national interest is increasingly absolute and irreversible.
But gaps persist. The prime-ministerial agenda is often crowded and 
his attention span short. Stephen Randall’s chapter on Canada± United 
States relations offers a more nuanced view of the department’s continuing 
relevance in shaping the national interest. Like Skelton’s ministry in the 
1920s and 1930s, the contemporary department, with its integrated foreign 
and trade policy functions, provides the institutional base for defining and 
pursuing the country’s North American interests. Surprised by the extent 
to which the country’s key relationship with the United States, of para-
mount importance to Canada on so many levels, has been mismanaged 
or ignored, Randall contends that influential Canadian diplomats, not 
presidents or prime ministers, have provided an essential bureaucratic con-
tinuity. The national interest in things American remains a departmental 
preoccupation.
Indeed, our final contributor might go even further in asserting the 
vital importance of a strong foreign and trade ministry. Political scientist 
Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon contends that the turn of the new millennium 
has seen a democratization of the foreign policy process. Canada’s involve-
ment in the Beijing Women’s Conference demonstrates a broadening of 
the national interest, which directly involves new players of a decidedly 
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domestic orientation. While working at a “specialist” level during much of 
the Beijing Conference, Foreign Affairs and International Trade also acted 
as a “generalist” department, managing the bargains and compromises ne-
cessary to secure “the best overall negotiating text.” Riddell-Dixon’s con-
tribution underlines a fact often overlooked in the debate over the national 
interest in Canadian foreign policy: our condition is compromised and im-
pure, and seeking Canada’s best possible advantage is an imperfect process.
Today’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has 
clearly come a long way from its origins, with operations in 175 coun-
tries, a personnel allotment totalling over 13,000 full-time equivalents, 
and an annual budget of $2.513 billion.12 Foreign policy itself has spilled 
far beyond the narrow borders that defined it a century ago and embraces 
a vast agenda. Policy-making too has become a messier and more complex 
business. Amidst these enormous changes, as the papers in this collection 
make clear, the contemporary department still shares the concern with the 
national interest that excited its earlier self. Strip away the lofty idealism of 
Borden’s imperialism or the soaring rhetoric of St. Laurent’s internation-
alism and underneath stands revealed the enduring preoccupation with 
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The national interest is a slippery beast ±  frequently invoked, seldom de-
fined, adjustable to shifts of circumstance and differences of perspective.1
Yet O.D. Skelton was confident that he knew precisely what Canada’s in-
terests in foreign policy were, and just as sure that the service of those inter-
ests must underpin the state’s conduct. Skelton’s three-decade-long crusade 
for independence from Britain, first as a professor and then as a public 
servant, was linked to his conviction that Canada’s international policies 
could only be right if they were based on a fully autonomous and objective 
stock-taking of “the real interests of one’s own country.”2 When he was 
named the permanent head of the Department of External Affairs half 
way through the 1920s, Skelton embraced the opportunity, turning his ef-
forts to the building of an institution of independence capable of projecting 
national interests out into the world. The results were mixed.
Oscar Skelton wrote the prologue to his service in External Affairs in 
January 1922, with a much-publicized address to the Canadian Club in 
Ottawa.3 Six weeks earlier, a federal election had brought W. L. Mack-
enzie King’s Liberals to power; the prime minister was in the audience, 
along with other members of the government.4 As he unwrapped his argu-
ment, the Queen’s University professor insisted that the country’s national 
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interests resided in Canada and nearby, not in a revived and highly central-
ized British Empire run by and for the British alone. Canada ±  liberal, 
flexible, constantly evolving, like the empire when it was at its best ±  had 
been inching towards the ultimate goal of unfettered self-government for 
decades. As a first principle, Skelton declared, Canadians must maintain 
the steady trajectory to freedom. It would not be easy. He warned that Brit-
ain’s leaders, alive to the fragility of their empire, were intent on drawing 
Canada into the imperialist web. Furthermore, they had the power to do 
so, abetted by Anglo-Canadians whose loyalties were divided between the 
Mother Country and Canada, or belonged entirely to Britain. The Brit-
ish would have that clout as long as the Canadian condition fell short of 
independence.
Sovereignty was Skelton’s precondition of the capacity to act in the na-
tional interest. More than that, it was an interest in itself, the supreme in-
terest that made the successful mobilization of all other interests possible. 
Skelton did not often explicitly invoke the notion of national independence 
because that remained highly controversial in the Canada of the 1920s. 
“Autonomy” was the term of choice, the safe middle ground preferred by 
contemporaries, shuttling Canada between liberty of movement and the 
comfort of the British connection, as the occasion demanded. Independ-
ence, however, was what Skelton wanted and thought necessary.
Proceeding from self-determination, Skelton put the emphasis on the 
core responsibilities of all national governments: to ensure security and sta-
bility, and to establish the conditions for prosperity. These were interests 
shared by the foreign and domestic realms of government activity, rightly 
he thought, since they were inseparable from one another as aspects of 
policy. What was foreign policy, he asked his Canadian Club listeners, but 
“simply an extension of domestic policy,”5 an argument that allowed him 
to make the case for as much control of external affairs as Canadians had 
painstakingly established in their internal affairs.
Next in the inventory of interests came the working out of relation-
ships, problems, and modalities on the North American continent. The 
foreign affairs of every country, Skelton told the Canadian Club, took 
place mainly at the fence lines that separated it from its neighbours, and 
largely arose from everyday matters of trade and economics. This assertion 
served two of Skelton’s purposes. First, it gave prominence to his belief 
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that in foreign policy geography was destiny. The United States could not 
be ignored as a factor in Canada’s future: North America was where, he 
had believed since he was a young man, the country’s “lasting community 
of interest” was situated.6 Second, Skelton’s North Americanism diverted 
attention from Canada’s deeply entrenched British connection. By stipulat-
ing that foreign policy ought to concentrate on the United States, he was 
divorcing Canada’s prime national interests from Britain’s. Unlike King 
and so many other Canadians of the time, Skelton thought that the strict 
separation of Canadian interests from British interests was possible and, if 
Canada was to seize control of its future, imperative.
Last, and deliberately last in the Canadian Club catalogue of interests, 
Canada’s connection to the world beyond North America had to be ac-
counted for and attended to, although its responsibilities in that direction 
had to be kept limited for the time being. Co-operation with Britain was 
not out of the question, but it should take place only on the basis that the 
two countries were distinct entities and when it could be demonstrated 
that interests were held in common. Nevertheless, Skelton maintained, the 
country was “in the world and must be of it.”7 At bottom, he was convinced 
that in the long run the way ahead for the national interest lay in measured 
engagement with the international community. For now, though, Can-
adians had to find their own way to maturity, coherence, and freedom.
In the folklore of Canadian foreign policy, a straight line is drawn be-
tween the Canadian Club speech and Skelton’s appointment three years 
later as under-secretary of state for external affairs. The staying power of 
this account of events is understandable enough. “Skelton’s address would 
make an excellent foundation for Canadian policy on External Affairs,” 
King wrote in his diary after hearing the talk, “and Skelton himself would 
make an excellent man for that department.” He “certainly has the know-
ledge & the right point of view.”8 Years later, Skelton’s wife Isabel scribbled 
in her scrapbook beside an account of the speech that it was this occasion 
“which really brought Oscar to Ottawa.”9
But Skelton’s ambition had a much longer pedigree. He had been on 
the road to the Department of External Affairs since its inception in 1909, 
when he told a colleague that he coveted the position of under-secretary 
±  the departmental chief, or deputy minister, in today’s terminology.10 He 
had been a close observer of every important political event of the last 
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generation, and an active participant in many of them. He was a leading 
Liberal nationalist voice on external policy, a frequent commentator in the 
press, and an advocate on the public platform. He had courted King, and 
advised him informally, from the moment he became leader of the Liberal 
party in 1919. He was anything but an unknown quantity. His transition 
from Queen’s to External Affairs was natural, and many years in the mak-
ing, even though it was difficult to leave the university that he loved.
At the Canadian Club, Skelton folded the Department of External 
Affairs into his contention that Canadians already had the basic outlines 
of the machinery to deal with the world outside. The department, he said, 
had not progressed very far in its development, but “so far as it has gone it 
has been very effective in its personnel.”11 That was without doubt a refer-
ence to Loring Christie, who had for a decade been the department’s legal 
advisor and the government’s chief external affairs analyst. After Christie, 
however, External Affairs had only Sir Joseph Pope, the dignified under-
secretary, who had held the post since 1909 and was considerably past his 
prime, and a tiny headquarters staff of thirty-three, more than half of 
whom dealt with passports.12
Christie was soon on his way out, he and Prime Minister King proving 
incompatible, personally and professionally.13 When Skelton was enlisted 
as an advisor to King and the Canadian delegation for the Imperial Con-
ference of 1923, the professor found in the Department of External Affairs 
(and in the public service) competence and goodwill but not initiative or 
breadth. Of Pope he wrote in his diary: “perfect Civil Servant, polished, 
… prepared to subordinate own views to those of temporary political chief, 
not now very vigorous & not at all in touch with intimate affairs of office 
which are in hands of the P.M.”14 So Skelton did all the conference prep-
arations himself, which was his inclination anyway, a fundamental flaw 
in his makeup that had a considerable impact on his effectiveness as an 
administrator.
King still had to squeeze Pope out, gently, and to convince Skelton to 
leave Queen’s. This took until April 1925. As soon as he was installed as 
under-secretary, Skelton set course for an independent (and independence) 
minded External Affairs that could act as the instrument and expression 
of Canadian interests as he interpreted them. He was aware of the meagre 
resources at his disposal, but he set high standards for the first recruit to his 
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staff, requiring (the terms of reference read) “a law degree or membership 
in a provincial bar association, two years of post-graduate studies in inter-
national affairs, practical experience in legal work, and a good knowledge 
of both English and French.”15 Jean Désy, a law professor at the Université 
de Montréal, was the one candidate who met the requirements, and he was 
immediately brought into the department. Skelton then acquiesced in the 
hiring of three officers, without a competition, to staff the new Canadian 
legation in the United States. One of them was the well-connected Hume 
Wrong, the grandson of former Liberal national leader Edward Blake. 
Wrong was supremely qualified, but he had been given his position: he 
had not won it after being tested against his peers. For Skelton, the ar-
rangement was acceptable as an expedient, in order to get the Washington 
mission running at a high level of efficiency as quickly as possible. The 
under-secretary was determined to have a different sort of department, a 
meritocracy.
Skelton modelled the department on the British Foreign Office, with 
young professionals recruited by a competitive process and promoted be-
cause of their achievements, not their connections. Comprehensive com-
petitive examinations for entry into the department began in 1927. The 
aim, said the under-secretary, was to locate people “of all-round ability, 
capable of performing in widely different assignments at short notice, rath-
er than a highly skilled specialist.”16 Candidates were required to have a 
university degree or the equivalent, with training in the law, history, polit-
ical science, or economics particularly favoured, and to possess the sterling 
characteristics of “undoubted integrity; tact; astuteness; keen perception; 
good judgment; and good address.”17 The first hurdle, a written exam, had 
four sections: a general essay designed to extract the applicant’s view of 
imperial relations, questions on Canada’s role in international affairs, a seg-
ment devoted to candidates’ area of academic expertise, and a précis. Skel-
ton set the papers, marked the results, and usually chaired the board that 
administered an interview to those who got at least 70 per cent overall on 
the exam and a pass in each of the four parts. Under the law, he had to give 
war veterans preference, but he refused to do so until they had satisfied him 
in the written examination.18
Skelton was disappointed by the response to his first competition, 
which yielded few applicants and only two who met the standard: J. Scott 
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Macdonald and E. D’Arcy McGreer. The under-secretary redoubled his 
efforts the next year in 1928, advertising nation-wide, approaching uni-
versities in search of candidates, and obtaining permission to hold exams 
outside the country in order to entice graduate students living abroad. 
This time there were sixty candidates, six of whom were successful: L. 
B. Pearson, Norman Robertson, H. L. Keenleyside, Kenneth Kirkwood, 
Paul-Emile Renaud, and Keith Crowther.19 Pearson and Robertson, future 
under-secretaries of the Department of External Affairs, were encouraged 
to apply by Skelton personally. Robertson he had known since they had 
sailed across the Atlantic together in 1923, when the Rhodes Scholar on 
his way to Oxford had taken a violent dislike to Skelton, who was ill at ease 
with people he did not know, but they had a more relaxed encounter during 
the summer of 1927.20 Skelton discovered Pearson, a colleague of Hume 
Wrong’s in the history department at the University of Toronto, at a dinner 
in Ottawa after the Imperial Conference of 1926. In subsequent corres-
pondence, Pearson learned of the under-secretary’s plans for a foreign ser-
vice governed by ability, where the genial young man, nicknamed “Mike,” 
was assured that he could reasonably look forward “to occupying the high-
est diplomatic posts without private income or political influence.”21
Skelton was surrounding himself with his own kind. Five of the six 
1928 recruits had graduate degrees from institutions outside Canada and 
had taught university courses; two, Keenleyside and Renaud, had doctor-
ates. This pattern persisted: a substantial proportion of the staff that Skel-
ton selected during his years as under-secretary came from teaching, and 
a large number of his choices had post-graduate training. He sometimes 
contradicted the merit principle, naming officers to positions by order-
in-council if some specific or urgent need arose, but that too reinforced 
the strong ties with the university world that were developing out of the 
examination system. In 1929, he chose John E. Read, the dean of law at 
Dalhousie University, as departmental legal adviser, putting through the 
appointment without advertising the position.22
In his employees, the under-secretary looked to Canada’s bicultural 
character, if imperfectly. Although he made nothing of it at his Canadian 
Club speech, perhaps because he was pitching his message mainly to the 
likeminded King, Skelton regarded French-English harmony, and the so-
cial cohesion that was meant to flow from it, as a fundamental national 
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interest. Following from his argument that domestic interests and inter-
national interests were intertwined, and reinforced by his belief that the 
French fact was an indispensable part of the Canadian story, his sermons 
on the importance of national unity were a staple of his speeches and writ-
ings on foreign policy. Bilingualism was not a requirement for entry into 
External Affairs, but Skelton encouraged French representation in the de-
partment and, by 1930, 30 per cent of his officers were francophones. Even 
so, the Montreal intellectual newspaper Le Devoir (among others) ques-
tioned why there were “si peu des notres dans cette carrière nouvelle” and 
wondered about the “perspectives d’avancement” for the few there were.23
French might be the language of diplomacy, but English was the lan-
guage of Skelton’s External Affairs. He could speak a rough French, but 
despite his clear regard for Jean Désy and other francophones, Skelton 
never seems to have communicated with his francophone officers in their 
own language or to have taken concrete steps to promote the use of French 
in the department, beyond beefing up translation services as business in-
creased. Below the level of under-secretary, there was evidence in the late 
1920s of what one British official called “bitterness and jockeying” between 
French and English officers24 and already the tendency on the part of both 
language groups to see francophones as most useful and happiest in posts 
abroad. Out of sight, however, was out of mind, and continual service away 
from headquarters was apt to marginalize young diplomats and impair op-
portunities for promotion.25
Only men could apply to become foreign service officers, and that 
remained the practice throughout Skelton’s time at External Affairs. He 
valued women, however, and a triumvirate of them ruled over the deputy’s 
central office in the East Block of the Parliament buildings. Each had an 
importance belied by her title. Skelton’s secretary, Marjorie McKenzie, was 
at the heart of everything, controlling access and the flow of information 
to the under-secretary, watching over his confidential records and drafting 
materials for his signature. She was competent in French, German, and 
Spanish, and in 1930 demonstrated her ability and determination when 
she insisted on taking the foreign service officer exam, even though she was 
not eligible for appointment. She tied for first place in a tough competition. 
Accountant Agnes McCloskey, energetic and often acerbic, was in effect 
the department’s chief administrative officer; she scrutinized the finances 
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and enforced regulations in a manner many found autocratic and inflexible. 
Hugh Keenleyside recalled in his memoirs that Skelton “was alternately 
amused, grateful, or impressed, and he trusted her, although not neces-
sarily her judgement, completely.”26 Grace Hart, a graduate of Queen’s and 
McGill hired in 1928 to organize the library, completed the group of indis-
pensable women. Although she and her little empire had a chaotic appear-
ance, they gave the department the professional research function Skelton 
realized was a vital component of an independent foreign office.27
The powerful McKenzie and McCloskey sat in Skelton’s inner office, 
only a few feet from the under-secretary. The junior foreign service officers 
were exiled to the attic of the East Block, where they walked the corridors 
in darkness and fought for space with the bats.28 When Mike Pearson won 
the first secretary competition in 1928, at a salary of $3,450 (a modest raise 
over his university salary), he rushed to Ottawa in response to a message 
to start work immediately, only to find there was nothing much to do. 
His initial job was to prepare routine background for a League of Nations 
conference on the causes of death, followed by requests for a list of British 
Empire treaties affecting Canada and materials relating to lighthouses in 
the Red Sea, international tariffs on cement, and the protection of women 
artists living abroad.29 Pearson’s companion in a cramped and depressing 
room under the eaves was Keenleyside, assigned in the beginning to re-
organizing and filing documents, a task for which he was discovered to 
have some flair. Their typing was done by an inefficient but kindly secretary 
on a crank-handled machine, which Keenleyside recalled was “even older 
than herself.”30
Paradoxically, having shaping his department around highly trained 
minds with the capacity for independent thought and action, Skelton 
showed no inclination to employ them systematically. External had the 
unrushed, ramshackle air of a university campus, and it was growing with-
out any clear organizational direction. Skelton was no administrator, and 
he was certainly no sharer of responsibility. He ran the department as a 
benign dictator sensitive to others but intent on having his own way. He 
understood his shortcomings as a manager and administrator, and the way 
office routine was absorbing so much of “my nights & days.”31 Yet he was 
too busy and preoccupied to stick to the rough parcelling out of duties that 
he knew was in the best interests of efficiency, and his “young men,” as they 
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were called, were given work that overlapped and went far beyond their 
areas of assignment. All were directly accountable to the under-secretary, 
who reviewed every scrap of paper written in the department and every 
communication that entered or went out of headquarters.32 The prime min-
ister might interview top candidates during the recruiting process, but he 
was only dimly aware of them after they were hired. Every memorandum 
or recommendation he saw came from Skelton.33 The department was Skel-
ton, and he wanted it that way, whether he would have admitted it or not.
His employees complained about Skelton’s weak commitment to 
matters of administration and delegation. They found him tightlipped 
and tightfisted, retiring and even distant. Only Keenleyside of the early 
recruits believed that they became friends, and he was almost certainly 
wrong about that.34 Most of them, with Wrong as a notable exception, 
revered “Dr. Skelton” for his command of language and international af-
fairs, for his immense political influence, for his unselfishness and high 
principle.35 They shared his rock-solid nationalism ±  the examinations and 
interviews were designed to show that ±  and his disdain for the showiness 
and hierarchy of high diplomacy. He gently improved their drafts, suffered 
their practical jokes without complaint, and tolerated a diversity of views 
on social, economic, and political questions.36 Everyone was treated equally 
and with respect, whatever their rank.37 When Keenleyside had been in the 
department for only a few days, Skelton arranged travel to Vancouver on 
business so that the new man could help with his family’s move to Ottawa. 
A short time later, the under-secretary took Keenleyside to a Canadian±
American smuggling conference, keeping him carefully under control but 
offering an early taste of raw diplomacy. It was Keenleyside’s first intimate 
glimpse of Skelton ±  quiet and diffident, but also astute, easy to under-
estimate, and far harder on the Americans than his reputation suggested. 
He was “at least as strongly opposed to the neo-imperialism of Washington 
as he was to the remnants of colonialism in London.”38
The growth of the department in Ottawa was paralleled by the be-
ginnings of a foreign service abroad. In 1927 Vincent Massey took up his 
post as Canada’s minister in the United States, the first diplomatic repre-
sentative in a foreign country. There was trouble between him and Skelton 
from the beginning, generated in some part by their differing attitudes 
about what diplomacy meant and was meant to achieve. Massey wanted to 
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purchase a luxuriously furnished Washington mansion at 1746 Massachu-
setts Avenue, with a price tag of $500,000, to serve both as a residence and 
chancery. Skelton opposed the idea as extravagant and politically risky, in-
stead suggesting that the patrician Masseys live in and work out of a hotel 
until something suitable was found.39
Skelton acknowledged that diplomatic prestige demanded a good 
front, especially for a new player on the international scene. Some of the 
expenditure could be justified on the grounds of national advertising and, 
just as banks tried to do with their palatial quarters, providing assurances 
of stability. Long-established traditions and standards could not easily be 
set aside. Diplomats were dined and wined, “and must retaliate in kind.” 
But discreetly: Canadians in Washington ought to keep in mind that their 
national interests in the United States were limited and specific, and so 
was their target audience. Their aim had to be squarely at influential pol-
iticians in Washington, not the American public at large and certainly not 
foreigners. As to contacts with the diplomats of other countries, Skelton 
sniffed: “Our jobs in Washington are our own and call for little of that 
daily hobnobbing with other legations which is inevitable in European 
capitals where everyone is playing the same game ±  how to tilt the balance 
of power a little more his own way ±  and is interested in every move and 
intrigue of every other representative.”40
With King’s help, Massey got his mansion. That did not change Skel-
ton’s view that the purchase had handed ammunition to the many domes-
tic critics of representation in foreign capitals and seriously prejudiced the 
Washington experiment “in the eyes of a great part of the country.”41 Skel-
ton and Massey then extended their battle over resources to expenses for 
the Washington legation staff, causing the under-secretary to apologize 
for a fit of temper over the telephone: “I have been brought up in a thrifty 
school and sky high estimates of living needs irritate me.”42 Skelton said 
that he was open to convincing, and he was soon proposing salary increases 
for Canadian diplomats. Miserly wages meant that only wealthy men could 
take on such work. “That unduly restricts the choice of men and involves 
serious political dangers. The state should foot its own bills … : it should 
provide as much for a rich man as for a poor man.”43 Massey, a very rich 
man himself, probably would have seen those words as part of the war 
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against him, although he too believed that diplomats with fewer advan-
tages than his own ought to get jobs at the top, even if only a few of them.44
Skelton loathed pomp. Massey adored it. When Skelton told Massey 
that his American counterpart, William Phillips, was about to be wel-
comed to Ottawa as minister “quite informally,” Massey protested to the 
prime minister, after tattling to the United States State Department, that 
it would be “distinctly unfortunate” if the reception was any less grand or 
dignified than the one he had been given in Washington.45 Skelton re-
sponded angrily, reminding Massey that the suggestion had come from 
the governor general, not the Department of External Affairs, and that, 
even if the State Department was unwilling to trust Ottawa to do right by 
Phillips, the under-secretary might have hoped that Massey would take it 
for granted. As for the Americans, “personally I wish more of their time 
might be given to such questions of diplomatic procedure as remembering 
that His Majesty’s Government in Canada is not a branch of His Majesty’s 
Government in Great Britain.”46
Skelton and Massey also clashed on the giving of British honours and 
titles, which the King government had discontinued, and on the wear-
ing of diplomatic uniforms. His tone laced with sarcasm, Skelton asked 
the minister in Washington what ought to be done about the question of 
formal dress for Canada’s fledgling diplomatic service: “Do you think we 
should seek some sartorial genius to devise a new one, or vary the British 
with some distinctive Canadian feature? Or should we try the frock coat of 
the American gentleman, or the overalls of modern democracy?”47 Massey 
replied that British diplomatic uniforms could be easily adapted with some 
maple leaves and Canadian buttons.48 Skelton’s own preference was clear. 
He favoured the overalls.49 Skelton had contempt for Massey’s aristocratic 
pretensions and condescension, and his anglophilia made it worse. The 
under-secretary’s project was a democratic, independent, modern country, 
alive to its own separate interests and determined to step away from Brit-
ain’s influences, the very antithesis of the Canada for which he imagined 
Massey stood.
The establishment of the legation at Washington was followed by an 
announcement early in 1928 that Paris and Tokyo would be next.50 Action 
in this field was part of Skelton’s grand but gradualist scheme of national 
independence, which he characterized as the natural outgrowth of evolving 
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self-government. As the country grew in population, industrial develop-
ment, and foreign trade, and as the progress of science increased contact 
with the world outside, the national interest demanded that Canadians 
begin to make provision for their distinct requirements abroad. Represen-
tation in three major capital cities was only a start, but it was important in 
both symbolic and real terms, setting the seal on Canada’s international 
standing and allowing important work to be done on the spot. To those, 
notably in the Conservative party, who predicted that Canadian diplomats 
running amok in foreign capitals would damage the British and their em-
pire, Skelton replied that disintegration had been prophesied at every step 
forward since responsible government had been achieved in the nineteenth 
century. The British Empire, in one of his favourite phrases, was “still do-
ing business.”51
For public consumption, Skelton put an elegant geographical gloss on 
the decision to locate legations in the United States, France, and Japan. 
Canada’s position was “that of the centre of a sort of world amphitheatre, 
surrounded as we are, on three sides, by these great powers, our frontiers 
are completely exposed of necessity. In friendship and good-will … lies 
our security.” Each of those states, moreover, had a significant relationship 
with the United Kingdom. It was Canada’s role to foster goodwill between 
the British Empire and the three big powers where the country would have 
a resident diplomat.52
Skelton’s real motives were elsewhere. He saw the diplomacy of a new 
nation in more concrete and down-to-earth terms ±  the interests of the 
everyday, the commonplace. At the Canadian Club, tying North America 
to his conception of the national interest, he had given precise Canada±
United States examples of interaction, drawn from the nitty gritty of trade, 
fuel, fish, and shared waterways, all to make the point that foreign policy 
was usually about the relatively small things, that they were concentrated 
in the economic sphere, and that most of them took place close to home.53
After the Washington legation’s first year of operation, Skelton noted that 
it had helped him deal with specific problems, including immigration, 
radio broadcasting, aviation, smuggling, extradition, and fisheries, as well 
as the more general protection of the interests of Canadian citizens in mat-
ters ranging from business enquiries to claims against the United States 
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government. Based on the Washington experience, the $80,000 additional 
cost of the Paris and Tokyo legations was bound to be a good investment.54
Paris needed little justification in terms of the national interest. The 
decision to mount a legation there spoke to Canada’s substantial French 
population and the country’s economic concerns. France, Skelton said, was 
the other of “our Mother Countries,” and there was an already existing 
foundation for representation in the commissioner general of Canada’s of-
fice, which had been in the French capital in one form or another since 
1882. The French capital could also function as a European base for trade 
promotion and a convenient headquarters for participation in various inter-
national conferences.55
In justifying the establishment of a mission in Japan, Skelton again 
concentrated on the practical interests of an independent diplomacy, where 
internal Canadian forces met external opportunities. He pointed out to 
the prime minister, and asked him to point out to the critics of the Tokyo 
choice, that the Pacific was on the rise as an area of “increasing and decisive 
importance” in world development and that the commercial possibilities 
were great. Moreover, a legation in Tokyo would help, as Skelton deli-
cately put it, in the “constructive regulation” of the immigration question 
that had been dividing the two countries for years. This was a conten-
tious political issue, particularly in British Columbia, where there was a 
longstanding demand for a “white Canada” policy and a complete ban on 
Japanese immigrants to Canada. Skelton had more liberal views than some 
of his colleagues in the public service, many of whom were out-and-out 
exclusionists, but he was a realist. As an essential part of the exchange 
of diplomatic representatives, he was a tough negotiator of an agreement 
with the Japanese government limiting immigration from that country on 
a mutually agreeable basis.56
The strengthening of the Department of External Affairs and the 
establishment of missions abroad fit precisely with Skelton’s understand-
ing of the national interest, beginning with state autonomy and moving 
through Canadian unity, security, and economic progress to North Amer-
ican solidarity and, when feasible and necessary, international cooperation. 
Each of these interests was promoted and advanced by representation in 
foreign capitals, in the United States particularly, and by a foreign office 
in Ottawa that was run by Canadians for Canadians. At the core of it all, 
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Skelton believed, must be people and policies that were “stoutly Canada 
First.”57 Where King wanted external relationships that Canadians could 
feel were their own, Skelton stipulated that they must be his country’s own. 
As he told the Canadian Club in 1922, “in all matters of foreign relation-
ship the stand that Canada is to take must be decided in Canada by Can-
ada’s elected representatives ±  by men responsible to the people of Can-
ada.”58
During the 1920s, Skelton pushed for expanded resources for the con-
duct of external affairs, while campaigning for the removal of every vestige 
of Canadian dependence on Britain. He had some success on both fronts, 
but Skelton’s vision of national interests tied to national independence had 
further to go than he realized. Part of the problem was of Skelton’s own 
making: utterly dominating his Department of External Affairs, he was 
unwilling to employ it to anything like its full capacity or potential. King 
meanwhile had no intention of creating more foreign missions and did not 
do so for another decade, partly on the grounds of expense but also because 
his diplomats might find trouble abroad, getting him into trouble at home. 
Nor, more fundamentally, would the prime minister take the steps that 
were needed to separate Canada once and for all from Britain and its in-
terests. When Canada eased into war alongside Britain in 1939, as if there 
was no choice, Skelton would be left wondering if his lifelong pursuit of 
national independence and the national interest had been a chimera.59
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As historians J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer argue elsewhere in 
this volume, it was abundantly clear by the 1930s that Canada’s national 
interest lay in increasingly closer defence relations with the United States. 
British political and military weakness, already apparent in the face of 
growing Japanese militarism and Nazi aggression in Europe, left Can-
ada exposed and isolated on the North American continent with only the 
United States for company. Then, as it would in 1945 and again today, 
an uncertain and fearful Washington looked north towards its vulnerable 
border as a source of danger. While Canada itself was clearly no threat, 
American policy-makers fretted that its lacklustre defence efforts made it a 
potential launching pad for an attack on the American homeland. Already, 
by 1934, President Franklin Roosevelt was anxious to establish some form 
of bilateral continental security cooperation to address this threat.
This chapter explores the readiness of Canadian diplomats to recog-
nize this changed reality and their capacity to deal with the consequences 
effectively. For O.D. Skelton, Canada’s influential under-secretary of state 
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for external affairs, continentalist connections with the United States ±  
economic, political, or military ±  initially seemed to offer Canada an op-
portunity to extract itself from the dangerous connections to the weakened 
and bankrupt British Empire that had killed 60,000 Canadians during 
the First World War. But this continentalist view was slow to triumph. 
Of course, part of the problem lay south of the border, where many of 
Roosevelt’s key foreign policy aides, worried about the president’s interest 
in Canadian security at a time when American opinion was profoundly 
isolationist, sought to block security cooperation with Canada. This was 
compounded by more important considerations north of the border. Prime 
Minister W.L. Mackenzie King showed little inclination to take a North 
American road when it came to security. Officers in the department of na-
tional defence, too often British by training and outlook, mounted a deter-
mined opposition to closer security ties with the United States. More im-
portant, Skelton and his diplomats in External Affairs too found reasons, 
thanks to American clumsiness and the vast continental power disparity, to 
suspect Washington’s motivations after 1936. As a result, Canadians were 
slow to acknowledge where their national security interests really lay in 
the 1930s, delaying genuine continental defence cooperation until German 
power threatened Britain’s, and Canada’s, very survival in 1940.
Canada had only a sporadic formal defence relationship with the 
United States before the 1930s. The two countries had cooperated briefly 
during the final years of the First World War to coordinate military plans 
and industrial cooperation. The United States and Pacific security loomed 
large again for Canadians in 1921, when Britain proposed to renew the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance over strong American, and then Canadian, ob-
jections. Formal defence relations reverberated too through the halls of 
Parliament in 1923, when the dynamic prophet of American air power, 
Brigadier General William (Billy) Mitchell, unsuccessfully floated the idea 
of a bilateral aviation alliance.1 Ottawa’s lack of official interest in building 
bilateral military connections with Washington was confirmed in 1927. 
Concerned by the volume of traffic between military authorities in Ottawa 
and British military attachés in the United States, Canada’s first minis-
ter at its new legation in Washington, Vincent Massey, insisted that Can-
adians “must stand on our own feet” and recommended posting Canadian 
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military attachés to London and Washington. “Damn nonsense,” sniffed 
the prime minister, quickly killing Massey’s sensible proposal.2
The absence of Canadian military officers in the Washington lega-
tion in the early 1930s meant that the young mission was ill-prepared to 
anticipate and handle American security concerns in the face of Japan’s 
growing aggressiveness in the Far East. Certainly, United States Army Air 
Corps (AAC) plans to conduct operations in western Canada and Alaska 
caught Canadian officials by surprise in 1934. Keen to restore its tattered 
prestige, worried about Japan’s ambitions and strength, and recalling Billy 
Mitchell’s earlier notions for a northern aviation alliance, the Air Corps 
proposed sending ten bombers to Alaska through Canada. The AAC told 
the State Department vaguely that the flight would “further” relations with 
Canada. However, the corps’ secret orders directed the flight to assess “the 
practicability of dispatching an air force to Alaska” in the event of war with 
Japan.3
Canada’s chief of the general staff, General A.G.L. McNaughton, was 
not fooled. Anxious to maintain good relations with Washington ±  he told 
Maurice Hankey, secretary of Britain’s powerful Committee on Imper-
ial Defence (CID), in December 1934 that estrangement from the United 
States only aided Canadians “opposed to cooperation with the Empire in 
time of war” ±  McNaughton feared that neither the United States nor Japan 
would respect Canada’s neutrality in a conflict. Indeed, he thought that the 
United States might even intervene militarily in British Columbia.4 Label-
ling the Alaskan flight a military reconnaissance likely to induce “similar 
requests from any other foreign power that could not well be refused,” the 
general worried that acquiescence would “make it very difficult to maintain 
our neutrality.”5
McNaughton, who was castigated as a “little Canadian” anti-imperial-
ist by some of his officers,6 enjoyed the confidence of Conservative prime 
minister R.B. Bennett. As historian Steve Harris has argued, the general 
was guided by two overarching objectives: modernizing the army so that it 
could fight again in Europe alongside British forces if needed; and making 
the military into the pre-eminent adviser on security matters to the Can-
adian government. McNaughton’s ambitions put him up against Skelton, 
whom King described as the “ablest man in the public service.”7 Skelton 
saw himself as a Canadian nationalist and believed that calls for imperial 
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solidarity “concealed a hard-headed attempt to exploit colonial loyalties 
for the benefit of Great Britain.”8 Convinced that a strong Canadian mil-
itary meant involvement in more bloody imperial wars, Skelton refused 
to allow his department to plan jointly with the Department of National 
Defence and opposed forming a Canadian defence committee that would 
bring together key departments to ponder security issues. As for relations 
with the United States, Skelton felt that Canada’s security lay “in her own 
reasonableness, the decency of her neighbour, and the steady development 
of friendly intercourse, common standards of conduct, and common points 
of view.” As an American diplomat observed in 1934, Skelton “has always 
been a friend of the United States and an advocate of more confident rela-
tions with us.”9 Skelton doubted that allowing American planes to overfly 
Canada once would imply a permanent arrangement. He challenged Mc-
Naughton’s claim that other countries might seek similar rights, pointing 
out that Washington “alone possesses territory on this continent between 
which a route through Canada is a natural one.” Still, as a sop to Mc-
Naughton ±  National Defence had asked Skelton not to mention its con-
cerns about the planned flight path to the Americans ±  Skelton asked that 
the Air Corps avoid the commercially promising Mackenzie River Valley. 
But when puzzled American Legation official Pierre de la Boal said that 
this policy was “likely to be looked upon in both countries as a measure 
prompted by military considerations quite unusual in the relationship be-
tween Canada and the United States and reminiscent of the inhibitions 
which exist in other parts of the world,”10 Skelton told Bennett that “it 
would be preferable to refuse on the ground that the route is not available 
rather than bringing in any military defence issues.” McNaughton pro-
tested that opening a route for American warplanes in a war with Japan 
involved broad issues associated with the maintenance of Canadian neu-
trality. Bennett was unconvinced. Indeed, the prime minister permitted 
the Air Corps fliers to employ the Mackenzie Valley path.11
Skelton was harder on America, as historian Norman Hillmer ob-
serves in his chapter, than his historical reputation suggests. The under-
secretary soon regretted his reasonableness when the Washington Herald 
declared that the Air Corps’s flight would test the route’s value in a war 
with Japan. Skelton feared that relations with Japan would suffer if Canada 
was seen to help Washington prepare to confront Tokyo in the Pacific and 
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he insisted that the Herald ’s claim made it impossible to permit further 
military flights to Alaska. While Skelton declined to obstruct the approved 
mission, American minister Warren Robbins correctly observed that the 
disclosure had strengthened the position of the Department of National 
Defence, which was already inclined “to view our military operations with 
some suspicion.”12
The Army Air Corps’s flight north in July 1934 drew huge crowds at 
five Canadian stops from Winnipeg to Whitehorse. The American consul 
in Edmonton proudly reported that locally based Canadian servicemen ex-
pressed pleasure “over what they regard as a symbol of identity between the 
interests of Canada and the United States in the matter of Alaskan defense.” 
Flight leader Colonel H.H. Arnold, a Mitchell acolyte and the future head 
of United States air forces in World War II, declared that an Alaskan fly-
way was feasible.13 Yet bilateral security relations languished. Carping to 
the British War Office that “the gradual establishment of a practice of dis-
patching aircraft to Alaska over Canadian territory might give rise to a 
rather awkward situation on some future occasion,” McNaughton did more 
than complain. Wanting options other than cooperation with Washing-
ton, the chief of the general staff laid plans for Defence Scheme No. 2, a 
plan to assert Canada’s neutrality forcefully in any military confrontation 
between Japan and the United States not involving Britain.14 Some in the 
Department of External Affairs also now viewed American plans more 
cynically. After the United States Navy surveyed the Aleutians in 1934 for 
bases against Japan and then announced large north Pacific naval exercises 
for 1935, an acerbic Hume Wrong ±  he had called the United States a “a 
barbarous country” in 1928 ±  warned that these plans to militarize the 
Pacific constituted “a matter of deep interest and concern to Canada.”15
Canadian worries about American plans deepened when the House 
of Representatives’ Committee on Military Affairs examined a proposal 
for an Army Air Corps base in the Great Lakes region during in-camera 
hearings in February 1935. Brigadier General C.E. Kilbourne fretted that 
it “would look as though we contemplated passing away from the century-
old principle that our Canadian border needs no defense.” But AAC officer 
Captain H.L. George countered that British warplanes could shuttle via 
Labrador to bomb American cities. General F.M. Andrews, command-
er General Headquarters Air Force, doubted that Canada would join an 
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anti-United States coalition; but if it did, American bombers flying from 
the new base could strike Toronto and Montreal. Emphasizing the import-
ance of aerial warfare’s short operational lines, Lt. Colonel J.D. Reardan 
stressed that only Canada offered such a threat. If Canada could not stop 
hostile powers from attacking the United States, Reardan concluded that 
we “would have to do so.”16 These were not marginalized opinions. The 
1933 Drum Board report, a 1934 Baker Board submission, a general head-
quarters report, and two U.S. Navy documents all had identified potential 
aerial threats coming from Canada.17 When the Government Printing Of-
fice mistakenly released the testimony in April 1935, the Washington Post 
chastised President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “hypocrisy” for advocating a 
Good Neighbor policy while his military plotted Canada’s doom. In re-
sponse, the committee’s chair, Representative J.J. McSwain, argued that 
the base was analogous to France’s Maginot Line and was designed “not 
against Belgium, but against what might come over or through Belgium.” 
He added that the limits on Great Lakes warships imposed by the Rush-
Bagot Agreement of 1817 did not apply to aircraft and that American for-
tifications lined the Canadian frontier.18 An incensed Under Secretary of 
State William Phillips assured Wrong that such “provocative references to 
Canada” were uncalled for. Roosevelt, in turn, repudiated the testimony 
and forced public apologies from McSwain and Secretary of War George 
Dern.19
The president’s “well merited rebuke” mollified critics, although Can-
adian and British newspapers were “inclined to treat the matter with a 
good deal of ridicule at the expense of the Congressional Committee and 
of our military authorities.”20 Initially amused by the public fumblings in 
Washington, Skelton told Boal on 2 May that he would not have objected 
had the project proceeded quietly. On further reflection, however, the Can-
adian official concluded that Congress had camouflaged the facility’s loca-
tion and purpose by describing it as an intermediate flight station. Skelton, 
making clear that the revelations could affect Canada’s attitude towards a 
United States± Japan conflict, now believed that the Air Corps had delib-
erately forced Canada’s hand in 1934. To ensure that Air Corps overflights 
should not become a matter of course, the under-secretary demanded that 
American planes adopt flight paths that minimized Canadian geographic 
and political exposure.21 Skelton’s considered statements contrasted sharply 
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with McNaughton’s views. McNaughton urged Prime Minister Bennett 
on 5 April to rebuild Canada’s military since an American incursion into 
British Columbia could end Canada’s political independence.22 The general 
argued that the United States “would not hesitate for one moment to oc-
cupy our country in order to deny potential bases to their enemy” and in-
sisted that the testimony of the committee of the House of Representatives 
presaged “an American protectorate over Canada.” Largely unmoved by 
this plea, Bennett offered National Defence a handful of new warplanes.23
McNaughton’s fear was at least partly valid. In 1924 Billy Mitchell 
had warned that if the United States and Japan clashed, “Canada would 
either openly side with the United States or run the risk of occupation.”24
While he praised Norman Armour, the new United States minister to 
Canada, as “one of the crack men in the Foreign Service,” Wrong ridiculed 
assertions that Roosevelt’s administration did “not in any of its plans or 
policies envisage the possibility of any change in the friendly relationship 
between the United States and any foreign country.” If so, he asked, why 
have a military?25 Once hopeful that the president would fix the grievous 
economic injustices that Canada had suffered at protectionist American 
hands at the start of the Great Depression, Wrong found it difficult “to 
find one positive action taken by the Roosevelt Administration which has 
been beneficial to Canada.” He added that “this Administration has proved 
itself more strongly isolationist than its two predecessors.” Roosevelt was 
“undoubtedly” full of good will towards Canada, but so far it “has been 
shown in words and not in deeds.” Unless something useful happened 
soon, his Good Neighbor Policy would stand as nothing “more than a slick 
and hypocritical phase.”26
Something quite useful soon followed Wrong’s complaint. Triumph-
ant at the polls in October 1935 after five years in opposition, King quickly 
signed a trade deal with Roosevelt, fulfilling Robbins’ claim that the Lib-
eral Party was “a little bit” more inclined “than the other party to play 
the game with us.”27 Skelton told Armour that he sought the creation of 
a “North American mind” to stop Canada from being further drawn into 
a “world-wide British economic empire whose interests, as progressively 
developed from London, might soon diverge seriously from” American 
needs. Armour was also pleased that King preferred “the American road.”28
King, a master of fuzzy statements, hoped that Canada might “link” the 
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United States and Britain during the London Naval Conference and Italy’s 
invasion of Ethiopia. Declaring that “we must stand together on all these 
questions,” King saw the trade deal as the “herald of a better day and a 
better way” for a troubled world.29 Even Wrong, surprisingly, agreed that 
Roosevelt was reaching beyond isolationism for a new foreign policy, “the 
definition of which is of immense importance to Canada as a North Amer-
ican country, as part of the British Commonwealth, and as a member of the 
League of Nations.”30
Indeed, unknown to Canadians, Roosevelt had already begun to think 
in these broad terms. Increasingly fearful of growing German and Japanese 
power, he told Secretary of State Sumner Welles as early as 1933 that “we 
here on this Continent must work out a continental understanding of iden-
tification of interests.” When Britain pondered naval concessions to Japan 
in 1934, the president threatened “to approach public sentiment in Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa in a definite way to make these 
dominions understand clearly that their future security is linked with us 
in the United States.”31 After telling Quebecers in July 1936 that the un-
defended Canada± United States frontier inspired other nations to live in 
peace, Roosevelt informed King privately that some American senators fa-
voured military intervention if Japan attacked British Columbia.32 Anxious 
to flesh out his continental vision, the president backed proposals to build 
a highway through Canada to Alaska so that American forces could reach 
the state quickly in a crisis. When a Canadian military report claimed 
that U.S. Army planning was “based on the general idea of a Far Eastern 
country making an attack on the United States by way of Canada,”33 King’s 
previously parsimonious Cabinet speedily approved $200 million in new 
military spending with an emphasis on west coast defence. The alterna-
tive, King claimed, was relying on Washington’s protection and “losing 
our independence.”34
The possibility that a highway to Alaska might have its military uses 
was not a new subject, but it was a troubling one. In 1931, a joint Canadian±
American board, anxious to build a highway to boost economic develop-
ment, had said it “would have no more military significance than any other 
road that might extend north beyond the British Columbia boundary.” 
Still, its American members, echoing Mitchell, had agreed it could possess 
“a very definite value from an aviation standpoint in cases where Canada 
352: External Affairs and North American Security in the 1930s
and the United States might be allies.”35 Before leaving the Department of 
National Defence for a post with the National Research Council in 1935, 
McNaughton cautioned that the road “would confront us with a somewhat 
delicate situation.” Even if the United States had no desire to use the road 
militarily, the new chief of the general staff, Major General E.C. Ashton, 
concluded in “a great international struggle military necessity would tend 
to overcome political scruples.” Canada would be foolish to create “what 
would then become a military asset of a very high order if possessed or 
utilized by our neighbours to the south.”36 Skelton was more judicious. He 
thought the route a perfectly intelligible aspiration by west coast peoples 
and argued that unless Canada “incurred a ‘moral’ obligation by allowing 
the United States to assume the … cost of building the highway in Can-
adian territory,” Ashton’s worries should not “be allowed to overcome such 
a project.” As a result, when American diplomats met with a senior Exter-
nal Affairs official to inquire about the highway in October 1936, Coun-
sellor Loring Christie, though he offered no official support, stated that 
Canadian military objections to the road merited no consideration.37
Christie’s reluctance to discuss the highway’s security implications re-
flected his growing concern about the deteriorating global situation and 
American motives in seeking closer relations with Canada. When King 
travelled to Washington in March 1937 to encourage a re-elected Roos-
evelt to confront communism and fascism in an effort to prevent another 
war, Christie was skeptical.38 Fervently opposed to Canadian participa-
tion in international collective security, Christie advised King in 1937 that 
relying upon America could render Canada an American protectorate.39
Skelton agreed. Canada could not “escape being affected by developments 
elsewhere,” he admitted. But, he added, Canada was “still the most se-
cure, the least exposed of all countries,” and it did not need American or 
British aid.40 At the White House, Roosevelt told King that an Alaska 
Highway “would be of a great military advantage, in the event of trouble 
with Japan.” When King asserted that while some Canadians believed that 
America’s controversial Monroe Doctrine of 1823 protected them from ex-
tra-hemispheric threats, “no self-respecting [Canadian] Government could 
countenance any such view,” the president replied soothingly that “what we 
would like would be for Canada to have a few patrol boats on the Pacific 
Coast, and to see that her coast fortifications around Vancouver were of 
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a character to be effective there.” As King later told Armour in Ottawa, 
Roosevelt had discussed Canada’s security in such “a nice way and without 
in any way suggesting how Canada should handle her own affairs.”41 But if 
a pleased King sought in an undefined manner to bridge Anglo-American 
differences over the response to fascist and communist aggression, Skelton 
remarked caustically to a visiting American that a bridge was designed “to 
be walked on.”42
Indeed, the tread of heavy boots resounded following Japan’s attack 
upon China in July 1937. Neither London nor Washington individually 
had the political will or military strength to re-establish the shifting bal-
ance of power in Asia. British overtures to Washington to mediate the 
conflict jointly were rejected by Roosevelt, who sought “cooperation on 
parallel but independent lines.”43 And Roosevelt expected Canada to fall 
into line. As a result, when Ottawa declined to endorse Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull’s peace plan, J. Pierrepont Moffat, assistant under-secretary 
of state for Western European affairs, had Armour browbeat Skelton to 
back the initiative.44
More important, the crisis strengthened American interest in closer 
continental security relations, and in early August, the president told Hull 
that he wanted an Alaska Highway “as soon as possible.” When Hull re-
ported that Canada had shown little inclination to discuss the matter, Ar-
mour suggested that a presidential visit to British Columbia would empha-
size the “solidarity existing between our own northwest and the stretch of 
territory separating Alaska from the continental United States.”45 Confident 
that a visit would influence opinion in the right quarters, Armour assured 
Moffat that Canada’s governor general, Lord Tweedsmuir, felt an Alaska 
Highway would have enormous strategic importance. Moffat was doubt-
ful, fearful that the Canadians might misinterpret the stopover’s ration-
ale.46 Hull overruled his under-secretary and Roosevelt briefly stopped in 
Victoria on September 30 to give a short public address.47
The visit, however, did not remove Canadian doubts about closer 
cooperation with Washington, and when Roosevelt asked for talks on an 
Alaskan highway in September, Ottawa was unsure how to react. Skelton 
was inclined to reject the request, pointing out that internal east-west com-
munications ranked first. Christie was more diplomatic. Worried that the 
White House might resent a rejection and keen to keep the matter on an 
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“economic plane,” Christie suggested a joint feasibility study. If Washing-
ton insisted on paying, Christie cautioned that Canadian military objec-
tions “presumably would have to be considered.”48 
The American president had more than just Canada on his mind. In 
late July 1937, he had asked British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to 
come to Washington to discuss broad questions of global stability. Though 
the dire Asian events “justified our worst fears” and cordial relations with 
totalitarian states seemed unlikely, Chamberlain declined to meet any time 
soon.49 Thus, in October, Roosevelt declared that “peace-loving nations 
must make a concerted effort” to quarantine countries seeking to foster 
international anarchy and instability. In response to critics, who worried 
that his plan could lead to a war with Japan, the president argued for a 
general peace treaty, not political and military sanctions50 Historian James 
MacGregor Burns has argued that the speech was a trial balloon to test the 
public mood; when the mood proved “unheroic,” Roosevelt “pulled in his 
horns further.”51 When the League announced a nine-power conference 
in November to discuss China, the president told Hull, Welles, and his 
personal representative to the talks, Norman Davis, that if mediation of 
the Sino-Japanese conflict failed, he would consider further steps. Smart-
ing from Chamberlain’s rejection, he told Davis in October that the United 
States would not lead against Japan as it could not “afford to be made, in 
popular opinion at home, a tail to the British kite.”52
Against this uncertain background, Roosevelt saw greater security 
cooperation with Canada as a step towards meeting American goals in 
the Pacific. Buoyed by his Victoria trip, which he judged a great success, 
the president told Armour in September that he wanted coordinated de-
fence plans “for that important section of territory lying between northern 
Washington [state] and the ‘panhandle’ of Alaska.” Describing British Col-
umbia as defenceless, Roosevelt dismissed Armour’s rejoinder that Canada 
had begun to revamp its coast defences. Recalling Anglo-American naval 
cooperation in the North Pacific in 1917± 18, he wanted a U.S. Navy officer 
to broach the subject in Ottawa. Armour suggested instead that King or 
his minister of national defence, Ian Mackenzie, meet with Roosevelt or 
Hull. Wisely, Armour consulted the influential under-secretary of state, 
Welles, who was doubtful. Like his two closest assistants, Moffat and 
Adolf Berle, Welles practised “Europhobic-Hemispherism” and opposed 
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speaking to Ottawa lest the United States find itself drawn into Britain’s 
imperial affairs.53
Welles’ fears that Roosevelt might be using a Canadian back door to 
secure an alliance with Britain against Japan seemed justified by events 
in late 1937. While the nine-power conference failed to resolve the Si-
no-Japanese conflict, neither the United States nor Britain offended “one 
another over the crisis: a feat of diplomatic trust, full of hope for future 
cooperation.”54 In late November, a hopeful Chamberlain told British Am-
bassador Robert Lindsay to seek Anglo-American naval conversations and 
an overwhelming display of naval force in the Pacific. Welles declined to 
cooperate since the United States would have to provide the naval display.55
Davis, an Anglophile who counted many friends among British diplomats, 
championed the view “that the existence of the British Empire is essen-
tial to the national security of the United States and that while we should 
not follow Great Britain nevertheless we should not allow the Empire to 
be endangered.” This was a view that Moffat ridiculed, and when Davis 
groused that Canada wanted to benefit from geography, imperial ties, and 
its friendship with the United States without assuming any responsibilities, 
Moffat declared “three cheers for Canada.”56 Even so, though he opposed 
Armour’s renewed suggestions that King should use a planned vacation in 
Florida to meet with Roosevelt in December, Welles promised to raise the 
issue with the president despite his fear that Roosevelt might be seeking 
a dangerous British alliance through a back door.57 While Armour agreed 
the matter should not be hurried, he told Welles that Canada’s Colonel 
Harry Crerar had met United States Army Chief General Malin Craig 
in November. Thinking that this chat may have marked the “first move” 
towards the president’s goal of closer defence cooperation with Canada, 
the American minister in Ottawa sent Welles news clippings about Brit-
ish Columbia’s new fortifications. As Canada was finally awakening to the 
necessity of west coast defences, Armour thought this would be as good a 
time as any to initiate military conversations.58
Japan’s shocking sinking of the USS Panay on the Yangtze River and its 
attacks upon British ships in Chinese waters in early December 1937 gen-
erated a war scare. Britain, or so American diplomats reported, was anxious 
for a synchronized Anglo-American response. Berle believed that this re-
quest for synchronicity, so reminiscent of British manipulations during the 
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1915 Lusitania crisis, was Davis’s doing, while Moffat assailed Britain for 
“treating us as their seventh dominion.” When Lindsay broached the mat-
ter in mid-December, Welles preferred concurrent action. But Roosevelt 
overruled Welles and sent Captain Royal Ingersoll to London for direct 
naval talks with the Admiralty about possible joint action against Japan.
Meanwhile, on December 20, Welles forwarded Armour’s letter of 
December 17, asking Roosevelt to “let me know what your desires may be.” 
Ever cautious of the anti-British and isolationist lobby, Roosevelt insisted 
that “nothing … be put in writing,” but he finally invited King to visit 
Washington in January.59 King declined, worried that his presence in the 
American capital might damage ongoing Anglo-American trade talks. A 
reluctance to act decisively typified the cautious King; as he told a British 
diplomat in 1938, “his experience of political life had taught him that any 
success he had attained had been due far more to avoiding action rather 
than taking action.”60 Armour explained Roosevelt’s desires personally to 
King in early January 1938 but failed to change his mind. When the prime 
minister nervously offered a spring visit to the American capital, Armour 
countered that Canadian officers could begin security discussions with 
Craig and Admiral William Leahy immediately and “without any publi-
city.” King agreed that such a discussion might be useful, but tempered his 
interest by adding that he “was merely thinking out loud.”61
In early January, in what Armour called an extraordinary coincidence, 
Canadian newspapers discussed British Columbia’s coastal defences, 
Anglo-American staff talks, and a possible Canada± United States west 
coast security scheme.62 Four days later, Skelton told Armour there was 
“much to be said for getting our defence programme on a realistic North 
American basis.” Still, given his history of suspicion towards military plan-
ning, Skelton did not want “such discussions to take place solely between 
technical defence officials.”63 Ashton, who had sent officers to Washington 
in 1937 to study American military industrial mobilization plans, was cau-
tious. He told his minister, Ian Mackenzie, that he wanted definite as-
surances that Roosevelt “would safeguard Canada’s situation and would 
not force her into a serious situation.” Having complained in 1937 about 
“the frequent difficulties experienced by this Department in the pursuit 
of its approved objectives through obstruction or, at least, lack of sympa-
thetic action elsewhere,” Ashton condemned the “ultra-isolationist” view 
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that Canada need not fight at Britain’s side, a clear swipe at Skelton and 
Christie. That policy, Ashton asserted, comprised “an act of secession from 
the Commonwealth” while a defenceless Canada would obviously concern 
the United States. Crerar, whom Armour had suspected of starting this 
process with his November 1937 meeting with General Craig, thought 
that enhanced security cooperation with the United States would “knock 
the feet from under” subversive Canadians who opposed joint military in-
itiatives sponsored by Britain.64
A few days later, Armour indicated that two Canadian officers would 
be welcome in Washington to meet their American counterparts. Skelton, 
having apparently lost the fight (if there had been one) to send External 
Affairs officials with the military officers, insisted that Canada’s legation 
in Washington must host the talks to ensure no “possibility of the slightest 
publicity.”65 There were other last minute complications. Prompted by the 
anglophile Canadian minister Herbert Marler, Commodore Percy Nelles 
proposed inviting British military attachés in Washington to join the talks 
between the Canadian and American officers at the legation. Warning 
that he “could not receive the British Military Attaché,” Craig balked and 
phoned Welles for guidance. Concerned that Canada was trying to bring 
Britain into the talks, a dangerous complication if the American press 
got wind of the matter, Welles ruled that only Craig and Leahy, not the 
Canadians, could provide American defence data to the British.66 Lacking 
knowledge of potential topics, Ashton was authorized “to give and receive 
information, but to make no commitments.” Possessing his own limited 
instructions, but willing to talk soldier to soldier, Craig discussed west 
coast defences generally before offering to defend Canada’s west coast and 
asking if British Columbia’s airfields could support American bombers. 
Stunned, Ashton sought to divert Craig by outlining scenarios facing Can-
ada: an Anglo-Japanese war in Asia; British neutrality in an United States±
Japan war in the north Pacific; and Canada joining an Anglo-American 
conflict against Japan. Craig thought only the third option was relevant 
and dropped his offer to focus on British Columbia airfields and coast de-
fences.67 The next day, while Craig feared considerable Japanese air attacks 
against the west coast, Leahy wished solely to meet Japan’s fleet in the cen-
tral Pacific. The Americans could offer no formal defence commitments, a 
statement the Canadians did not dispute.68
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Had the legation discussions progressed, it is doubtful that Exter-
nal Affairs or King would have welcomed even an informal alliance with 
Washington. In early 1937, after Escott Reid of the Canadian Institute of 
International Affairs suggested a Canada± United States military alliance, 
diplomat Hugh Keenleyside accused Reid of excessive rationality. As-
serting that governments and peoples could not be expected to be “intelli-
gent enough” to see logically the necessities of their situations, Keenleyside 
argued that practical politics ruled out any “serious and well-thought-out 
defensive agreement between Canada and the United States.”69 Keenleyside 
had not misjudged the political situation in Ottawa. Having purchased 
two destroyers in January 1938 expressly to protect the vulnerable west 
coast, less than two months later King felt more strongly than ever “how 
inadequate are Canada’s defence forces, and how necessary it is for us to do 
something to preserve this country to future generations against nations 
that place all their reliance upon force.”70
But King worried too about nations, including the United States, 
which seemed to place their reliance upon resisting force. In August 1938, 
worried by German aggressiveness, Roosevelt sought to send a very public 
message to Adolf Hitler. Taking advantage of a speech in Canada mark-
ing the opening of a bridge linking Ontario with New York State across 
the St. Lawrence River, the American president admitted that his nation 
could no longer say that “the eddies of controversy beyond the seas could 
bring no interest or no harm.” He promised dramatically that “the United 
States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened 
by any other empire.”71 While Roosevelt claimed that what he had said 
“was so obvious that I cannot understand why some American President 
did not say it half a century ago” and Canada’s media praised the Monroe 
Doctrine’s northern extension,72 King was concerned. The prime minister 
judged Roosevelt’s comments most significant, and he said publicly a few 
days later that his government was “putting our own means of defence in 
order” to make Canada “as immune from attack or possible invasion as we 
can reasonably expect to make it.” During the Munich Crisis, a shaken 
King advised his Cabinet that if Britain was “worsted in a world struggle, 
the only future for Canada would be absorption by the U.S., if we are to be 
saved from an enemy aggressor.”73
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Indeed, until he expressly sought military talks with the United States 
as France collapsed in June 1940, King showed little enthusiasm for any of 
Roosevelt’s security-related schemes. Present in Washington in late 1938 
when Roosevelt suggested producing 50,000 warplanes for the United 
States and western democracies, King declined to commit his nation to 
the president’s plan to build planes in Canadian-based factories. Similarly, 
during the long summer of 1939, with war clearly on the horizon, King 
remained cagey. When Roosevelt mused that the U.S. Navy might need 
access to Halifax’s harbour, the Canadian said that access would depend 
on unspecified “developments.” When a deal was finally struck in late Au-
gust to allow the American military vessels to use Halifax, King insisted 
that use must not interfere with Canadian naval activities.74 Continental 
security only reigned once the August 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement cre-
ated the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. King took the lead, calling 
in the new American minister to Canada, J. Pierrepont Moffat, in June 
1940, to suggest bilateral military staff talks. The prime minister also used 
Christie, now Canada’s minister in Washington, to inform Roosevelt of 
his new willingness to do more. Thus, it was unsurprising when Roosevelt 
asked King in August to meet him in Ogdensburg, New York, to consider 
“the mutual defence of our coasts on the Atlantic.”75 King happily signed 
on when Roosevelt presented him with a short proposal to create a Can-
ada± United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) that would 
formulate continental defence plans for the two governments to consider. 
According to American Secretary of War Henry Stimson a relieved King 
signed the pact “almost with tears in his eyes.”76
Conspicuously absent from the Ogdensburg meeting was Skelton. 
King, instead, took Moffat with him, a choice King apparently did not see 
fit to explain or justify even in the privacy of his diary. If Skelton’s pride 
suffered any injury, it did not show. Indeed, he called the PJBD’s creation 
“the best day’s work for many a year” and a result of “the inevitable sequence 
of public policies and personal relationships, based upon the realization 
of the imperative necessity of close understanding between the English-
speaking peoples.”77 Furthermore, both Skelton and Keenleyside, as early 
as June 1940, had warned King that if the strategic situation worsened ±  
Skelton especially feared that Japan might enter the war on Germany’s side 
±  Canada would have no choice but to seek American military assistance. 
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According to Keenleyside, the United States might simply demand that 
Canada accept a bilateral continental defence arrangement.78
Theoretical impediments to cooperation ended when the United States 
entered the Second World War in December 1941. Canada’s dual prob-
lem then, as Norman Robertson, Keenleyside, and Reid pointed out in 
1941± 42, was to prevent American domination of the Allied war effort 
and ensure that Canada’s interests were protected. As Reid put it, there 
was no sense in “being indignant about what the United States was doing” 
for Canadians “were being treated as children because we have refused to 
behave as adults” in foreign affairs. Reid wanted to bolster the legation in 
Washington, have Canadian officials meet senior State Department of-
ficials regularly, separate the posts of prime minister and secretary of state 
for external affairs, and make “the construction of an effective collective 
system the main goal of our policy.”79 Reid was right in 1942. However, 
his judgment of External Affairs’ stand on security cooperation with the 
United States in the 1930s was unnecessarily harsh. The department’s hesi-
tations carefully sought to balance its national security interests and its 
independent scope to manoeuvre while retaining a circumspect view of a 
powerful United States. Given Roosevelt’s sustained interest in closer bilat-
eral ties and the strong opposition of the Department of National Defence 
to closer ties with the United States, this was not an easy task.
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The anticipation simmered just below the surface of Quebec City on a fresh 
May morning in 1939. Crowds of Quebecers, leavened by a sprinkling of 
notables from elsewhere in Canada, focused their attention on the quay on 
the St. Lawrence. In the distance an ocean liner, the Empress of Australia, 
was heaving into sight. This was by itself nothing special: ocean liners were 
not strangers to the port; but today the Empress was carrying special guests. 
Royalty was coming to town, and not just any royalty ±  for Quebec had 
hosted princes and princesses before ±  but the reigning monarch of the 
British Empire, George VI, and his consort, Queen Elizabeth. This was a 
first, for no reigning British king or queen had ever visited Canada.
The royal tour of 1939 had been the focus of in-depth planning on the 
part of the Canadian government, and of the Canadian people, since the 
idea of the tour had been advanced by Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie 
King at the Imperial Conference of 1937. As the yacht ferrying the king 
and queen made its way ±  majestically, in the eyes of the crowd ±  from the 
Empress to the quay, Quebec’s citizens would be the first, as the Canadian 
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media reported, to have the honour of receiving Canada’s king and queen ±  
and the empire’s too, of course. The Canadian papers could think of noth-
ing better than to reprint the words of the London Times, which concluded 
that it “comes to them in a sense by geographical accident, but no province 
of the dominion can show better title than the right of seniority which 
belongs to the French-Canadians of Quebec.”1 Certainly the crowds that 
swarmed the Quebec docks seemed to justify that faith.
Support for the monarchy notwithstanding, controversies over inter-
national policy erupted regularly in Canadian politics during the period 
leading up to the Second World War. Liberal Prime Minister William Lyon 
Mackenzie King and his French-Canadian “lieutenant” Ernest Lapointe 
responded carefully to these debates, conscious that Canadian involvement 
abroad would rouse strong currents of opinion at home that represented 
a danger to national unity, still fragile in the wake of the divisive clash 
over conscription during the First World War. They recognized that in 
any major war involving Britain, increasingly likely after the unfortunate 
Munich settlements of 1938, Canadian involvement was inevitable, given 
the strength of imperialist sentiment across the country. But participation, 
they feared, would likely generate an isolationist backlash from Quebec. As 
international relations became more dangerous in the late 1930s, the stakes 
for Canadians, particularly those concerned with Canadian public opinion, 
increased dramatically. As a result, King’s key concern in the immediate 
run-up to the conflict was to ensure that Canada’s entrance into the war do 
only minimal damage to the delicate state of Canadian unity. At best, it 
seemed that internal conflict could be managed, but not avoided.
Canadian foreign policy during the 1930s was important therefore not 
only for its international implications but also for its internal consequences. 
The decade’s repeated European crises forced Canadians to ponder the 
question of what it meant to be “Canadian,” which differed along trad-
itional religious, ethnic, and linguistic lines. As Canadian society split over 
these questions of identity, the result was an ongoing disagreement about 
the underlying nature of the country and its national interests. Aware that 
his government could not resolve these issues of policy and identity, King 
sought to paper over these disputes, postponing debate on international 
issues, and, by implication, discussions about the national identity. King 
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instead focused on domestic issues, insisting that his government would 
respond to international developments on a case-by-case basis.2
King’s policy of political compromise for the sake of national unity 
was not universally popular and was questioned even within his own gov-
ernment. This was especially true within the ranks of the Department of 
External Affairs. While Canada’s small band of young diplomats agreed 
with the emphasis that the prime minister placed on national unity and 
applauded his efforts to recognize the strength of isolationist sentiment in 
Quebec, many of their number, including the department’s under-secre-
tary, O.D. Skelton, thought that the government should go further in this 
direction. They were convinced that courting isolationist and non-inter-
ventionist sentiment would generate a more distinct national viewpoint, 
one that better reflected the national interest.
These views were reflected, for instance, in a memorandum by Hugh 
Keenleyside, one of Skelton’s early protégés in External Affairs, on his pas-
sage through the Prairies on his way home to British Columbia during the 
Munich crisis of 1938. Of course, Canadians of British origins, he wrote 
Skelton, were “prominent in Canadian business and social life, and it is 
natural that [they] should be over-represented in our organs of opinion. In 
spite of a good many shocks during the recent years ±  and particularly since 
Mr. Chamberlain took office in Great Britain ±  this element in the popula-
tion still seems in general to approve of the idea that ‘When Britain is at 
war we all are at war.’”3 But Keenleyside held out hope for the future. Not 
only had imperialist sentiment been shaken by international developments 
over the last few years, but this older group had failed to fully transmit 
these views to the younger generation.
The development of a more “progressive” view of Canadian foreign 
policy, Keenleyside argued, lay with the ethnic minorities in the Prairie 
provinces and with the younger elements of the population. These segments 
of Canadian society, he wrote, had increasingly come to the conclusion that 
the present “mess” in Europe was largely a result of British policy, and that 
it was not Canada’s responsibility to “sacrifice another generation of Can-
adians to try to straighten it out.... So if Britain and the rest of Europe want 
to go to Hell let them go ±  but let us stay out of it and try to maintain some 
remnants of decency on this continent.”4 Cautiously optimistic, Keenley-
side argued that, given the West’s “racial” and generational composition, a 
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Canadian political party with a policy of Canadian autonomy would gain 
widespread support. With the right sales-pitch, which could be developed 
by drawing on the growing “expertise” of the Canadian intellectual com-
munity, the young diplomat thought that an autonomous platform might 
sway Quebec and parts of rural Ontario. “It would, of course, precipitate 
a bitter fight,” Keenleyside acknowledged, but hadn’t “the time for such a 
fight arrived? Or must we go through another World War first?”5
Keenleyside’s views found a ready echo in the East Block headquar-
ters of the Department of External Affairs. Skelton too was concerned 
about the relationship between public opinion and Canadian interests. 
The under-secretary told his colleague Hume Wrong in March 1939 that 
Canadian involvement in any European war would likely be based “simply 
and solely on the grounds of racial sympathy with the United Kingdom.”6
Nonetheless, like Keenleyside, he remained hopeful that this imperialism 
might soon be the victim of its own success. “If the next year or so passes 
without a war,” he continued, “I have little doubt that the ripening of public 
opinion in the assumption of more national responsibility in questions of 
war as well as in questions of peace will continue at a more rapid pace than 
in the past ten years.” The implication was that this would mean a dimin-
ishing role for imperialist sentiment in the formation of Canadian policy. 
But, Skelton cautioned, this would not happen by itself. These changes 
would require Canadian intellectuals to engage public opinion and educate 
Canadians to “think boldly about Canada’s place in the world.”7 While 
civil servants would not be directly involved in this exercise by virtue of 
their non-partisan standing, Skelton implied that External Affairs should 
encourage these developments. Serving the national interest for Skelton 
meant defining this interest, and, in particular, “educating” Canadians to 
think of their interests as extending beyond the imperial connection with 
Great Britain.
How this “education” might be accomplished was a difficult ques-
tion. Public opinion and its influences are always notoriously difficult to 
quantify, and this was especially true of Canada in the 1930s, when there 
were no public opinion polls and the idea of public opinion itself was still 
relatively new and contested. Some of those Canadians interested in the 
possible role of public opinion in a democratic society embraced the ideas 
associated with the newest “yardstick” of public opinion, the Gallup Poll 
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developed by the Institute of Public Opinion (IPO). Though available only 
in the United States in the 1930s (Gallup came to Canada in 1941), IPO 
rhetoric reflected progressive views of contemporary democracy. Polls, 
George Gallup and his colleagues argued, would provide an immediate, 
consistent, and accurate measure of public views and would return dem-
ocracy to “‘The People’ in an age of increasing corporate interests.”8 Their 
voices could now finally be heard over those of “The Interests,” who repre-
sented only the powerful few.9
But the rhetoric used so successfully by the IPO in the United States 
did not resonate as strongly in Canada. While populist ideas were present 
north of the border, they did not play the pivotal role they did in the Amer-
ican system. Canadian journalists, for instance, focused on the limitations 
of the new system, perhaps because they were traditionally considered, by 
themselves and others, as “bell-wethers” of public opinion. They showed 
little inclination to embrace the doctrine of vox populi vox dei and insisted 
that Canadians should embrace Britain’s “cautious reserve” vis-à-vis public 
opinion. As H.T. Stanner wrote in a Canadian Business piece in December 
1941, all “too frequently it is found that large numbers of people have little 
or no specific knowledge of defence problems and consequently, are in no 
position to form a guiding opinion.”10
Canadian politicians argued in turn that the very philosophical foun-
dation for the principle of polling contradicted the nature of Canadian so-
ciety. Canadian democratic principles, based on the British parliamentary 
system, differed significantly from their American counterparts. Whereas 
proponents of the Gallup system heavily emphasized the role of populism, 
Canadian political leaders emphasized Parliament, the representatives of 
“the People,” as the source of democratic legitimacy. Cabinet minister C.G. 
“Chubby” Power, for example, reminded his colleagues in the House of 
Commons in 1939 that their primary duty was to the nation, rather than 
to their constituents at home “who know nothing of the question under 
discussion.” The same idea was also reflected in King’s governing principle 
that “Parliament will decide.”11
Indeed, King was especially sceptical of public opinion, which he 
understood in intuitive terms to represent a limit of his power. His views on 
public opinion are perhaps best seen in his diary recollections of a conversa-
tion he had with Conservative parliamentarian R.B. Hanson in December 
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1941. King, in response to Hanson’s plea that he form a national govern-
ment, outlined his detailed views on the nature of government:
Hanson said, at one stage, that with my large following I could 
do anything I wished. I replied to him that my views of the 
source of power were very different to those of some other men.... 
I said that such successes I had had, I believed, came from the 
fact that I believed my power came from the people; that it was 
not something that arose from some ‘superman’ power which I 
myself possessed; that I felt I had held that power by being true 
to the people and to the promises I had given to them. That 
they trusted me because they knew I would not break faith with 
respect to their own views and wishes. 
Hanson then said: ‘Then you feel that you should not lead?’ 
To which I replied: That is not the case. That I believed the 
people had a true instinct in most matters of government when 
left alone. That they were not swayed, as specially favoured indi-
viduals were, by personal interest, but rather by a sense of what 
best served the common good. That they recognized the truth 
when it was put before them, and that a leader can guide so long 
as kept to the right lines. I did not think it was a mark of leader-
ship to try to make the people do what one wanted them to do.12
Despite the hesitations of journalists and politicians, there were many in 
Canada during the 1930s who were determined, not only to tackle the 
problematic question of how to measure popular opinion, but also how to 
influence it. For those in the Canadian government who wanted to play a role 
in shaping this opinion, which included some members of the Department 
of External Affairs, it seemed possible to exert some influence. As historian 
Ernest May has shown, a “foreign policy public” can play a significant role 
in shaping public views on international relations. Although only a relatively 
small segment of the public followed international events, this group played 
a disproportionate role in shaping the discussion of international relations. 
This was largely due, he claims, to their social status, the respect given them 
by their community, and their access to information not readily available. 
Quoting sociologist Edward A. Ross, May argued that every “editor, 
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politician, banker, capitalist, railroad president, employer, clergyman, or 
judge has a following with whom his opinion has weight. He, in turn, is 
likely to have his authorities. The anatomy of collective opinion … form[s] 
a kind of intellectual feudal system.”13
The formation of a consensus was aided, according to May, by 
the economic and political interests shared by this elite.14 In addition, 
although their predominance could be challenged, their position and 
access to information from overseas ensured that “the establishment could 
determine collectively the terms on which any foreign policy debate would 
be conducted.” This influence, however, was subject to limitation. As May 
argued, the foreign policy public could not radically change the terms of 
international involvement. Furthermore, given the fluid nature of public 
opinion, they “could know in advance only the extreme limits of what 
their constituency might approve or disapprove.”15 They could not be sure, 
therefore, of how to significantly shift public opinion on international 
relations. Those attempts were further hindered by the technical problem 
involved in reporting international developments during the interwar 
period. Information on international events took time to cross the oceans 
to Canada, and wire services did not provide a great deal of copy on world 
events to Canadian newspapers.16
Notwithstanding these limitations, which were only barely understood 
at the time, younger Canadian policy-makers and intellectuals remained 
convinced that public opinion could be bent to their will, provided that it 
was given proper leadership. As diplomat Keenleyside wrote in his memoirs 
almost fifty years later,
It is perhaps true that internal stresses within Canada made 
an enlightened and more positive policy in foreign affairs 
impossible. But it is at least arguable that if the government had 
made any serious effort to give leadership in the interpretation of 
the international scene, the Canadian people, French-speaking 
and English-speaking alike, might have responded with the 
humanity and intelligence that marked many other aspects of 
Canadian life.17
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While King refused to provide open leadership in shaping a debate on 
foreign policy, a new class of Canadian intellectuals were convinced that 
they had an important role to play in shaping public opinion. As historian 
Doug Owram has argued, English Canadian intellectuals in the 1930s, 
influenced by the tradition of progressive reform inherited from their pre-
decessors and the socio-economic crisis of the depression, were increas-
ingly tempted to play a role reforming the injustices in Canadian society. 
Echoing Skelton’s comments to Wrong, they focused on their self-pro-
fessed role of educating and shaping Canadian public opinion. They agreed 
with the overall sentiment that the “facts, if properly analyzed and properly 
interpreted, would point toward the proper policies and attitudes.”18 And 
they insisted that their training and expertise, in the social sciences in par-
ticular, made them uniquely qualified for this role. This assumption was 
reinforced by the assumptions of Canadian society, that the new challenges 
of the period required leadership from experts, whether self-educated or 
academically trained.19 As Professor Bruce Kuklick has argued, the focus 
of intellectuals on public opinion reflected their belief that if politics were 
“rational,” the appropriate course would be apparent.20
The efforts of intellectuals and policy-makers to mobilize public opin-
ion in support of “rational” policy, however, were hampered by the per-
ipheral role that they still occupied in Canadian society, the way public 
opinion was formed, and the rifts within the intellectual community itself. 
Nowhere were the divisions in Canadian society more apparent than in the 
country’s intellectual society. This community was limited in size, in both 
English and French-Canada, and was often isolated, both from each other 
and from the larger Canadian community.
The English Canadian intellectual community was notable for its 
separateness, underlined by its distinctive educational achievements. In 
an overall population of less than 12 million, a university degree, which 
increasingly signalled membership in the intellectual community, was a 
relative rarity.21 This was particularly the case in a society that had suffered 
greatly from the economic crisis of the decade. Indeed, the total number of 
university students formed only a tiny fraction of the community. Almost 
half of the Canadian population did not finish high school. In 1931, only 
46 per cent of sixteen-year-old Canadians were in school.22 In the 1935± 36 
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academic year, Canada’s universities and colleges granted 6,772 degrees. 
Of these, 786 were graduate degrees.23
This intellectual community, partially due to its small size, was ex-
tremely close-knit and insular. Members of the English Canadian intel-
lectual community corresponded often, pursued projects in common, and 
socialized together. These connections started in school as many attended 
the same universities in Canada and were reinforced through graduate 
work at institutions abroad. The number of Canadians pursuing graduate 
degrees was so small that acquaintance was impossible to avoid.24 Within 
the developing network of intellectuals, positions often overlapped in vari-
ous societies such as the Canadian Clubs, the Canadian Radio League, 
and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.
Individual members of this community were also very well connected 
with the global intellectual community. Due to their interest in inter-
national developments, the connections created by their educational ex-
periences, and the quality of their scholarship, Canadian intellectuals con-
nected with international streams of thought and leading global thinkers. 
This sense of international connection was in many ways utterly foreign to 
Canadians as a whole. Indeed, Owram concluded that their education and 
their university experiences “thus provided the elite with a sense of exclu-
sivity and accomplishment that distinguished members from the public at 
large and from other groups involved in public affairs.”25
French Canada’s intellectual community occupied its own, equally 
fast, solitude. Though a parallel to Owram’s study on the English Can-
adian intellectuals has not yet been published, certain themes are clear 
enough. Generally, the two main groups of intellectuals in Canada did 
not overlap, and the social and educational connections that bound each 
group together did not exist across them.26 Even those intellectuals who 
attempted to bridge the gap were often uncomfortable with this relation-
ship.27 Cultural differences dividing the two groups were reinforced by the 
French Canadian’s focus on different issues, reflecting their unique cultural 
and political concerns.28
Their main focus involved the viability of French Canadian society. 
Raised in an environment that stressed the values of family, church (al-
most all French Canadian intellectuals were Catholic), and rural life, they 
naturally concentrated on these themes in their own work. Those concerns 
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focused on the contamination of Quebec society by the increasingly influ-
ential forces of industrialization, urbanization, and modernism.29 French 
Canadian society was in their view an organic structure that had allowed 
their culture to survive for centuries in a North America dominated by 
Anglo-Saxon and Protestant values.30 French Canadian nationalists, in-
cluding the members of the Action Libérale Nationale, the Jeune-Canada 
movement, and L’Action nationale, argued that the spread of modern influ-
ences, including the centralization of federal power, industrialization and, 
most insidiously, modern, especially American, culture, was eating away 
at their community from the inside.31 They pushed for policies meant to 
deter these influences, policies of “re-Frenchification” and colonization, 
of “acheter-chez-nous” and the destruction of the “Trusts.”32 These views, 
combined with a general sense of remoteness from international develop-
ments, encouraged a focus on domestic issues and regional views. Euro-
pean developments, when reported in the pages of Quebec newspapers, 
served to remind French Canadians that peace was precarious and implied 
that war threatened the establishment of a strong, autonomous French 
Canadian society.33
While Canadian intellectuals were thus inclined to hold themselves 
apart, Canadian society was just as inclined to hold them at arm’s length. 
Many influential members of Canadian society, for example, continued to 
view academics as removed from the everyday concerns of society. As his-
torian Michael Horn has argued, members of the Canadian business com-
munity, in particular, often contended that academics should refrain from 
commenting on public issues unless they had something “useful” or “con-
structive” to contribute.34 This sentiment, and the fact that those who spoke 
out were often subject to public abuse, only encouraged the firm convic-
tion within academia that the intellectual community ought to be removed 
from the cares of the world.35 While Owram has argued that the academic 
community had become much more involved in public issues during the 
1930s, particularly due to the social impact of the Great Depression, he, 
along with fellow historians Michael Horn and David Fransen, all agreed 
that Canadian academics had not yet achieved the prominent role in soci-
ety that they would in later periods.36
There was one important exception; a small group of English Canadian 
intellectuals were able to connect in limited ways with the general public. 
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By the 1930s, their community increasingly included key members of the 
Canadian press, particularly, a group of young journalists clustered around 
editor John Dafoe and the Winnipeg Free Press. This included Grant Dex-
ter, Max Freedman, and George Ferguson, who had long-standing con-
nections with Vincent Massey, one of the leading power-brokers of the 
Liberal party.37 These contacts were enhanced by those that Dexter and 
Dafoe forged with the intellectual community in Winnipeg, which in-
cluded Roderick K. Finlayson, E.J. Tarr, and the Sanhedrin group. The 
Sanhedrin, whose name echoed the biblical description of an influential 
group of Jewish elders, provided a link between the intellectual commun-
ity, notable journalists, and key members of the Liberal party.38 As the 
intellectual community attempted to gain a greater share of influence in 
the shaping of policy during the Depression, it found in Dexter and Dafoe 
“allies who could use publicity and propaganda to encourage movement in 
new directions.”39
But this was a limited and potentially dangerous liaison. Those mem-
bers of External Affairs, including Lester B. “Mike” Pearson, who were 
interested in “educating” Canadian opinion, were at times reprimanded for 
any suggestion of intimacy with those outside of the government. Pearson’s 
close association with Dexter, while both were stationed in London dur-
ing the late 1930s, was of particular concern to Skelton and his political 
bosses.40 Pearson eventually briefed Dexter almost daily during the Czech 
crisis in October of 1938, making him as informed, and certainly more 
up-to-date, than many officials in Canada.41 Alarm at this kind of activity 
grew to the point that any publication by the Free Press of materials embar-
rassing to the government, particularly on foreign policy, led to increased 
scrutiny of Pearson. Thus, while the lines between the intellectual com-
munity and Canada’s civil service increasingly blurred in the late 1930s, 
there were clear limits on how far individuals like Pearson could engage 
Canadian opinion.
Despite their aspirations to shape public opinion, Canadian intellec-
tuals enjoyed only limited or inconsistent influence and were often frus-
trated by the lack of impact their views had in shaping political discourse 
or public opinion.42 Surprisingly, they rarely considered the implications 
should public opinion come to a consensus with which they disagreed. 
The Canadian reaction to the royal tour of King George VI and Queen 
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Elizabeth in the summer of 1939 represented the most obvious manifesta-
tion of this problem. Canadians flocked to see their majesties in huge num-
bers, sincere in their enthusiasm and, at least on the surface, loudly and 
resoundingly loyal to the crown and to the empire. As one editorial put it 
“there can be no doubt that the royal visit will have created in this country 
a personal appreciation of the throne of nation and empire as may go so far 
as to make for a new era in intra-British relationships.” It would also en-
courage a “greater sense of unity and purpose on the part of the Canadian 
people themselves.”43 Even in Quebec and among the ethnic communities 
of the Prairies, the royal tour was met with massive crowds.44
King’s foreign policy, therefore, while far from emotionally satisfying 
(or even at times logically consistent), seemed to many contemporary ob-
servers to reflect the general sentiments of the majority of Canadians. In 
1937, Escott Reid, not yet a member of the Department of External Af-
fairs, had published a generally positive analysis of King’s foreign policy. 
The Liberal prime minister’s focus on national unity, relations with the 
United States and Britain, and the maintenance of Canadian autonomy 
in relations with the League of Nations and the British Empire seemed to 
represent the realities of Canada’s position, both politically and emotion-
ally. While there were many questions that King’s foreign policy left un-
answered, including international economic grievances and, more import-
antly, Canada’s position in response to a war involving the United States 
or Britain, Reid concluded that this policy of ambiguity was, in fact, an 
appropriate one:
If Mr. King were to give unambiguous answers to the seven 
questions he has left unanswered, he would raise a tremendous 
political storm in Canada. Parties would split. Passions would 
be aroused. The national unity of Canada would be subjected to 
severe strains. If war should break out, such a crisis will prob-
ably be inevitable.… A crisis now would settle the question, and 
as a result there would be no crisis of any importance when the 
war did break out.… In other words, a crisis today would be 
a ‘preventive’ crisis. But democracy and democratic statesmen 
hate both preventative wars and preventative crises.45
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While historians today might share Reid’s conclusions, those who wanted 
King to pursue a more proactive approach to shaping public opinion in 
the 1930s did not find these sentiments comforting. Certainly Skelton ap-
peared disheartened by the trends of opinion during the lead up to Can-
ada’s declaration of war in September of 1939. His memorandum, entitled 
“Canada and the Polish War, A Personal Note,” touched on the limitations 
inherent in Canada’s involvement in a global empire.
The first casualty in this war has been Canada’s claim to in-
dependent control of her own destinies. In spite of a quarter 
century of proclamation and achievement of equality and in-
dependent status, we have thus far been relegated to the role 
of a Crown colony. We are drifting into a war resulting, so far 
as the United Kingdom’s part is concerned, from political and 
diplomatic actions initiated months ago without our knowledge 
or expectation. An Ottawa paper has gloated over the fact that 
the foreign policy of Canada is in the hands of the Prime Min-
ister of Great Britain; it has not yet called attention to Inskip’s 
sideshow, ‘the Dominion Office as the Foreign Office of the 
British Empire.’46
The under-secretary was ultimately frustrated with the way in which Can-
adian opinion remained unable to overcome its imperialism and the gov-
ernment’s unwillingness to act in shaping it.
The 1939 royal tour demonstrated both the continuing appeal of this 
imperialism and the impact of public opinion on government policy. The 
issue became increasingly important as the likelihood of Canadian involve-
ment in a European conflict increased after the Munich agreements of 
October 1938. Pearson, for example, expressed his concerns regarding the 
long-term consequences of the royal visit on Canadian public opinion in 
his correspondence with Skelton.
I can’t help feeling that all the outbursts of Royal and Imperial 
sentiment which the tour has evoked and which has naturally 
been reported here in fulsome terms will make it even more 
difficult for this country to understand the unsentimentally 
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nationalist basis of Canada’s external policy. There is not much 
use in saying that the enthusiasm shown was to Their Majesties 
in their personal capacities as King and Queen of Canada. I am 
afraid 99 per cent of the people in this country are not so expert 
in constitutional subtleties as to be able to distinguish between 
patriotic outbursts for the King of Canada and patriotic out-
bursts for the Ruler of the British Empire.… In this respect, I 
feel personally that whereas the Royal Visit seems to have done 
so much good in many respects, in this respect, it does make 
even more complicated certain complicating features of Can-
ada’s imperial relationship.
His letter concludes wryly that from “reading the Canadian newspapers, I 
am sure I would be shot as a traitor on sight if I were ever rash enough to 
give expression to such views [on the negative aspects of Canadian imper-
ialism] in the hearing of my intoxicated countrymen at the present time.”47
Pearson’s observations and the massive coverage of the royal tour pro-
vides a different, grimmer, perspective on the views of department officials 
regarding the potential of “educating” Canadians about their national in-
terests. Canada entered the war on 10 September 1939 with overwhelming 
support from English Canada. There was also very little active resistance 
on the part of French Canadians or their representatives in the House of 
Commons, despite the expectations of both internal and external observ-
ers.48 The Globe and Mail, although disappointed that the declaration had 
not immediately followed that of Britain, happily reported the unanimity 
of the result.49
Ian Rutherford, in his discussion of the public debate in the United 
States regarding the possibility of war with Iraq in 2003 concluded that 
the result “was not really dialogue, an exchange of views, but a series of 
clashing monologues.… The debate that occurred was mostly in the heads 
of the journalists and the citizens at the receiving end of all this propa-
ganda.”50 The nature of Canadian public debate during the 1930s, as much 
as anything, brings this formulation clearly to mind. Canadians during 
the decade were largely uninterested in understanding divergent views, let 
alone their context. The historiography of public opinion, especially when 
contrasted to the views of contemporaries, encourages the conclusion that 
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public opinion shifted slowly in response to international developments 
that Canadians saw as challenging their longstanding, if underlying, inter-
ests. The fact that the conclusions they reached regarding this role repre-
sented their continuing embrace of a connection with both Britain and the 
United States and the maintenance of Canadian autonomy, did not reflect a 
failure to “think boldly.” Rather, it reflected their realization, whether they 
thought in those terms or not, that a continuation of these policies would 
best reflect their national self-interest.51
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“Relations with the United States are at the centre of Canada’s foreign and 
domestic policy interests at every level,” wrote Michael Hart in his new 
book, From Pride to Influence: Towards a New Canadian Foreign Policy. “The 
principal foreign policy challenge for Canada is to manage the pervasive-
ness of this U.S. reality.”1 There can be no question that Hart is right, and 
his judgment stands as correct at least since the end of the Second World 
War and arguably from 1938 when American President Franklin Roos-
evelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King exchanged defence pledges at 
Kingston and Woodbridge, Ontario. But our foreign policy-makers have 
not always recognized reality, sometimes putting other concerns, global or 
domestic, ahead of the reality of Canadian national interests.
And what are those national interests? Here is my list with which, I 
suspect, few would quarrel seriously:
When the 
Department of 




 1. Canada must protect its territory and the security 
of its people;
 2. Canada must strive to maintain its unity;
 3. Canada must protect and enhance its 
independence;
 4. Canada must promote the economic growth of 
the nation to support the prosperity and welfare 
of its people;
 5. Canada should work with like-minded states for 
the protection and enhancement of democracy 
and freedom.
There is nothing remotely contentious here. Of course, these interests are 
simple enough to state but not always easy to achieve because they some-
times conflict. It is the task of national leaders to sort out the conflicts 
and determine the best strategy to protect and advance Canada’s interests. 
What is surely clear is that the presence of the United States is omnipresent 
in most, if not all, of them.
***
Oscar Douglas Skelton was the senior official in the Department of Exter-
nal Affairs who built and shaped the department. He was the man who did 
the recruiting in the 1920s and 1930s, and he was the thinker who deter-
mined the policy direction, subject to political control. What made Skelton 
unique is that he thought in terms of the national interest from the time 
he became under-secretary of state for external affairs in 1925 and indeed 
before. Other Canadians then accepted that Britain’s interests were almost 
automatically indistinguishable from Canada’s,2 and it was such attitudes 
that took Canada into the war in 1939 just as they had in 1914. Skelton 
wrote innumerable memoranda excoriating British policy in Europe in the 
1930s and denouncing Britain’s Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s 
government for the way it treated the Dominions, for assuming (correctly) 
that they would do what they were told. The under-secretary, who, it is fair 
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to say, missed the necessity of stopping Hitler, did not want Canada to 
behave as a lapdog and go to war simply because Britain did. But his prime 
minister, who almost always agreed with Skelton ±  except on the most im-
portant matters ±  certainly understood English-speaking Canadian opin-
ion better than the under-secretary did and knew that Canada had to go to 
war in 1939. Prime Minister Mackenzie King, in other words, was a strong 
minister unafraid to rein in his chief foreign policy adviser when necessary.
Nothing that happened in the first nine months of the Second World 
War changed Skelton’s mind that the war did not serve Canadian interests 
well. But soon even he could not be blind to the military-political realities. 
The Anglo-French defeat in the Low Countries and in France in May and 
June 1940 changed everything. Suddenly, and realistically, Britain’s key 
national interest of survival was critical to Canada. Canada’s own national 
interests demanded that it should work with like-minded states for the 
protection and enhancement of democracy and freedom, and Skelton saw 
this at once. “It amuses me a little,” King noted in his diary on May 24, 
“how completely some men swing to opposite extremes. No one could have 
been more strongly for everything being done for Canada, as against Brit-
ain, than Skelton was up to a very short time ago. Yesterday ... he naturally 
did not want me to suggest any help for Canada, but rather the need for 
Britain. He now sees that the real place to defend our land is from across 
the seas.”3
There was, of course, less contradiction than King perceived. As a na-
tional interest thinker, Skelton understood that a Nazi victory, unlikely in 
September 1939 but very probable in late May 1940, posed a grave threat 
to North America and to freedom and democracy everywhere. Everything 
Canada could do to defeat Hitler was necessary ±  and very much in the na-
tional interest. Still, the change in Skelton was marked, and he was quick 
to realize that Canada could not be protected unless an arrangement with 
the United States was reached.
The trick now was for Canada to do the maximum possible for the war 
effort overseas and to guarantee Canada’s own security if ±  and it seemed 
more like when, that summer of 1940 ±  Britain fell to Hitler. This meant 
getting closer to the still-neutral United States and as quickly as possible. 
Skelton wrote at the end of April 1940 that “the United States is already 
giving in many respects as much help as if it were in the war, but its further 
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diplomatic and financial and naval and perhaps air support are powerful 
potentialities. Our task is two fold: to make effective our own share and 
to speed in every practical and discreet way the cooperation of the United 
States.”4
On May 19, Hugh Keenleyside from Skelton’s staff went to Washing-
ton to see Roosevelt and to deliver the prime minister’s appeal for aircraft to 
replace those Britain now could not supply for the British Commonwealth 
Air Training Plan. The president offered limited help, but more important, 
however, was Roosevelt’s return message to King of two phrases: “certain 
possible eventualities which could not be mentioned aloud” and “British 
fleet.”5 If Hitler forced Britain to sue for peace, what would happen to the 
Royal Navy? Would it escape to Canada to carry on the fight or would it 
be turned over to the victors? Questions that had seemed unthinkable on 9 
May 1940 were ten days later urgently seizing the attention of the Amer-
ican president and the Canadian prime minister.
Skelton was not the only one who had altered his thinking under the 
press of events. Informed public opinion, watching the evacuation of allied 
troops from Dunkirk and the surrender of France, understood that Canada 
had now been forced to re-think its political and defence relationship with 
the United States. In mid-July, “A Group of Twenty Canadians,” largely as-
sociated with the Canadian Institute of International Affairs but including 
some public servants (Keenleyside, J.W. Pickersgill, and Robert Bryce) and 
Liberal Members of Parliament (Paul Martin and Brooke Claxton) pro-
duced “a programme of Immediate Canadian Action” that called for this 
reappraisal. “Co-operation with Washington,” the programme said bluntly 
and correctly, “is going to be either voluntary on Canada’s part, or else 
compulsory; in any event it is inevitable.” Skelton “took a positive attitude 
towards the talks,” and received the statement “with interest and apprecia-
tion.”6 Suggestions for a closer relationship were heard in Washington too, 
and in mid-August, Roosevelt invited King to meet him at Ogdensburg, 
in upstate New York.7
The result was the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), the 
first Canada± United States defence alliance. As someone who had long 
believed that “the North American mind”8 was markedly distinct from 
that of the Old World and its age-old conflicts, Skelton was overjoyed. It 
was “the best day’s work done for many a year. It did not come by chance,” 
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he wrote to King, “but as the inevitable sequence of public policies and per-
sonal relationships, based upon the realization of the imperative necessity 
of close understanding between the English-speaking peoples.”9
Exactly so. Canada had guaranteed its safety no matter the result of 
the war in Europe, thanks to the new American alliance. Moreover, with 
this guarantee, Canada could now offer maximum military support to 
Britain, sure that its own defence was secure. Even better, public opinion, 
aside from a few Tory stalwarts who feared Canada being swallowed by the 
United States,10 was overwhelmingly supportive.
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, however, was less pleased, 
telegraphing King that if Hitler could not invade Britain, all such trans-
actions “will be judged in a mood different to that prevailing while the 
issue still hangs in the balance.”11 The British leader obviously believed 
that Canada was scuttling to safety. Skelton prepared a draft response 
to Churchill’s imperial rant ±  “we can perhaps safely leave the verdict of 
history for the future to determine” ±  which was not sent, but it took a 
propitiatory telegram from Churchill on September 12 before King ±  and 
Skelton ±  were mollified.12
The creation of the PJBD was arguably the high point of Skelton’s ca-
reer. Skelton had always insisted that North America was where Canada’s 
“lasting community of interest” and its “current of destiny” resided.13 But 
he had never before managed to have the national interest determine the 
government’s actions on questions of war and peace. But now in the midst 
of a terrible military debacle, he had seen his prime minister take a historic 
step. In August 1940, the national interest demanded a defence alliance 
with the United States. For the first time, Canada had put its interests 
ahead of all others, and Churchill’s intemperate, foolish response made this 
very clear. The British leader saw only the new alliance and a weakening 
of the old, and failed to note that the PJBD brought the United States 
closer to Britain’s ranking ally and, simultaneously, let that ally do more for 
Britain. His imperial blinkers on, Churchill missed the point, and Skelton, 
never having worn those particular blinkers, got it.
Then ten months later and just a few weeks after Skelton’s death at 
the wheel of his car, the Hyde Park Declaration, again reached by Roos-
evelt and King, secured Canada’s wartime economic interests.14 This again 
was brilliant prime ministerial negotiation, driven by immediate necessity 
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but also by a clear understanding of future reality. The national interest 
demanded that Canada promote the economic growth of the nation to 
support the prosperity and welfare of its people, something that could only 
be achieved by the closest economic cooperation with the United States. 
Canada was fighting Canada’s war and Britain’s, and the Hyde Park Dec-
laration let it keep its factories going, employment and production high, 
and to do the maximum possible for a financially strapped Britain. Canada 
was also recognizing at last that it was a North American nation and that 
its national interests, first and foremost, had to be Canadian.
The turn to the south, the move toward a national interest policy, was 
Skelton’s great achievement, accomplished because he had helped his prime 
minister prepare the ground. The two men did not always see eye to eye, 
but in the summer of 1940 they did, and they achieved a historic realign-
ment that protected Canadian interests and advanced the Allied cause.
***
A very different sequence of events would occur some two decades later, one 
that changed Canadian politics and came close to jeopardizing the defence 
relationship with the United States that Skelton and King had created.
One of Skelton’s ablest recruits to External Affairs was Norman Rob-
ertson, a British Columbia Rhodes Scholar, who joined in 1929 at the age of 
twenty-five. Robertson had worked mainly on trade questions through the 
1930s, but he had greatly impressed King who appointed him, rather than 
the more senior Lester B. “Mike” Pearson, to succeed Skelton as under-
secretary in 1941. He ran the Department of External Affairs throughout 
the war and held a variety of critical appointments in Ottawa, London, and 
Washington until his death in 1968. He was a Canadian nationalist but 
also very much an internationalist, someone who understood that Canada 
had to work with its friends to advance its interests.
In late 1958, Robertson left his post as ambassador to Washington to 
become under-secretary for a second time, first for Sidney Smith, a univer-
sity president turned hapless politician and foreign minister, and then from 
early June 1959 for his fellow British Columbian Howard Green in the 
Progressive Conservative government led by Prime Minister John Dief-
enbaker.
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A key national interest for any country is that it must strive to pro-
tect and enhance its independence. This was something that concerned the 
Diefenbaker government, fearful as it was that Washington’s sometimes 
bullying ways might stampede Canada into decisions, whatever the con-
sequences might be. Diefenbaker believed that this had occurred, aided 
and abetted by the Canadian military, when the North American Air De-
fence Command (NORAD) was created just after the Tories took power. 
He may have been right; certainly he suffered attacks from the Liberals 
who had negotiated the agreement before their defeat in the 1957 elec-
tion and knew its details better perhaps than the incoming government. 
Nonetheless, it was Diefenbaker in February 1959 who agreed to install 
nuclear-armed Bomarc surface-to-air missiles at two bases in Canada and 
soon after to arm Canada’s troops in Europe with nuclear weaponry. The 
difficulty was that a myriad of details remained to be settled before the 
weapons were in place, and it was here that Robertson and Green exercised 
their influence.
Or perhaps it was the under-secretary who exercised his influence on 
the minister. Howard Green was a fine gentleman without much experi-
ence of foreign affairs. He was from birth an Empire-first Tory, and he 
remained innately suspicious of the United States and fearful of its influ-
ence, but he could learn and he quickly came to admire the officers in his 
department. Still, he was a naif, and disarmament, a subject of interest to 
Robertson as well, captivated him despite its hopelessness in the darkest 
period of the Cold War.15 That led inevitably to the primacy of the nuclear 
question.
In his various postings, Robertson had dealt with nuclear issues and 
generally accepted the necessity of the weapons. He understood the need 
to protect the American deterrent, and he recognized that intimate cooper-
ation in air defence between the two North American nations was neces-
sary. But by 1959, he had begun to worry about the effects of radioactive 
fallout on humankind’s ability to survive, and the mutuality of assured 
destruction that underlay deterrence theory had begun to trouble him. The 
nationalist internationalist that he had always been was about to be re-
placed by the traditional Canadian moralist.
The catalyst that turned Robertson from tacit supporter to opponent of 
nuclear weapons was an article in the British magazine The Spectator that 
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argued that hydrogen bombs had changed the nature of war. There could 
be no victor and no chance that civilized life could survive. The answer, 
author Christopher Hollis said, was unilateral nuclear disarmament and a 
build-up of conventional forces. The Soviets had no interest in destroying 
the West for did not Marxist theory postulate that victory over capitalism 
was certain? Why then destroy what you would eventually take? Robert-
son sent the article to the prime minister with a note declaring that his 
“personal views” coincided with Hollis’.16 Two days later Green became 
secretary of state for external affairs and the anti-nuclear forces had their 
champions.
For the next three-and-a-half years, Robertson’s fertile mind produced 
delaying tactic after dilatory response. American policy required United 
States control of warheads? Then Canada should be for dual control or, 
even better, no warheads at all on Canadian soil. Should the cabinet dis-
cuss the nuclear question, as defence minister Douglas Harkness wanted? 
No, if word leaked out, this might jeopardize Canadian disarmament ef-
forts at the United Nations. Time and again, the wily diplomat in External 
Affairs fought off the Department of National Defence’s cack-handed ef-
forts to move the nuclear issue along so that Canada could negotiate the 
arming of the weapons the Diefenbaker government had secured from the 
United States. Canada’s ambassador in Washington, Arnold Heeney, noted 
that Green’s “own attitudes and prejudices, in a curious way, combine with 
[Robertson]’s cosmic anxieties, particularly in our defence relationships, 
external and domestic, to produce a negative force of great importance.”17
The issue that was to destroy the Diefenbaker government had been de-
lineated, and the tumbrils of Tory collapse had begun to roll.
The difficulty with the Robertson-Green position was that it flew dir-
ectly in the face of Canada’s national interests. These required Canada to 
get along with the United States in the interests of its security and its eco-
nomic well-being, not to mention Canada’s reliance on alliances to advance 
democracy and freedom. The Americans had large burdens to bear in Eur-
ope and Asia, but the defence of their homeland was properly their high-
est priority, and Canada needed to recognize that. Robertson’s delaying 
tactics put his judgment, his values, and his high sense of morality ahead of 
Washington’s ±  all fine except when the superpower neighbour’s security 
was involved. A refusal or a delay in arming the Canadian component of 
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NORAD with nuclear weapons may not have jeopardized United States 
security outright ±  Canadian Bomarcs and interceptors, nuclear-armed or 
not, did not rule the skies over Canada ±  but it was a harbinger of even 
more troubling Canadian attitudes to come during the Cuban missile crisis 
of October 1962. And these were troubling enough that President John F. 
Kennedy’s frustrated, angry administration moved successfully to topple 
the dry husk of Diefenbaker’s government in January 1963.
Nonetheless the responsibility for the government’s collapse should not 
be placed on the delaying tactics of Robertson and Green. It was John 
Diefenbaker’s alone. His inability to make up his mind on the nuclear 
question had pitted External Affairs against National Defence, divided 
his cabinet, caucus, party, and country, and reduced Canadian± American 
relations to their lowest point in the twentieth century.18 Still, Robertson, 
fighting for the moralistic and unrealistic position he believed in and un-
checked, indeed encouraged, by his weak minister, seemed to have for-
gotten the national interest.19 That was not a mistake Skelton would have 
made, and there was some irony in the fact that Mike Pearson, the friendly 
rival Robertson had beaten out (without trying) for the under-secretary’s 
job in 1941, would accept nuclear weapons as soon as he came to power as 
prime minister in early 1963. Getting on with the Yanks was essential and 
necessary, and Pearson was nothing if not a practical man.20
***
Skelton had been heard in 1940, and should have been. Robertson was 
listened to from 1959 to 1963, and ought not to have been. The Canada of 
1940 was still psychologically a colony; the nation of the early 1960s was 
in an age of confidence and wealth, and after the Suez Crisis of 1956 in 
particular, it had begun to believe that it was a player in foreign policy. It 
wasn’t, not really, and in fact its influence was in the midst of a slow decline 
after the flush of power and influence created by the Second World War 
faded.
What Diefenbaker had done was to make the pulling of tail feath-
ers from the American eagle the national sport, and his successors, Brian 
Mulroney aside, successfully emulated him. The highpoints of this ap-
proach came under Prime Ministers Pierre Trudeau, Jean Chrétien, and 
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Paul Martin, with Lloyd Axworthy, Chrétien’s foreign minister, as the 
prime exponent of this tactic. With its security, trade, and economy de-
pendent on the United States, this was never wise policy. Canada was not 
a great power, not a self-sufficient island, and tail-feather pulling, while 
one of few sports other than hockey at which Canadians had long excelled, 
was foolish and appealed to the lowest common denominator of shrill anti-
Americanism.
All Canadians want Canada to be independent; certainly Skelton and 
Robertson did. But wise counsellors understand the limitations within 
which they must operate, and the most realistic Canadians have under-
stood that their nation’s aim should be to be as independent as possible in 
the circumstances, as one correspondent once told the late Peter Gzowski 
on the Canadian Broadcast Corporation’s radio program, “This Country 
in the Morning.” That is precisely it. Seize an opportunity if it comes, as 
Skelton did in 1940. But don’t, as Robertson did, pretend to be a major 
player by inventing obstacles to throw in the way of the great power on 
whom we depend, and especially not on issues, like disarmament, that we 
can only influence at the margins. Don’t shout out that Canada is a moral 
superpower, in other words, forever telling the Yanks that we know best. 
Robertson ±  and Trudeau, Chrétien, Martin, and Axworthy ±  did that, 
and they were wrong.
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In 1965, while the United Nations was celebrating its twentieth anniver-
sary, Canada’s Department of External Affairs drafted a short book, We the 
Peoples: Canada and the United Nations, 1945± 1965. According to its auth-
ors, the text presented “in compact form, an accurate and balanced survey 
of Canada’s participation in United Nations activities.” It explained “some-
thing of the philosophical basis of Canadian policy, or in other words, the 
Canadian ‘approach’ to issues coming before the United Nations.”1 More 
realistically, the tone of the publication was faithful to the department’s 
understood duty to reflect the sentiment of the time: Confident and opti-
mistic, We the Peoples celebrated Canada’s early United Nations experience.
Neither the tone nor the sentiment lasted. In 1967, Egypt brashly dis-
missed the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Sinai, shocking 
and disillusioning Canadians who saw the peacekeeping force and their 
participation as a symbol of their county’s worldly effectiveness. The fol-
lowing year, Canada’s new prime minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, prom-
ised to recalibrate Canada’s approach to world affairs. As historian Robert 





Bothwell has explained, to Trudeau, and others, Canadian foreign policy 
“had become the handmaiden of a misguided devotion to international 
institutions. Along the way, Canada’s national interest had been lost, or at 
least submerged, and Canada had earned itself the reputation of an inter-
national busybody.”2 When Trudeau’s secretary of state for external affairs 
revised We the Peoples ten years later, he went so far as to take explicit aim at 
its predecessor, noting that his text was “written from a more critical point 
of view; failures as well as successes [were] recorded, and disquietude [was] 
expressed as well as satisfaction.”3
What caused Canadians to become so distressed about the United 
Nations? And how did their understanding of the venerable international 
institution become so detached from their interpretation of the national 
interest? While some of the answer lies in objective developments in New 
York and further abroad, part of it lies in the way that External Affairs and 
its political masters explained their conduct on the world stage during the 
organization’s opening decades. This explanation was regularly given in 
annual reports, which permit historians to see how the Canadian public’s 
understanding of Canada’s place and role within the United Nations be-
came increasingly removed from the national interest.
During the negotiations to create the United Nations and through the 
term of Secretary-General Trygve Lie (1945± 52), the Department of Ex-
ternal Affairs pursued a United Nations policy of advocacy without insist-
ence: a measured approach that acknowledged the country’s strengths and 
weaknesses and was indeed informed by the government’s interpretation 
of the national interest. The ultimate goal during this period was to ensure 
the institution’s long-term viability. As the United Nations adjusted to the 
leadership of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld (1953± 61), the death 
of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, and the beginnings of decolonization, the 
department experienced its own transition. Having established a reputa-
tion in New York for diplomatic excellence, it often found itself in the spot-
light. What resulted was an approach to the organization that was at times 
less pragmatic but also more outwardly and politically rewarding. In the 
words of the former official turned commentator, John Holmes, Canada’s 
United Nations diplomacy “was not yet self-conscious,”4 but it was heading 
that way. Departmental reports during the early U Thant years (1961± 65), 
a time largely characterized by global optimism and idealism, were more 
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boldly positive. Although still conscious of the national interest, two suc-
cessive secretaries of state for external affairs, Conservative Howard Green 
and Liberal Paul Martin (Sr.), reshaped the Canadian commitment to the 
United Nations, framing it as a self-serving means of asserting a national 
presence on the world stage more than a necessary strategic duty. Canadian 
rhetoric came to emphasize what Ottawa was doing for the world rather 
than what an effective United Nations meant to the national interest. In 
summary, then, the language of the External Affairs’ reports throughout 
the organization’s first two decades reflected an evolving Canadian attitude 
towards the United Nations that was consistent with the changing national 
and international mood of the time. Nevertheless, by developing and ar-
ticulating policy that was consistent with the aims of its political masters, 
the Department of External Affairs was complicit in diplomatic efforts 
that increasingly lost sight of Canadian national interests.
Demands for Canada to commit itself to the “construction of an effect-
ive collective system” could be heard within the Department of External 
Affairs as early as January 1942, but the mandarins who worked in the 
East Block on Parliament Hill were not genuinely involved in discussions 
of the United Nations organization until more than eighteen months later.5
Before that, a plebiscite to release the government from its promise not to 
impose conscription and a much slower evolution of public attitudes in 
favour of greater internationalism allowed the reluctant Canadian prime 
minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King, to limit any opportunities for 
comprehensive planning. King did not receive a serious update on the state 
of British and American thinking about a new world organization until the 
end of March 1943, and it was only in July that the prime minister, who 
served as his own secretary of state for external affairs, publicly declared 
his support for what became the United Nations.6 Later that month, King’s 
under-secretary of state for external affairs, Norman Robertson, finally set 
in motion a process that resulted in the department’s first postwar planning 
groups, the advisory and working committees on post-hostilities problems.7
Over the next year and a half, the occupants of the East Block strove 
to determine how Canada might best contribute to the creation of a world 
organization that promoted the interests of the United Nations allies.8
Ensuring that the small powers were not taken for granted ±  while Brit-
ain, the United States, and eventually the Soviet Union devised the basic 
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framework of the world body ±  was a priority.9 The chair of the working 
committee on post-hostilities problems, Hume Wrong, explained Can-
adian thinking in February 1944: “as a secondary country we have not a 
great enough influence to make our views prevail. We should, however, 
be in a position at least to decide what is not acceptable and to advocate 
greater changes or additions to fit our particular interests.”10 Those interests 
included multilateral cooperation to promote national security, freedom to 
diverge from the United States on foreign policy, and fair representation of 
the smaller and medium-sized powers on the most significant UN bodies.
Not much later, Wrong described a Canadian dilemma. His govern-
ment, he wrote, “had two points of view to consider. We did not want to 
throw a monkey-wrench into the harmony among the Great Powers, but, 
on the other hand, we wanted to protect the Canadian position as well as 
that of the small countries.”11 It was vital to Canada’s interests that the new 
world organization be created. Once its establishment had been confirmed, 
Ottawa had to do its utmost to ensure that the perspective of smaller states 
was considered before significant decisions affecting Canadians were made. 
What became known as the functional principle ±  the idea that non-great 
powers should be granted influence in world affairs on a case by case basis 
commensurate with their capacity and willingness to contribute ±  formed 
the basis of the department’s philosophy going forward.12
The functional principle was based on the premise that there were two 
types of states in the global order: great powers, who participated in all 
international decisions; and everyone else, whose impact varied by issue. A 
corollary to this principle, albeit one that was never explicitly articulated, 
was that lesser states could exert more significant influence on those issues 
that concerned the great powers the least. Led by Wrong, the Depart-
ment of External Affairs therefore focused its postwar planning exercises 
on those elements of the United Nations Charter that played a lesser role 
in the US± UK± USSR negotiations. This meant thinking seriously about 
the economic and social aspects of the new organization, as well as making 
a significant contribution to the development of international law.13 At the 
founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco in April 1945, 
the department ultimately disappointed many of its smaller allies by sup-
porting a relatively broad interpretation of the great power veto. Its middle 
power-like leadership came through its exemplary diplomatic behaviour 
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during the drafting of the more innocuous articles of the United Nations 
Charter, which established the Economic and Social Council as well as in 
the discussions to create a world court.14
Diplomatic professionalism became the defining feature of the depart-
ment’s approach to the United Nations during the Trygve Lie era. De-
scribed generously by political scientist Anthony Gaglione as “turbulent 
years” for the organization, the period between 1945 and 1953 largely dis-
appointed. Cold War politics dominated UN meetings and caused the great 
powers to lose faith in the organization as a legitimate stage for diplomatic 
negotiations.15 External Affairs therefore channelled its efforts into low-
key initiatives designed to ensure the long-term viability and credibility of 
the United Nations as a whole. As Prime Minister King had explained at 
San Francisco, the ultimate goal was to build a structure “which over the 
years and decades to come will be strong enough to stand any strains to 
which it may be subjected.”16
The department sent many of its best officials to the early UN meet-
ings.17 They were drawn from the First Political Division ±  the ultimate 
domestic destination for talented diplomats ±  which was aptly renamed 
the United Nations Division in 1948. The group was assigned a broad 
mandate, including the provision of all advice on the government’s United 
Nations policy as well as public relations and communication with the or-
ganization’s secretariat. As historians John Hilliker and Don Barry have 
explained, Canada’s permanent delegation in New York shouldered greater 
responsibilities than many of its international equivalents. It liaised with 
other states’ UN offices and took the lead on virtually every foreign policy 
issue that related even indirectly to United Nations activities.18
From the beginning, Canadian diplomats were concerned with the 
composition of the United Nations Secretariat. At the international meet-
ings that followed San Francisco (which focused on the technical challen-
ges of turning a blueprint for a new world body into a functioning political 
structure), the Canadians emphasized, in their own words, “the necessity 
of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity 
… in the selection of the staff.”19 The call for competent representatives ex-
tended to individuals chosen to serve on UN committees and chairpersons 
selected to run their meetings. Members of the East Block also advocated a 
new committee on procedures and organization to maximize the efficiency 
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of General Assembly sessions and to guarantee that, when the political and 
diplomatic elite did travel to New York, their time would not be wasted by 
faulty organization and rhetorical excess.20
This rather conservative approach ±  emphasizing the little things and 
staying clear of the spotlight ±  was in evidence at the second part of the 
first session of the General Assembly in 1946. When the Soviet Union 
introduced an unhelpful resolution on disarmament, the Canadian delega-
tion declined to respond publicly. As the official report on the session made 
clear, Ottawa did not “consider it appropriate that a nation with a compara-
tively small population which had never had armed forces which might 
constitute a threat to the peace of the world should take the lead in putting 
forward the necessary amendments.” Rather, the Canadians argued, it was 
the United States ±  the only state then capable of launching an atomic 
weapon ±  that was best positioned to lead the effort.21
In spite of its disappointment with the world organization during its 
initial sessions, the Department of External Affairs orchestrated a suc-
cessful campaign to obtain a seat on the Security Council for 1948± 49. 
Although some states viewed accession to the ineffective council as an ill-
advised misuse of diplomatic resources, and others looked upon member-
ship on the elite body merely as an opportunity to bolster international 
prestige, the Canadians considered service on the council to be a duty and 
indeed a responsibility that self-proclaimed middle powers were obligated 
to accept. Just as Canada contributed more than its per capita share to the 
United Nations’ budget, it also allocated the human resources necessary to 
maintain the organization’s viability. Moreover, while other middle-sized 
states seemed to aspire for greatness, Canada’s diplomats remained focused 
on the basic practicalities that made international order possible.22
Ottawa’s term on the Security Council began just as the Cold War 
increased in intensity. Even as the great power conflict brought much of 
the work of the United Nations to a stand-still, however, Canada’s repre-
sentatives remained calm. The difficulties were not grounds to dissolve the 
organization, they argued; rather, increasing use of the great power veto at 
the Security Council meant that expectations would have to be lowered, 
and member states would have to become more creative in their efforts 
to maintain peace and order. One of the most effective ways forward was 
to minimize grounds for great power conflict. Canadian representatives 
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therefore spoke in favour of a rigorous and transparent budget-setting pro-
cess. Their campaign to minimize duplication and promote fiscal restraint 
among a proliferation of United Nations agencies continued as well.23
Members of the Canadian delegation also did not hesitate to criticize their 
international peers for idealistic overreach, with Secretary of State for Ex-
ternal Affairs Lester Pearson going so far as to proclaim: “We must not 
dissipate the moral and other resources of a world which desperately needs 
peace on too many secondary objectives, however desirable they may be in 
themselves.” In 1948, the delegation publicly identified the United Nations’ 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization as one of the worst of-
fenders.24
As Canada’s term on the Security Council came to an end in 1949, 
members of the Department of External Affairs remained guarded in their 
hopes for the organization as a whole. In reflecting on the international 
response to a Soviet blockade of Berlin, they noted,
The United Nations did what it could … to provide the machin-
ery through which an agreement could be reached if and when 
both parties wanted to agree. Although the importance of this 
function ought not be exaggerated, it should not be underesti-
mated. At a time of crisis, negotiations such as those which took 
place through the non-permanent members of the Council may 
well serve to reduce tension and to find ways out of a dilemma 
which might otherwise lead to war.25
The department continued to lobby for greater efficiency in the conduct 
of United Nations meetings and remained outspoken in its criticism of 
speeches that were clearly intended to serve a domestic political agenda 
rather than to advance the global dialogue. It persisted in linking economic 
and social development to peace and security ±  lending credence to the 
value of the proliferation of UN agencies ±  but at the same time it urged 
the secretariat to manage the organization’s budget prudently.
The department’s plea for caution and moderation hardly abated as the 
United Nations entered its second decade. In his preface to the report on 
Canada’s involvement with the United Nations in 1950, Pearson wrote: 
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The United Nations should not be judged as if it were a court to 
try offenders, with a police force always ready and able to pun-
ish those found guilty. The United Nations is not an entity in 
itself. It is the sum total of the wills of its members and of the 
combined contributions which they are willing to make. It is 
not now able to apply overwhelming pressure at all times on all 
offenders, major or minor. Its members must therefore conserve 
their limited resources in order to be able to apply them collect-
ively where they are most needed.26
Focusing on the unspectacular, setting realistic expectations, and manag-
ing efficiencies: this was the Department of External Affairs’ approach to 
UN engagement as the 1950s began.
There is scholarly debate over the extent of Canada’s loyalty to the 
United Nations during the Korean War, which dominated the organiza-
tion’s agenda toward the end of the Trygve Lie era. Although it is clear that 
Canadian policy-makers disagreed over whether their country should sup-
port the United Nations at the expense of Western solidarity, most analysts 
have concluded that Canada remained a moderate actor throughout the 
conflict, perpetually concerned with the long-term viability of the United 
Nations as a global institution.27 The East Block continued to measure the 
United Nations’ successes and failures realistically and recognized the lim-
ited impact of the General Assembly on any particular crisis.28 Nonethe-
less, argued Pearson, in spite of this lack of influence, Canada could not 
forsake its international commitments. “The basic principles of our national 
life,” he argued in the report for 1951± 52, “our need for unity and security, 
our belief in political liberty, the protection of our heritage of Christian 
civilization ±  affect every aspect of our external affairs. Canadian policies 
±  though they should be national policies ±  will always be influenced by 
international factors.” 29 Such thinking did not imply that Canada would 
be everywhere every time; Ottawa’s acceptance of global responsibilities re-
mained contingent on the state of its and its allies’ resources and a strategic 
assessment of where Canada could maximize its impact.
The measured, conservative approach of Canada’s Department of 
External Affairs was similarly evident in United Nations discussions of 
North-South issues. As countries in the rapidly decolonizing developing 
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world demanded greater freedoms, if not outright independence, the Can-
adian response favoured deliberate evolution over radical, and potentially 
violent, change. Moreover, in spite of the broad political failures of the 
United Nations as a whole, and of the international campaign for disarma-
ment more specifically, it was incumbent upon member states to remain 
diligent and committed to promoting peaceful means of conflict resolu-
tion. This was not to say that alternatives to the United Nations could 
not and should not be explored ±  the department noted repeatedly that 
its membership in NATO in no way contradicted its commitment to the 
UN ±  but that abandoning the world organization was not consistent with 
Canadian interests.30
The end of Lie’s term as secretary-general in November 1952 coincid-
ed almost exactly with Lester Pearson’s accession to the presidency of the 
United Nations General Assembly. (Pearson was elected less than a month 
before.) Both occurrences were critical to the Department of External Af-
fairs’ subsequent United Nations experience. Lie’s successor, Dag Ham-
marskjöld, was a pragmatist, but he was also an activist, determined to 
use his position as secretary-general to rehabilitate the reputation of the 
world organization and increase both its influence and its effectiveness.31
Joseph Stalin’s death in March 1953 and the subsequent thaw in Cold War 
tensions empowered the secretary-general to act more boldly than his pre-
decessor could have ever thought possible. Over the next eight years, the 
United Nations played a more aggressive role on the world stage, one that 
included Canada to a greater extent than historical precedent might have 
supported.
The increase in Canadian activism began symbolically with Pearson’s 
election. The foreign minister, already popular with the international media 
and within diplomatic circles, emerged as a recognized UN leader, and 
Canadians grew proud of his significance in New York. The combination 
of global acclaim and domestic enthusiasm for Canadian internationalism 
gradually shifted the focus of the Department of External Affairs. Over 
time, the United Nations became less of an organization to be nourished, 
and more of a platform to celebrate and perpetuate Canadian international 
achievements.
At first, changes in the behaviour in New York were hardly notice-
able. Members of External Affairs continued to focus on the importance 
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of sound economic management: the reach of the organization as a whole 
was not to exceed its grasp.32 The 1953 department’s general report recalled 
the significance of the great powers to UN affairs, noting that their dis-
agreements limited the ability of the smaller states to advance their own 
initiatives.33 Nonetheless, there were signs of political adjustments. The re-
port on Canada and the United Nations from 1953 to 1954 expressed hope 
that the organization would become “the principal forum for the settlement 
of contentious international issues.”34 Such an ambitious statement was a 
departure from previous depictions of the United Nations as “a meeting 
place of rival political and economic philosophies,”35 one that had “not yet 
achieved sufficient strength to resolve the major political problems of the 
contemporary world,” nor had “yet been able to provide to its Members 
the degree of security which would enable them to put it to full use for the 
peaceful settlement of international disputes.”36
In 1954, Canada accepted a seat on an exclusive subcommittee of the 
UN’s disarmament commission, a position which placed it on a relatively 
equal level with four of the five great powers. (Only China was excluded.) 
Again, recalling the prior unwillingness of Canadian delegates to assume a 
public leadership role on this issue, one might infer at least a modification 
of Canadian policy. The decision to co-sponsor a resolution praising the 
establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency in 1955 is con-
sistent with such a conclusion.37 Perhaps in part reflective of an improved 
international mood ±  made possible by an increasingly moderate and con-
ciliatory Soviet Union ±  there was also a new optimism in the tone of the 
official departmental reports. Writing in early 1956, Pearson remarked, 
There is now, it seems to me, a much greater comprehension of 
how closely the nations of the world are bound together, and 
the more fortunate peoples of the earth have assumed increas-
ing responsibility for the progress of less technically advanced 
countries. All this, and more, constitutes a considerable body 
of achievement. If we have the wisdom and courage to avoid 
the ultimate catastrophe of war, the United Nations can grow 
and develop as an effective and well-equipped organization for 
man’s progress toward an incomparably better life.38
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Pearson’s idealism built on his colleague Paul Martin’s success in facilitat-
ing the admission of sixteen new members to the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly in 1955. Martin, the federal cabinet minister who had been 
asked to lead the Canadian delegation while the secretary of state for exter-
nal affairs was away in Moscow, lobbied tirelessly to secure an agreement 
among the great powers who had previously vetoed the application of any 
state whom they viewed as an opponent in the Cold War.39
Whether Martin’s efforts should be considered an achievement in line 
with Canadian interests is debatable. Certainly, the Department of Exter-
nal Affairs thought so. In the words of its 1954± 55 UN report: “The United 
Nations could have been formed with a membership ‘exclusive to those 
who see alike on most things,’ but Canada never had any doubt as to the in-
finitely greater value of an organization embodying all the major traditions 
and contemporary philosophies of government.”40 The official history of 
External Affairs is similarly positive, noting the impact of Martin’s initia-
tive on Canada’s international reputation.41
Political scientist Tom Keating’s analysis, however, is more measured. 
Although Martin’s achievement demonstrated Canada’s ability to negoti-
ate multilaterally, expanding the United Nations membership changed the 
organization fundamentally, and not necessarily in a way that benefited 
Canadian national interests. Certainly, the United Nations better reflected 
the contemporary geopolitical environment but, in doing so, it became less 
of a servant of the West in the Cold War.42 John Holmes, who spent close 
to a decade as the department’s primary conduit on United Nations affairs, 
concurs, adding that because Minister Martin forced the United States to 
compromise on the world stage, the influence of Canada’s greatest ally over 
the rest of the world body declined.43
Regrettably, none of these analyses link the department’s United Na-
tions experience in 1955 to Canadian conduct during the Suez crisis the 
following year. In 1956, Lester Pearson played a leading role in brokering 
a compromise between the warring factions of Britain, France, and Israel 
on one side and Egypt on the other. The result was the imposition of what 
is known today as the first modern United Nations peacekeeping force. 
For his efforts, Pearson received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. His suc-
cess, following so closely after Martin’s, signified to many what one analyst 
called “a kind of break-through to new levels of responsibility for Canada 
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in the world.” To the respected commentator Maxwell Cohen, Ottawa had 
assumed the obligations of a great power, setting a precedent that could 
lead to significant changes in Canada’s international role and responsibil-
ities.44
The Department of External Affairs was initially less optimistic than 
the general public. Pearson’s achievement had been a source of significant 
national division at home (the Conservatives had accused him of selling 
out the British), and it coincided with the UN’s failure to respond to a 
brutal Soviet invasion of Hungary.45 On the peacekeeping force itself, the 
department wrote cautiously: “we have been able to introduce a new ele-
ment into the conduct of international relations which may be important if 
±  and it is well to emphasize the ‘if ’ ±  it works effectively on this occasion.”46
Indeed, the theme of the United Nations report for 1956± 57 was the 
familiar one of restraint. “The fact to remember,” wrote the foreign min-
ister, Pearson, “is that the United Nations is none other than the nations 
of this earth with all their weaknesses and conflicts. It is not some heav-
enly body beyond our world’s problems. It cannot accommodate what we 
its members are unprepared to do.”47 He went on to accentuate the limits 
of the organization and praised Canadians for their consistently moderate 
expectations of the United Nations as a global actor. Rather than advocat-
ing complete nuclear disarmament, the report suggested a more realistic 
short-term goal of limiting any further arms build-up. It cautioned against 
devising international development strategies based on any perceived moral 
necessity while encouraging greater focus on the possibility of success. It 
noted the potential benefits of the creation of an international civil service, 
but then conceded the perhaps insurmountable challenge of convincing 
United Nations member states to contribute their most effective diplomats 
to a cause that obligated them to put global interests ahead of national 
concerns. On the development of a covenant on economic, social, and cul-
tural rights, the department sided with a minority in opposing the explicit 
enumeration of the steps necessary to make global commitments. “By their 
nature they were not rights which could be guaranteed unequivocally by 
legislation,” Ottawa explained, “and might more appropriately be con-
sidered as objectives to which governments and peoples should strive, by 
legislative or other means, as appropriate to the conditions and systems of 
individual countries.”48
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In summary, the final report on the United Nations published under 
the leadership of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent and Secretary of State 
for External Affairs Pearson downplayed recent national accomplishments 
and lowered expectations of what Canada might achieve in the future. That 
the new Conservative prime minister, John Diefenbaker, allowed it to be 
published after winning the 1957 election, however, did not mean that his 
government planned to follow its implicit advice. Diefenbaker’s early pub-
lic statements as prime minister and acting secretary of state for external 
affairs suggest that he was much more enamoured with Maxwell Cohen’s 
thinking than with the message that his department was sending him. At 
the meeting of the General Assembly in September 1957, Diefenbaker an-
nounced to the world that, “so far as Canada is concerned, support of the 
United Nations is the cornerstone of its foreign policy.”49
Departmental publications under Diefenbaker’s first secretary of state 
for external affairs, the sincere, yet inexperienced Sidney Smith, reflect the 
conflict between the two approaches. The 1957 report was measured, yet 
optimistic. Smith conceded that the United Nations had often struggled 
because of the great powers’ inability to compromise, noting that accepting 
its limitations was “merely to face the facts of international life.” But he also 
called the organization “a unique and indispensable instrument of inter-
national diplomacy which has achieved important results in all of the vari-
ous spheres of activity for which it was created.” The latter statement was 
an exaggeration that even the rest of the report itself could not sustain. The 
department in fact admitted that there were significant limits to what the 
organization had achieved in the security realm, emphasizing instead the 
importance of the UN’s social and economic accomplishments.50
Smith passed away before the 1958 report had been completed, and its 
relatively modest assessment of the United Nations and Canada’s contribu-
tion to its conduct that year is consistent with a department whose leader-
ship was in flux.51 The 1959 version was similarly restrained, prompting one 
analyst to observe that under the foreign policy novice, Howard Green, 
Canada appeared to have withdrawn from the international spotlight.52
There were signs, however, that the pressures ±  domestic and inter-
national ±  that were pushing a more idealistic approach to the fore were be-
coming greater. In September 1959, the department published an unusual-
ly comprehensive and retrospective summary of Canada’s UN contribution 
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in its magazine, External Affairs. “Canada and the United Nations: The 
Record after Fourteen Years” was the first comprehensive (official) analysis 
of the history of Canadian participation in the organization and marked a 
departure in the overall approach to reporting the East Block’s activities. 
The tone was different from the yearly summaries. Whereas the annual 
publications had concentrated on the progress of the institution as a whole, 
this article put Ottawa front and centre, emphasizing Canada’s impact on 
United Nations policies and practices. On the first page, the department 
boasted of “the frequency with which Canada and Canadians have ap-
peared in the record of the United Nations.” The essay also concluded with 
an optimism that was hardly consistent with the more guarded general 
tenor of the previous thirteen years: “the accomplishments of the United 
Nations during its lifetime are indeed impressive, and the successes far out-
weigh the failures, not only in the more serious and spectacular crises, but 
also in the lesser disagreements which have been settled before they could 
develop into something serious.”53
The accounts of the following year confirmed that Green’s era would 
be different. The decision to focus on Canada was proclaimed immediately: 
“The Annual Report of 1960 differs from previous Annual Reports. Instead 
of methodically recounting events in various countries and organizations 
during the year, it concentrates on a few main themes in which Canada has 
a special interest or concern and expands the Canadian Government’s pos-
ition on them.” The document captured the zeal and passion of its minister 
as well as Green’s personal opposition to nuclear proliferation. It empha-
sized Ottawa’s efforts to pass a resolution at the Disarmament Commis-
sion, which admittedly had little real impact, as well as its commitment to 
working with like-minded countries, a statement that constituted a rejec-
tion of the unspoken tradition of ensuring that Canada’s great power allies 
were on side for any major United Nations initiative.54 More cynically, the 
report reflected what analyst Peyton Lyon later described as a Conservative 
obsession with Canadian prestige that was measured by the popularity of 
the delegation in New York.55
The shift in focus coincided with the UN’s greatest crisis to date. At 
a time when Soviet intransigence, under the now firmly in power Nikita 
Khrushchev, was once again threatening the future of the organization, 
and members of the developing world were plotting to reshape the political 
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and economic agenda, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld was killed in a 
plane crash. The choice of his replacement, the former Burmese diplomat, 
U Thant, was telling. Decolonization and its implications soon dominated 
the United Nations dialogue.56 Ironically, the emphasis on the global south 
enabled a more rigorous pursuit of the Conservatives’ agenda. As advocates 
of the functional principle might have predicted, once the United Nations 
began to tackle challenges that were of less direct concern to the great 
powers, Ottawa could make its public presence felt more easily.
In the departmental report on Canada and the United Nations for 
1961, Green and his officials took credit for improving the atmosphere in 
New York in the wake of Hammarskjöld’s tragic death. Canada, the ac-
count maintained, urged the organization to strive for consensus on the 
most pressing international issues, such as global disarmament and the im-
pact of science and technology on national and international outer space 
strategies.57 The following year, in spite of the nearly catastrophic Cuban 
Missile Crisis, the Department of External Affairs proclaimed that the 
United Nations “found itself in a position of enhanced prestige and au-
thority increasing the confidence of members states about the future of the 
organization.”58 Having now fully abandoned the conservative perspective 
of the past, the report celebrated the organization’s “remarkable resilience” 
and expressed hope over the future of the recently revived disarmament 
negotiations. Even though U Thant was precluded from playing his pre-
scribed role in Cuba, his general assistance enhanced the UN’s prestige. 
The specialized agencies continued to demonstrate their critical contribu-
tions to international economic and social development. And the organ-
ization in New York remained the only quasi-universal body designed to 
promote and support improved global understanding.59
The defeat of the Diefenbaker government had no impact on the in-
crease in the announcements of Canadian leadership in New York. Rather, 
the period of détente (and increasing Western influence in the developing 
world) which followed the Cuban Missile Crisis seemed to inspire even 
greater internationalist optimism throughout Ottawa. When Paul Martin 
took over as secretary of state for external affairs under Prime Minister 
Lester Pearson, the Department of External Affairs became more aggres-
sive. At the meeting of the General Assembly in September 1963, Pearson 
called for an expansion of both the Security Council and the Economic 
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and Social Council as well as a new team of military experts to advise the 
United Nations Secretary-General on the future of peacekeeping.60 These 
dramatic pronouncements betrayed the caution of the 1940s and 1950s as 
well as the idea that major constitutional changes should be great power 
initiatives.
Martin’s summary of the Canadian experience at the United Nations 
predictably echoed Pearson’s confidence in Canada’s diplomatic abilities. 
More interesting, however, was the conflicted nature of the report as it 
related to the progress of the UN as an organization. The first pages pre-
sented an overly optimistic view of the state of United Nations affairs. Mar-
tin celebrated the hope, calmness, and moderation that seemed to typify 
the post-Cuban strategic environment and praised the work of the special-
ized bodies in promoting economic and social stability. Later on, however, 
the tone became sombre. Rejecting Pearson’s call for dramatic structural 
changes, Martin argued that real progress was most likely to result from 
“a painstaking process of accommodation.” The key, he alleged, was for the 
United Nations to “keep its house in order and all its instruments ±  of con-
ciliation, co-operation and collective response ±  ready for instant service in 
the cause of peace and understanding.”61
The next year, the general departmental report used pragmatic lan-
guage but stressed idealistic thinking. “In a constantly contracting world,” 
wrote Martin, “the national interest can be defined only in part by ref-
erence to what preoccupies us within our national boundaries. In many 
respects, the national interest can best be advanced by cooperative inter-
national action designed to further the interests of the world community 
at large.” Later on, he added, “We are concerned that the United Nations 
should continue to have an effective capacity to keep the peace because this 
is something in which we believe.” Peacekeeping, he wrote, “is one of the 
practical ways in which a middle power like Canada can meet its respon-
sibilities as a member of the world community.”62
These comments mark a shift in Ottawa’s conception of the United 
Nations as an organization. With Canadians feeling more secure about 
their place in the world, and their government intent on transforming its 
minority position into a majority, the United Nations became valued for 
its role in promoting the ideals of peace and disarmament, not because it 
advanced Canada’s national interest in order and stability. Ottawa became 
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an ambitious coalition builder as opposed to a secondary actor whose great-
est role played out behind the scenes. In 1957, in recalling the creation of 
the United Nations Emergency Force that established a temporary peace 
in Suez, the department had written, “The United Nations has been able 
to establish an Emergency Police Force in the Middle East.”63 In 1965, 
it celebrated Canadian leadership “not only in establishing UNEF but in 
securing a basis for its financing which reflected the belief that the peace-
keeping endeavours of the United Nations were in every sense the collect-
ive responsibility of its members.”64 It was this optimism that explains the 
language and tone of We the Peoples, an internationalist spirit that did not 
survive the ‘Canada First’ mentality of the early Trudeau era.
In conclusion, the change in tone within the UN reports of the De-
partment of External Affairs between 1943 and 1965 reflects the ministry’s 
loyalty to its political masters and the circumstances of the time. Regret-
tably, the department’s effectiveness enabled Canadian leaders to gradually 
set aside the national interest in favour of more parochial concerns. And 
although the drift was eventually arrested, elements of the misguided opti-
mism remain in much of the historical literature.65 More realistically, as 
two analysts reflected as early as 1956, “membership in the United Nations, 
insofar as it means an increase in responsibilities without an appreciable 
advance in influence, exacts a price that is far from negligible in return for 
its contribution to the creation of the kind of world that Canada’s national 
interests demand.”66 Functionalism was critical: Canada’s Department of 
External Affairs could indeed play a significant role at the United Nations, 
but only on particular issues based on its capabilities and the relative inter-
est of the great powers.
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By the spring of 1946 the spectre of a Soviet threat to North America 
loomed large in the minds of American officials, who warily cast their eyes 
over polar projection maps and saw an undefended attic to the continent. 
Ambitious defence plans for the Arctic began to flow onto the desks of 
Canadian officials, evoking grave concerns in the Department of External 
Affairs about Canada’s sovereignty in the region. Lester B. Pearson, then 
ambassador to the United States, believed that these defence projects of-
fered Canada an opportunity “to secure from the United States Govern-
ment public recognition of our sovereignty of the total area of our northern 
coasts, based on the sector principle.”1 Canada’s longstanding but officially 
unstated sector claim to all of the lands (and eventually waters) between 60° 
and 141° west longitude up to the North Pole offered the simplest solution 
to consolidating its opaque Arctic claims.2 Although Pearson was confident 
that he could attain from his American counterparts formal recognition on 
this basis, he was overly optimistic.
Sovereignty and 
Security: Canadian Diplomacy, the United States, and the Arctic, 
1943–1968
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Unwilling to push the United States into a position where they had to 
disagree with Canada’s claims, Hume Wrong, the acting under-secretary 
of state for external affairs, advised Pearson to avoid any formal attempt to 
secure American recognition. Not only would its Antarctic interests keep 
the United States from accepting the sector theory, Wrong astutely noted, 
but any such attempt might prompt Washington to challenge Canada’s 
claims.3 “For a good many years now we have proceeded without difficulty 
on the assumption that our sovereignty was not challenged,” Wrong ob-
served. “A declaration of this sort would revive discussion of an issue which 
may in practice turn out to have been closed.”4 While Pearson had been 
willing to lay all of Canada’s cards on the table in the hopes of attaining 
the optimum desired outcome, Wrong embraced a modest diplomacy that 
sought to shape a more sustainable, if less dramatic, solution to Canada’s 
sovereignty worries.
The historical literature is divided along similar lines. One recent com-
mentator has asserted that Canada should have embraced Pearson’s ap-
proach in the postwar years and pressed for formal United States recogni-
tion of Canadian sovereignty in return for Canada’s cooperation in the 
northern defence projects.5 Historian Shelagh Grant has suggested that 
Canada actually sacrificed its sovereignty to ensure American security.6
Such conclusions distort the context of decision-making and the nature of 
bilateral negotiations regarding the Arctic. Scholars David Bercuson and 
Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel have emphasized the cooperation, respect, and 
open dialogue that characterized the defence relationship after 1946 and 
argue that Ottawa successfully safeguarded Canada’s sovereignty and ef-
fectively contributed to continental security.7 This paper concurs with their 
assessment based upon a fresh appraisal of the archival record, much of it 
recently declassified.
Canadian policy-makers, particularly in the Department of External 
Affairs, did an admirable job of balancing Canadian sovereignty inter-
ests with the security needs of the United States from the early Cold War 
to the eve of the Manhattan voyage in 1969. Although Canada did not 
get its way on every issue, an underlying spirit of mutual respect allowed 
Canada to preserve ±  and indeed strengthen ±  its sovereignty while ac-
commodating its American ally insofar as its national interests allowed. 
This approach secured United States acquiescence to Canadian territorial 
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sovereignty claims, despite America’s rejection of the sector principle. 
When the emphasis shifted to maritime issues in the 1950s, the legal issues 
proved more intractable, but a functional approach, predicated on “agree-
ing to disagree” over the status of the waters of the Arctic archipelago, 
maintained a cooperative bilateral relationship. Rather than seeing Can-
adian decision-making in the 1940s and 1950s as failing to secure Amer-
ican acquiescence to Canada’s future claim to the Northwest Passage, a 
more positive appraisal might recognize how careful diplomacy helped to 
position Canada so that it could implement a functional approach under 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in the early 1970s and declare straight 
baselines under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in 1985. While postwar 
diplomatic actions appear ad hoc, reactionary, and tentative, they were ap-
propriately suited to a complex situation. Officials at External Affairs ac-
knowledged Canada’s limitations but managed in steering a prudent and 
practical course to lay the groundwork for future assertions of Canadian 
jurisdiction and sovereignty in the Arctic.
The modern Canadian sovereignty debate began during the Second 
World War. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 
1941, the Canadian Northwest became an important strategic link to Al-
aska. The United States undertook a number of massive defence projects 
in northern Canada, including a system of airfields called the Northwest 
Staging Route, an oil pipeline, and the Alaska Highway. As Washington’s 
stake in the northwest steadily grew, the Canadian government, includ-
ing the Department of External Affairs, remained as uninterested in pro-
tecting the sovereignty of the region as it had been prior to the war.
Although Liberal Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King 
allowed the Americans onto Canadian soil with few constraints, he was 
always suspicious of their intentions. Worrisome reports from Malcolm 
MacDonald, the British high commissioner who visited the defence pro-
jects in 1943 and was alarmed at the scale of American activities, spurred 
the prime minister to reassert control in the Canadian North.8 To ensure 
greater control over American activities and protect Canadian sovereign-
ty, the government appointed a special commissioner, Brigadier-Gener-
al W.W. Foster, to oversee the various American defence projects in the 
Northwest.9 As the war drew to a close, Canada increased its control over 
the North by securing full ownership of all permanent facilities on its 
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territory by purchasing them from the United States. The Americans also 
agreed that, before they began any project on or over Canadian territory, it 
had to be approved by the Canadian government.10 By 1945 most Amer-
icans had left Canadian territory and the Northwest was more secure than 
ever.
While it is easy to condemn the government for its reactive approach 
to protecting Canadian sovereignty in the North during the war, it is also 
understandable. In the midst of a global war and suffering from a lack of 
experienced personnel, External Affairs had to prioritize its areas of focus. 
In the early years of the war, with the European theatre the overriding na-
tional preoccupation, officials did not look to the Canadian North for ob-
vious reasons. Neither did the department plan for the difficult sovereignty 
issues that arose during the war, which compelled it to deal with these 
problems in a reactive manner. As the war progressed, however, External 
Affairs grew in size and sophistication and began to handle complex prob-
lems effectively, including the situation in the North.11 The steep wartime 
learning curve paid off, and the defence negotiations of the early Cold War 
proved that Canadian diplomats were both attentive and responsive to po-
tential sovereignty encroachments.
Shortly after the defeat of the Axis powers, the wartime relation-
ship between the Western allies and the Soviet Union began to dissolve. 
Canada’s undesirable strategic position, sandwiched between two oppos-
ing superpowers, meant that “Canada could not stay out of a third World 
War if 11,999,999 of her 12,000,000 citizens wanted to remain neutral,” 
to quote Louis St. Laurent’s memorable phrase.12 Canada had become the 
potential frontline of the next global conflict. “The dilemma,” military his-
torian David Bercuson has argued, was simple: “how could Canada help 
protect the continent against the Soviet Union ±  a job Ottawa agreed need-
ed doing ±  while, at the same time, it protected the Canadian north against 
the United States?”13
In early May 1946, the United States proposed the establishment of a 
chain of weather stations in the Canadian Arctic. Despite American as-
surances that Canada’s sovereignty would not be threatened, Canadian of-
ficials believed that American acceptance of the sector principle was the 
ideal way to protect Canada’s interests.14 Global interests, however, made it 
impossible for the Americans to formally accept Canadian sovereignty in 
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the region by sanctioning the sector principle, which was also used by the 
Soviet Union to claim a large section of the Arctic and by several nations 
to claim vast portions of the Antarctic.15 Accepting Canada’s claims would 
have strengthened the positions of these nations to the detriment of Wash-
ington’s strategic interests.16 Had Canada insisted on a formal recognition 
of its sovereignty, its position would have been dramatically weakened by 
the inevitable American rejection.
Officials in the Department of External Affairs advised against asking 
Washington for a formal assurance that Canada’s sovereignty would not 
be threatened lest this indicate “that we entertain some doubts as to our 
claims in the Arctic.”17 Instead, they set to work creating guidelines for the 
weather station program that would best enforce Canada’s claims to the 
Arctic. Acknowledging American assurances that Canadian sovereignty 
would not be threatened, the department suggested that the venture be ap-
proved as a joint project so long as all permanent rights to any installations 
were retained by Canada, the majority of personnel would be Canadian, 
and the projects would be under Canadian command.18 This approach was 
consistent with the steps taken during the final years of the war to gain 
control of the defence projects in the Northwest. Using these proven meth-
ods, Canadian officials hoped to consolidate their country’s sovereignty in 
the Arctic.
Although the same guidelines were laid out in a report by Chief of 
the General Staff Major General D.C. Spry and accepted by the Cabinet 
Defence Committee, King decided to deny the American request for 1946. 
Acknowledging the American tendency to act swiftly and with little con-
cern for Canada’s needs when threatened, the prime minister hoped the 
United States would pause to evaluate Canada’s difficult position. On 2 
July, Ottawa informed Washington that the program had not been rejected 
±  only deferred for the purposes of further study.19 This prime minister-
ial-directed policy of delaying decisions on continental defence, slowing 
the whole process until the complex situation could be sorted out benefi-
cially for Canada, was a cautious but prudent one. Bold, aggressive moves 
(particularly ones that would have entailed significant Canadian defence 
expenditures) would have been out of step with the cooperative defence 
relationship then taking shape.20
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In early 1947, after careful negotiations, the two countries accepted 
a set of formal guidelines regulating continental defence, effectively as-
suring Ottawa that the United States had no desire to violate Canadian 
sovereignty claims in the North.21 In mid-February, the prime minister 
announced the general principles governing Canada± United States defence 
cooperation in the House of Commons. “As an underlying principle,” King 
explained, “all cooperative arrangements will be without impairment of 
the control of either country over all activities in its territory.”22 There was 
no mention of the sector principle; the wording of the agreement avoided 
such controversial language. This omission, however, did not concern the 
Canadians. Canada had explicit assurance that its terrestrial sovereignty in 
the Arctic would not be threatened.
Despite gaining solid assurances protecting Canadian sovereignty over 
the Arctic, External Affairs maintained a level of persistent concern about 
American activities in the region. The government carefully monitored all 
American activities in the region to ensure that nothing was done that 
could be perceived as a lack of Canadian control. When American aircraft 
attached to Operation Polaris, a project originally established to study the 
challenges related to Arctic flying, began carrying out regular reconnais-
sance flights and engaging in aerial photography in the Arctic in 1947, 
the Canadian member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) 
argued that the Americans had strayed from the initial aims of the project 
and forced an apology.23 The following year, when United States ships used 
the Fury and Hecla Straits without first notifying Ottawa and securing 
the necessary approvals,24 External Affairs immediately complained to the 
State Department to set the matter right.25 In the most effective asser-
tion of Canada’s de facto control of the region, savvy diplomats at External 
Affairs forced the Americans to adhere to the Game Laws of the Arctic 
Preserve, the Scientists and Explorers Ordinance, and the Archaeological 
Sites Ordinance. Before Americans could hunt in the Arctic, for example, 
they had to seek the approval of External Affairs or the Department of 
Mines and Resources.26 Interestingly, the original creators of the Arctic 
Game Preserve, especially the former under-secretary of state for external 
affairs, O.D. Skelton, had hoped it would prove of distinct value as an 
assertion of Canadian sovereignty in the North.27 During the early Cold 
War, the Arctic Preserve fulfilled this purpose.
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The Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line
The decision to build a Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line across Can-
ada’s Arctic in the 1950s posed a series of more serious sovereignty ques-
tions. As early as 1946, Canadian and American authorities had begun 
to consider the possibility of building a radar chain in the Arctic to give 
warning of any Soviet attack. In June 1954 the Canada± United States Mil-
itary Studies Group urged that a radar network be built stretching more 
than eight thousand kilometres from Alaska to Baffin Island, to provide 
warning of an incoming Soviet attack. By extending military outposts 
northward, defence planners sought to achieve strategic defence in depth.28
Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent’s government, already stretched 
thin honouring its NATO commitments in Europe and the UN police 
action in Korea, could not afford the kind of defence installations required 
to satisfy its superpower ally. The Americans would have to pay for and 
build the high Arctic radar network, even if three-quarters of the installa-
tion stretched across Canadian territory. But Canada did not write a blank 
cheque, despite the claims of some critics. Ralph Campney, the minister 
of national defence, explained the government’s logic to the Cabinet De-
fence Committee on 20 January 1955: “If a substantial contribution to the 
operation and maintenance of the line were to be made once it had been 
completed and was in operation, it would not, in my view, be necessary to 
participate in the construction and installation phase, other than to ensure 
that Canadian interests were protected in the ways outlined in the pro-
posed agreement.”29 Cabinet endorsed the decision on 26 January 1955 and 
sought a formal agreement with the United States.
Canadian negotiators reached an advantageous agreement with the 
Americans. Washington bore the full cost of construction but subcon-
tracted to Canadian companies and hired Canadian civilian technicians 
and support staff. Canada retained title to all sites in its northland and in-
sisted upon the right to inspect work and to approve any change of plans. 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police Constables and Northern Service Of-
ficers were stationed at several sites to regulate relations with the Inuit 
and to oversee game laws. Moreover, the United States agreed to share 
geological, hydrographical, and other scientific data obtained during the 
construction and operation phases and agreed that Canadian government 
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ships and aircraft could use landing facilities at beaches and airstrips. 
Concurrently, the United States was prohibited from using the airstrips 
for any activity other than DEW Line support without Canadian consent. 
“The list of conditions read like a litany of Canadian sovereignty sensitiv-
ities and desire for control,” historian Alexander Herd notes.30 All told, 
it was a small coup for Canadian sovereignty: the Americans officially 
acknowledged that all of the islands in the Far North explicitly belonged 
to Canada. “As a result of the DEW Line Agreements,” strategist R.J. 
Sutherland explained, “Canada secured what the United States had up to 
that time assiduously endeavoured to avoid, namely, an explicit recogni-
tion of Canadian claims to the exercise of sovereignty in the Far North.”31
Although journalists and politicians on the opposition benches con-
tinued to voice concerns about sovereignty after the radar network was 
completed in 1957, federal officials reached mutually satisfactory solutions 
in Washington showing that the Americans respected Canada’s insecur-
ities about sovereignty.32 Indeed, the DEW Line contributed more to Can-
adian sovereignty in the North than it detracted from it. It was run in the 
spirit of partnership, the Royal Canadian Air Force took over the manage-
ment of Canadian sections of the line in 1959, and it did not drive Canada 
into bankruptcy. “The capital costs of those DEW-Line stations in Canada 
was approximately $350 million,” Clive Baxter of the Financial Post noted 
on 23 February 1963. “This was paid for entirely by the U.S. but in almost 
every case, construction and transportation contracts went to Canadian 
firms giving northern development the biggest shot in the arm it ever had.” 
The benefits did not end there. He reported that the Americans paid $25±
28 million annually to operate the DEW Line, with most of the money 
flowing into Canada. “Some 96% of the civilians employed on the line 
(there are only a handful of military men) are Canadians. Food supplies 
and airlift are bought from Canadian suppliers.” During the construction 
phase, the DEW Line agreement required contractors to “give preference 
to qualified Canadian labour” and this continued during the operation 
phase. The employment of both Inuit and southern Canadian men, who 
represented 97 per cent of the personnel along the Canadian section of the 
line by 1963, may have helped to entrench Canada’s claims to “effective oc-
cupation” of its arctic.33 In short, historian Michael Evans aptly concluded, 
the agreement “allowed the United States to build and operate the DEW 
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Line … [and] protected the sovereignty of the Canadian government while 
offering financial subsidies to the Canadian economy and contributing to 
the development of the Canadian frontier.”34
Sober assessment of the operational phase of the DEW Line should 
have allayed any continuing concerns about American intentions or threats 
to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. International lawyer Eric Wang, a legal 
adviser at National Defence, visited the line in May 1969 and concluded 
that Canadian sovereignty had been strengthened rather than weakened 
as a result of the DEW Line’s existence. Touring the Canadian section of 
the radar network, he came away convinced that reports about the insensi-
tivities of the Americans on the DEW Line “and the inferences they carry 
about Canadian sovereignty in the North, are very misleading.”35 American 
behaviour was both accommodating and appropriate, and Wang concluded 
that both countries’ interests in the radar network were compatible and 
mutually beneficial. In his assessment, anecdotal evidence of sovereignty 
encroachments and bilateral friction had been overblown:
American policy towards the DEW Line appears to be based 
on a desire to accommodate themselves as harmoniously and as 
constructively as possible into the Canadian setting which they 
have to operate.… Perhaps it may be possible to detect some 
sour notes by diligent searching. I wonder, however, whether 
any such problems would weigh very heavily against the im-
portant benefits which accrue to Canada from this project in the 
development of the North, not to speak of its essential contribu-
tion to our security. Indeed we might be tempted to congratu-
late ourselves (with a nod to Professor [James] Eayrs) for enjoying 
a “free ride” at least in this area of our defense activities on our 
own soil, without any unpleasant side effects.36
Scholars should turn to environmental and socio-cultural legacies of the 
DEW Line, not alleged sovereignty erosion, if they wish to challenge 
Wang’s claim that the effects of this continental defence megaproject were 
overwhelmingly benign. Canadian diplomats and defence officials did not 
sell out vital national interests ±  they secured them through quiet diplo-
macy, a functional approach, and a process that was “cordial, respectful, 
and mutually beneficial.”37
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The Arctic Archipelago and Maritime Claims
After the conclusion of the DEW Line agreement in 1955, the federal 
government’s primary de jure sovereignty concerns shifted from the main-
land and archipelagic islands to the water (ice) between and around the 
islands. The unique geography of the Canadian Arctic made it an interest-
ing and complicated case. Its symmetrical, unitary appearance ±  “practical-
ly a solid land mass intersected by a number of relatively narrow channels 
of water” ±  distinguished it from other archipelagos around the world, a 
British diplomatic document stated in 1958.38 That same year, External 
Affairs’ legal expert Gilles Sicotte wrote that the properties of Canada’s 
Arctic waters made them even more unique. They were not open to naviga-
tion without extensive Canadian assistance, their ice cover was completely 
indistinguishable from land for most of the year, and the sea ice was lived 
on and moved over. The Arctic archipelago was physically, geographically, 
and economically tied to the mainland.39 But as late as the 1950s senior 
Canadian officials admitted that Canada had not clearly formulated its 
position with regard to sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic basin and 
the channels between its Arctic islands, both from “narrow national” and 
“international” points of view.40 This clarification would take decades to 
realize.
While postwar military activities bolstered Canada’s legal claims to 
the mainland and islands of the archipelago, the Arctic waters were an 
entirely different story. By agreement, American vessels that supplied the 
DEW Line applied for and received Canadian waivers under the Canada 
Shipping Act before they proceeded.41 Captain T.C. Pullen, serving as the 
commanding officer of HMCS Labrador at the time, was appointed a U.S. 
Navy task group commander and reported to a U.S. Navy admiral during 
the 1957 sealift. One of his jobs was to ensure that three United States 
coast guard ships got safely through the Northwest Passage. “In those 
days, Canadians did not react as they would now to foreign encroachment 
in their Arctic waters,” he reminisced thirty years later; “but they had no 
cause. Great care was taken by the United States to respect Canadian in-
terests. The joint security interest in the DEW line provided a shared in-
centive to devise arrangements that would avoid injury to either national 
position.”42 Indeed, journalists heralded Canada’s supply efforts as a “big 
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gain for sovereignty” in that it “immeasurably strengthens our claim to the 
waters between the islands.”43 The simple fact that these vessels would have 
to pass through Canadian coastal waters to supply DEW Line stations on 
Canadian land made this a relatively uncontroversial arrangement that did 
not call into question the extent of Canada’s maritime claims.
How far did Canada’s territorial waters extend? The question reached 
the House of Commons on 5 April 1957, and External Affairs lawyer Jim 
Nutt explained that the seaward boundary of the internal and contigu-
ous water boundaries of the Archipelago remained unclear. “Lancaster 
and Viscount Melville Sounds constitute the main waterway through the 
Arctic Archipelago and are approximately 70 miles wide at the eastern 
entrance and 100 at the western entrance,” he noted. “The establishment 
and recognition of the territoriality of these waters would seem to be tan-
tamount, at least by implication, to the establishment and recognition of a 
claim to all the internal waters of the Archipelago.”44 So what waters did 
Canada actually claim? Senior government officials in Ottawa scrambled 
to find out. In the mid-1950s, the government requested copies of the ori-
ginal British title documents to the Arctic Islands and began to study its 
rights to the waters in the archipelago.45
Before Canada formulated an official position, it had to ponder na-
tional goals and the international implications of claiming the waters and 
ice, as well as the underlying seabed and air space above. “In addition to 
any advantages,” observed Gordon Robertson, deputy minister of northern 
affairs and natural resources and chairman of the Advisory Committee 
on Northern Development, “sovereignty would imply certain obligations 
including the provision of such services as aids to sea and air navigation, 
the provision of any necessary local administration, and the enforcement 
of law” ±  in other words, the expenditure of public money. In response, 
the Soviet Union might either reject the claim or use it as a pretext to as-
sert sovereignty over an even larger sector north of its mainland, and other 
countries would likely refuse to recognize a Canadian claim.46 Indeed, re-
porters recognized that “the Russians would like nothing better than to stir 
up a row between Uncle Sam and Canada over who owns the Arctic ice 
and sea on our side of the North Pole.”47
Canadian diplomats recognized that pushing for clarity and trying to 
secure American and other countries’ acquiescence to Canadian claims was 
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not a straightforward matter. As the Legal Division reported to the act-
ing under-secretary on 23 February 1954, a formal solicitation carried “an 
implication that we may have some doubts regarding our sovereignty in the 
absence of formal recognition by foreign states.”48 Another departmental 
memorandum noted that it was almost a “certainty that the United States 
would not concede such a claim and that the world at large would not ac-
quiesce in it. It would therefore seem preferable not to raise the problem 
now and to implicitly reserve our position in granting permission for the 
U.S. to carry out work in Canadian territorial waters.” It made more sense 
for Canada to reach agreements with Washington on “the unstated as-
sumption that ‘territorial waters’ in that area means whatever we may con-
sider to be Canadian territorial waters, whereas the U.S. does likewise.”49
Provoking protests from foreign countries would hardly serve Canada’s na-
tional interests, and the longer Canada exercised authority the stronger its 
claims would become.
Canada could not pretend to exist in a vacuum, its sovereignty issues 
divorced from broader geostrategic considerations. Claiming a twelve-mile 
territorial sea, for example, would place Canada in conflict with British 
challenges to the Soviet Union regarding fishing rights up to a three-mile 
limit.50 As a member of the Commonwealth and fellow North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) ally, Canada was not anxious to undermine 
Britain’s position. In addition, transits of the Northwest Passage by U.S. 
Navy submarines demonstrated the great strategic importance of the Arctic 
to Canada’s closest defence partner. The Arctic Ocean, covered by a dense 
and noisy ice pack, sheltered submarines from aerial surveillance and sonar 
detection ±  important considerations with the introduction of submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Commander James F. Calvert of the 
submarine, USS Skate, told public audiences that the United States could 
“best hold its world leadership by gaining superiority in the Arctic,” and 
that the Arctic waters would soon become an “entirely nuclear sub-ocean.” 
While this was not official policy, it indicated to Canadian officials that the 
American government would take “ever increasing interest” in the region.51
What imperative was there for Canada to act unilaterally and adopt 
straight baselines to close off its Arctic waters, in advance of international 
law, and with little regard for its allies’ interests? In 1958, the International 
Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted Article 4 of the Convention 
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on Territorial Waters which provided for a straight baseline system to de-
limit its territorial sea. This, in conjunction with the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) decision in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (1951), might 
apply to the waters of the channels between the islands of the Canadian 
Arctic Archipelago ±  but not to the Polar Basin lying north of Canadian 
land territories. Canada had insisted during the deliberations that the base-
lines not be limited to twenty-four miles, given that bridging the straits 
between the Arctic islands would require “much longer baselines than that 
±  the longest across Viscount Melville Sound would be about 200 miles.” 
Such legal ambiguity meant that boldness would not necessarily serve in 
Canada’s best interests.52 In 1959 Gordon Robertson presciently speculated 
that in the future the discovery of resources in the archipelago, the closing 
of the Panama Canal or the development of an open polar sea, might raise 
the stakes and incline Canada to act unilaterally.53 Robertson’s analysis was 
sound and remains as pertinent today as it was in 1959. It was, of course, 
inherently speculative, and to cajole allies on the basis of hypothetical 
threats to national sovereignty rooted in questionable legal claims to water 
(rather than physical security threats) would be unrealistic and difficult.
By the late 1950s, External Affairs saw “little advantage and numer-
ous disadvantages to the assertion by Canada of the claim to the waters 
of the [Polar Basin lying north of the Canadian mainland], at least at the 
present time” because “it would undoubtedly stir up international contro-
versy.” International law did not justify it, and the conditions in the region 
made such a claim “next to impossible to enforce.” By contrast, it saw a 
strong case for asserting Canadian sovereignty over the waters between the 
Arctic islands. The “main stumbling block” would be the United States, 
which would presumably insist upon “free navigation” through the North-
west Passage. “However, it is not impossible perhaps that quiet negotia-
tions with the United States leading to the granting of special privileges 
in … these waters might achieve reluctant acquiescence from them.” In 
conclusion, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Norman Rob-
ertson, who had recently returned to Ottawa after a stint as ambassador in 
Washington, “thought that it would be in no nation’s interest to invite an 
international wrangle, comparable perhaps to the one now going on con-
cerning the Antarctic, by laying controversial claims to the waters and ice 
of the Arctic Basin.”54
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In the 1960s, Lester Pearson’s Liberal government continued to of-
ficially endorse a three-mile territorial sea, but it also announced its inten-
tion to expand its control beyond those limits by unilaterally creating a 
nine-mile fishing zone adjacent to its three-mile territorial sea. Although 
the government introduced legislation to this effect and instituted an ex-
clusive fishing zone based upon straight baselines along the east and west 
costs, it retreated from making any moves to do the same in the Arctic. The 
government knew that the United States would object if Canada made any 
internal waters claim or declared straight baselines, but it hoped that the 
Americans might support an extension of Canada’s claim to Arctic waters 
for reasons of defence and national security. The United States, however, 
reacted sharply, fearing any move in the Arctic could set a dangerous pre-
cedent. The Canadian government thus retreated from its plans, and Can-
ada did not officially issue any geographical co-ordinates to delineate its 
claim to baselines in the Arctic for another twenty-three years.55
Conclusions
Was this policy of caution, predicated on the uncertain status of Canada’s 
possible internal waters claims in international law and the views of its 
allies, a failure? Commentators who suggest that Canada should have 
secured its claims more effectively, given that Canada could have acted 
differently, and that this would have yielded a stronger Canadian claim 
today, are practising “what if ” history.56 We must weigh our judgments on 
the basis of the relationships that existed at the time, prevailing norms of 
international law, and cost-benefit analyses of possible courses of action.
Our reading of the evidence suggests that Canada’s cautious and 
gradualist strategy, avoiding internecine battles with our American allies 
over controversial legal issues like the sector principle, allowed the country 
to perfect its terrestrial sovereignty in the postwar period. External Affairs 
officials were well aware of the implications of their decisions, kept American 
indiscretions in perspective without succumbing to popular alarmism, and 
devised a modest strategy for expanding and entrenching Canada’s claims. 
There is no indication that Washington was prepared to accept the sector 
principle in the postwar period, which undergirded much of Canada’s 
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confused stance on its possible maritime claims until the 1950s. Indeed, 
historian Gordon W. Smith, writing in the mid-1960s, found it “difficult 
to understand why Canadian authorities have continued to trifle with the 
sector principle, and it is even more difficult to understand why attempts 
have been made, as indicated by various official decrees, pronouncements, 
and maps, to try to apply it to regions other than land.”57
While international law evolved to include the possibility of straight 
baselines, any Canadian case would have been precarious in the 1950s and 
1960s. “Under general international law and particularly the decision of the 
International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Judgment, 
a case could be made for treating the Arctic Archipelago as a whole with 
the mainland and measuring the territorial sea from straight base lines 
drawn about the coastline of the outer circumference of the Archipelago,” a 
March 1959 legal appraisal concluded. Yet “the insufficiency of evidence of 
a longstanding and unequivocal [Canadian] intention to assert sovereignty 
over these waters,” particularly vis-à-vis foreign states, would bring close 
scrutiny.58 Instead, quiet diplomacy allowed Canada to avoid alienating its 
allies and circumpolar neighbours, to contribute to continental defence, 
and to lay the groundwork for the functional approach initiated under 
Trudeau in the wake of the Manhattan voyages and the straight baselines 
invoked by Mulroney’s Conservatives in the wake of the Polar Sea.
Franklyn Griffiths and other commentators continue to suggest that 
a functional Canadian approach to managing and controlling its internal 
waters, based on “agreeing to disagree” with the Americans on the legal 
status of the Northwest Passage, remains a feasible and realistic option. 
They usually turn to the 1988 Cooperation Agreement on icebreaker 
transits as evidence of bilateral willingness to forge a working compromise 
by avoiding core legal entanglements.59 They might also look earlier, to the 
first two decades of the Cold War when Canada and the United States 
found space to coexist in the name of continental defence without prejudice 
to their respective legal positions. The United States acknowledged that the 
Arctic Archipelago belonged to Canada without validating the Canadian 
sector principle. Canada was more vague on its claims to the Arctic waters, 
but based upon the available evidence (which is avowedly partial) it avoided 
placing the United States in a position where it had to formally challenge 
Canada’s sovereignty claims. Slowly establishing rights to Arctic waters 
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without provoking foreign legal protests, The Financial Post explained 
in October 1958, was a prudent course. If all went well, “About 1980 
we can say: ‘Of course this is a Canadian territorial sea. Everyone has 
acknowledged this for 20 years.’”60 Rather than seeing Canadian decision-
making as a failure to secure its claim to the Northwest Passage in the 
1960s, a more positive appraisal might recognize how careful diplomacy 
helped to position Canada so that it could implement a functional approach 
under Trudeau and declare straight baselines under Mulroney.
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When, in late 1965, Presidents Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia and Léopold 
Senghor of Senegal proposed the creation of an international organiza-
tion for French-speaking states, they unwittingly created a problem for the 
Canadian government and the Department of External Affairs. In their 
initial conception of this organization, neither Bourguiba nor Senghor 
anticipated, nor wanted, Canada’s participation. What they envisaged in-
stead was a modest organization that would enhance the ability of French-
speaking countries in Africa to preserve their shared linguistic and cultural 
heritage.1 Over succeeding months, however, their proposal attracted sup-
porters who not only embraced the idea but also broadened it. In Canada, 
this development compelled the government and the Department of Ex-
ternal Affairs to consider what role Canada should play in the emerging 
community of French-speaking states; a question complicated by Canada’s 
difficult relations with France in this period, as well as the challenges faced 
from the government of Quebec, which asserted the right to its own inter-
national personality and to conduct its own international relations.
Advancing the National 
Interest: Marcel Cadieux, Jules Léger, and Canadian Participation 





From the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, the Department of External 
Affairs and its officials devoted a great deal of their time and energy to 
advancing Canada’s interests in the international community of French-
speaking states. For two of the department’s officials in particular, how-
ever, this issue took on an added importance. Both Marcel Cadieux and 
Jules Léger played key roles in the debate over Canada’s involvement in the 
community of French-speaking states by virtue of their official positions 
as under-secretary of state for external affairs and Canada’s ambassador in 
France, respectively. Beyond that, they were also the senior francophone 
officials in a department struggling, like the government as a whole, to 
become more inclusive of, and responsive to, the francophone dimension 
of Canada’s biculturalism. For them, Canada’s involvement with the inter-
national community of French-speaking states served Canadian national 
interests by reinforcing traditional conceptions of French Canadian iden-
tity at a time when this identity was being threatened by the emergence 
of a much narrower form of Québécois nationalism. By the 1960s, French 
Canadian nationalists in Quebec ±  those who had formerly identified with 
a pan-Canadian community of francophones with a vibrant role to play in 
a bicultural Canada ±  were increasingly focusing their sense of identity on 
the territory of Quebec alone and the government of Quebec as defender 
of French culture in North America. For Cadieux and Léger, this develop-
ment posed a significant threat to their conception of Canada and the place 
of French Canadians in it, though they differed widely on how best to 
respond to it.
From the moment that it was first proposed in 1965, there were mixed 
feelings in the Department of External Affairs about what the establish-
ment of an international community of French-speaking states meant for 
Canada. Some officials, like Thomas Carter, the head of the department’s 
European Division, were decidedly sceptical about the benefits for Can-
ada of becoming involved in a community which, because of the resent-
ment that many of its potential members still bore towards France, they felt 
would never be as widely embraced as the British Commonwealth. Indeed, 
countries like Algeria, Guinea, and Morocco were more concerned about 
eradicating the remnants of French colonialism in their societies than 
with preserving their French heritage and links with France. An inter-
national organization of French-speaking states would not, consequently, 
1237: Canadian Participation in the Francophone Community
help Canada build ties with such countries. Moreover, involvement could 
impose extensive financial and political commitments on Canada. Be-
cause economically advanced French-speaking countries like Belgium and 
Switzerland had no intention of joining, Canada would be the only polit-
ical and economic counterweight to France in the francophone organiza-
tion. As such, French African countries would expect much greater finan-
cial assistance from Canada than it could hope to meet, in contrast to the 
Commonwealth where wealthy countries like Australia and New Zealand 
shared the burden with Britain and Canada.2
Based on the initial conception of the proposed community, Carter 
added an additional note of concern. Since no one in French Africa or 
France seemed to want to replicate the British Commonwealth’s political 
focus and formal structure, the French-speaking community was likely to 
confine itself exclusively to issues of culture and language, precisely the sort 
of emphasis that would engage the ambitions of the government of Que-
bec. The Canadian government, therefore, could expect a long and bitter 
fight with Quebec over the latter’s desire to participate in the community 
on its own behalf, especially since “the advocates of a more independent 
attitude for Quebec would consider it as a natural forum in which to pro-
mote their cause.”3 Given the damage to Canada’s domestic harmony and 
national unity that would inevitably result from such a fight, would it not 
be better, Carter wondered, for the Canadian government to focus on bi-
lateral rather than multilateral efforts to improve its relations with French-
speaking countries?
Carter’s reasoning struck Marcel Cadieux as fundamentally unsound. 
Cadieux believed that for Canada to eschew involvement in a multilat-
eral association of French-speaking states would send precisely the wrong 
message to French Canadians, many of whom, especially in Quebec, 
already believed that the federal government was not interested in the 
French-speaking world. It was this belief, in fact, that underlay some of 
the arguments that individuals like André Patry, the former professor of 
international relations turned senior advisor to Quebec Premier Jean Le-
sage, and Claude Morin, Quebec’s deputy minister of intergovernmental 
affairs, used in the early to mid-1960s to demand greater international re-
sponsibilities for the government of Quebec. If the Canadian government 
could not, or would not, satisfy French Canadian interests in establishing 
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stronger relations with the French-speaking world, then according to Patry 
and Morin the responsibility fell to the government of Quebec to do so 
for itself. For Canada to ignore an association of francophone countries, 
even if it worked tirelessly to strengthen bilateral relations with these na-
tions, risked letting “the feeling develop that federal policies do not take 
sufficient account of the aspirations of French Canada in the international 
sphere.”4 From Cadieux’s perspective, there could be no question of the 
need for Canada to participate actively and enthusiastically in the com-
munity of French-speaking states, however it developed.
Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin and the Liberal 
government as a whole shared Cadieux’s view about the need for Can-
ada to be more responsive to French Canadian interests in the realm of 
foreign policy. Since their election in 1963, Martin and Prime Minister 
Lester Pearson had devoted significant energy and resources to improving 
Canada’s relations with French-speaking countries. New embassies were 
opened in Senegal and Tunisia in 1966; Canadian developmental assistance 
for French-speaking countries in Africa expanded rapidly from $300,000 
in 1963 to $7 million just a few years later; and contacts, exchanges, and 
discussions with French African governments increased significantly over 
the same period. All of this was part of a deliberate strategy to incorporate 
French Canadian interests more explicitly into Canada’s foreign policies 
and thereby help minimize the adverse effects of the growth of Québé-
cois nationalism on Canadian unity. Long overdue, from the point of view 
of Cadieux and Léger, this strategy nonetheless represented an important 
step towards the fulfillment of long-standing French Canadian aspirations 
for a full and vibrant role in Canadian national and international affairs.5
Jules Léger and Marcel Cadieux joined the Department of External 
Affairs in 1940 and 1941, respectively. At that time, and for a long time 
thereafter, the department, its officials, and its culture were overwhelmingly 
anglophone, a situation against which both Cadieux and Léger struggled. 
Even Léger’s appointment to the department’s top post, under-secretary 
of state for external affairs, in 1954 did not fundamentally alter the rela-
tive marginalization of French Canadians in the Department of External 
Affairs and, more generally, in the formulation of Canada’s foreign rela-
tions.6 Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, Cadieux in particular 
fought extremely hard to change that state of affairs: he pushed to make the 
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department bilingual in the 1950s by advocating French language train-
ing for Canada’s anglophone diplomats;7 his book, Le Diplomate canadien, 
was intended, at least in part, to attract more young French Canadians 
into Canada’s foreign service8 and he pleaded with his political superiors to 
allocate more aid to the French-speaking countries in Africa as a demon-
stration of the Canadian government’s responsiveness to French Canadian 
international interests. Unfortunately, these pleas fell on deaf ears in the 
Conservative government of John Diefenbaker.9
The election of the Liberal government in 1963, however, changed the 
dynamic in Ottawa and the new government’s broad pursuit of bilingual-
ism and biculturalism promised to bring French Canadians and their in-
terests more fully and equitably into the fold of the Canadian government 
and Canadian national affairs. For Marcel Cadieux and Jules Léger, this 
was a very welcome development. Both of them were French Canadian 
nationalists in the tradition of Henri Bourassa, the early twentieth century 
advocate of a bilingual and bicultural Canada.10 Like Bourassa, Cadieux 
and Léger sought the widest possible participation of French Canadians 
in the development of Canada on the basis of equality and mutual respect 
between Canada’s French and English-speaking peoples. After 1963, the 
realization of this vision of a truly bicultural Canada seemed closer than 
ever.
French Canadian conceptions of nationalism had not remained static 
since the days of Henri Bourassa, however. By the 1920s, some French 
Canadian nationalists had begun to reject the non-territorial, pan-Can-
adian definition of French-Canadian nationalism that was intrinsic to 
Bourassa. Instead, nationalist leaders like Abbé Lionel Groulx focused 
their attention much more narrowly on Quebec as the spiritual home of 
the French presence in Canada and the only political jurisdiction where 
French Canadians ±  being the majority of the population ±  could protect 
their culture from the threat of assimilation. Over several decades, cul-
minating in the 1960s, this process transformed many, if not most, French 
Canadian nationalists in Quebec into Québécois nationalists.11 Insofar as 
this development encouraged the concomitant emergence of a separatist 
movement in Quebec, it posed a significant challenge to Canada’s national 
unity.12 Even moderate expressions of Québécois nationalism, however, 
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raised fundamental questions about the ongoing place of French Can-
adians in Canada and Canadian national life.
As French Canadian nationalists focused more attention on the prov-
ince of Quebec, they magnified the importance of the government of Que-
bec as defender of the French culture in Canada. Indeed, by the early 1960s, 
Premier Jean Lesage was calling the government of Quebec “the political 
expression of French Canada.” Building on the arguments contained in the 
Tremblay Report, the report of the Quebec Royal Commission that criti-
cized the centralization of power in the federal government’s hands at the 
expense of provincial jurisdictions after 1945, Lesage’s government sought 
special powers to go along with its special responsibilities as the voice of 
French Canadians in Canada.13
Daniel Johnson, who succeeded Lesage as premier in 1966, stated Que-
bec’s claim even more explicitly: to protect and promote French Canadian 
interests and culture the government of Quebec needed full constitutional 
equality with the rest of Canada and complete responsibility for French 
Canada’s political, economic, social, and cultural affairs.14 In practice, this 
argument inspired such initiatives as the Quebec government’s attempt to 
gain control over the federal program of educational assistance for French-
speaking countries in Africa between 1964 and 1966.15 The move was ul-
timately unsuccessful but the logic of even moderate forms of Québécois 
nationalism nonetheless reinforced the idea that Quebec City, rather than 
Ottawa, was the only appropriate locus for any and all initiatives connected 
to the épanouissement of French Canada in the mid- to late 1960s.
Like the Canadian government as a whole, Cadieux and Léger re-
jected the premise that the government of Quebec was the sole political 
voice of French Canada. They understood the frustrations that had helped 
feed such claims, and they even sympathized with them.16 Yet they shared 
the belief that French Canadian interests were best served, not by focus-
ing solely on Quebec, but rather by maximizing the broader opportun-
ities available through the Canadian government as a whole. Cadieux and 
Léger’s own careers demonstrated that it was possible for French Can-
adians to succeed in Ottawa and, at the very moment when the Canadian 
government was becoming more receptive to French Canadian interests, 
the demands of Québécois nationalists threatened to derail what they and 
others had struggled so hard to achieve.17 In essence, despite the emergence 
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of Québécois nationalism, Cadieux and Léger remained French Canadian 
nationalists who felt that no good would come from abandoning Canada. 
Instead, they believed that the Canadian government needed to remain 
an outlet for the energy, skills, and aspirations of all of Canada’s French-
speaking peoples.18 It was for this reason that Cadieux and Léger con-
sidered Canada’s involvement in the community of French-speaking coun-
tries after 1965 not only desirable but necessary. Fundamentally, this com-
munity offered the Canadian government the opportunity to demonstrate 
that it was still capable of addressing French Canadian, and even Québé-
cois, needs. Failing to demonstrate that capability, however, would only 
reinforce Québécois nationalists’ criticisms of the Canadian government 
and buttress the already growing ambitions of the government of Quebec.
Cadieux and Léger had very little trouble persuading Paul Martin and 
Lester Pearson that the Canadian government needed to pursue involve-
ment in the emerging community of French-speaking states aggressively 
after 1965. They even prevailed upon the government to try to take a leader-
ship role in establishing the community, part of a strategy to ensure that 
it developed in a way amenable to Canadian interests. In particular, they 
hoped to nudge the community towards a more formal, politically oriented 
organization similar to the Commonwealth or, alternatively, a very loose, 
informal organization of private agencies and associations, either of which 
would have maximized the role for Canada while minimizing the scope 
for Quebec’s involvement.19 Unfortunately for the Canadian government, 
the initiative in determining the nature of the francophone community lay 
largely in French African capitals like Dakar and Tunis or in Paris rather 
than in Ottawa. And in Paris, at least, the French government very much 
wanted Quebec to play an important role in the francophone community.
From the opening of Quebec’s Délégation générale in Paris in 1961 
through the negotiation of a cultural accord in 1965, relations between the 
governments of Quebec and France became remarkably close during the 
1960s. More to the point, the government of Quebec needed France to sup-
port its international ambitions. Without that support, Quebec’s claim that 
it exercised the same competence over fields like education and culture at 
the international level that it did within Canada, articulated by the Gérin-
Lajoie Doctrine of 1965,20 would have carried much less weight. How-
ever, with French President Charles de Gaulle increasingly convinced that 
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a bicultural Canada was ultimately unworkable and anxious to strengthen 
the rayonnement of French culture in Quebec, the French government was 
more than willing to recognize Quebec’s claims to international compe-
tence and deal directly with it in international affairs.21 Naturally, the Can-
adian government resented the special relationship that developed between 
the governments of France and Quebec in the 1960s, yet it could do little 
to impede it or to stem the deterioration of its own relations with France 
in the same period.22 Nor could the Canadian government prevent France 
from trying to ensure that Quebec was able to participate fully and au-
tonomously in the emerging international community of French-speaking 
states.
Despite leaving the initiative on the development of this community 
in the hands of other governments, the French government worked hard 
to keep its focus strictly on language and culture. It had its own reasons 
for doing so ±  it wanted to avoid the impression that it was seeking to 
impose some form of neo-imperialism on its former colonies in Africa23 ± 
yet this focus also strengthened Quebec’s claim to its own membership in 
the community on the grounds that it involved areas of its constitutional 
competence. Because of its responsibility for fields like culture and educa-
tion, the French government was convinced that Quebec had an important 
role to play in the francophone community that Canada, which de Gaulle 
and many others in Paris considered essentially an anglophone country, 
did not.24 It was this conviction, and the French government’s willingness 
to use its influence in French Africa, that ultimately helped Quebec se-
cure an invitation to the Libreville meeting of ministers of education from 
France and French Africa in early 1968 and, subsequently, to participate in 
the conferences in 1970 and 1971 that established the Agence de coopération 
culturelle et technique, forerunner of the organization that would become 
known as la Francophonie.25 In the meantime, however, the Canadian gov-
ernment needed to determine its own response to efforts to gain for Que-
bec autonomous membership in this francophone community.
Between 1964 and 1968, Cadieux and Léger were the central figures 
in the debate within the Department of External Affairs about how to 
respond to Quebec’s interest in the international community of French-
speaking states and in international affairs more broadly. Friends as well 
as colleagues, they generally shared a common view about Canada and its 
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international interests, but on this particular issue they diverged noticeably. 
For Cadieux there could be no question of Quebec’s being able to act on 
its own behalf internationally since, under both international law and the 
Canadian constitution, the Canadian government enjoyed exclusive juris-
diction over all aspects of international affairs. Consequently, the federal 
government was the only body entitled to represent Canadians, all Can-
adians, internationally.26 Quebec therefore had no authority to act inter-
nationally and any pretentions otherwise had to be opposed vigorously as a 
threat to federal authority and, more importantly, Canada’s national unity. 
Any concessions to Quebec’s international ambitions, even in the fields of 
education or culture, would only encourage Québécois nationalists to make 
further demands at the expense of the federal government. Moreover, if 
France continued to encourage Quebec’s ambitions, Cadieux felt that the 
Canadian government had to be prepared to respond forcefully, even if it 
meant rupturing Franco-Canadian relations.27
While Léger agreed with Cadieux about the need to defend the Can-
adian government’s constitutional position aggressively, including its claim 
of pre-eminence in international affairs, he did not share his colleague’s 
absolute conviction that Quebec had to be prevented from exercising any 
international role whatsoever. Instead, Léger advocated a more conciliatory 
attitude towards Quebec’s international ambitions. After all, he argued, 
any international activities undertaken by Quebec were really only a threat 
to Canada if they took place in defiance of the Canadian government. Ul-
timately, he believed that the solution to the crisis over Quebec’s intention 
to participate in the international community of French-speaking states 
lay in negotiating a settlement that allowed Quebec to join the community 
under the overall umbrella of Canada’s own involvement. Léger consist-
ently advocated such a settlement from 1966 to 1968.28 Even on the eve of 
Quebec’s participation in the Libreville Conference, when Cadieux him-
self was pushing Lester Pearson and Paul Martin to punish France and 
Quebec, Léger counselled caution and a negotiated agreement to resolve 
the constitutional dispute.29
At first, these differences did not unduly affect the relationship be-
tween Cadieux and Léger. As the Canada-Quebec-France crisis over the 
francophone community deepened in 1967, however, Cadieux became ever 
more concerned about Léger’s apparent willingness to concede that Quebec 
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did in fact have some capacity to act on its own behalf internationally. In 
March 1967, Léger wrote an article for the Canadian Institute for Inter-
national Affairs’ International Journal that, to Cadieux, seemed to favour 
allowing Quebec a role to play in Canada’s relations with French-speaking 
countries. The article also neglected to stress to Cadieux’s satisfaction that 
“the Canadian government [was] the instrument for the expression of Can-
adian foreign policy in terms of the bicultural and bilingual character of 
the country.” Fearful of the consequences of this argument being made 
in such a public way by a prominent member of the department, Cadieux 
denied Léger permission to publish this article.30 Fundamentally, Cadieux 
was concerned that Léger failed to understand the full political and consti-
tutional implications of allowing Quebec to develop its own foreign rela-
tions, with France or any other French-speaking countries. For his part, 
Léger believed that Cadieux’s instinctive response towards the dispute 
with Quebec and France was too confrontational and that this too carried 
long-term risks for Canada and its domestic and foreign interests.
Some of their differences with regard to dealing with Quebec and its 
international ambitions can be attributed to their respective positions in 
the Department of External Affairs and the view of events they gained 
from them. As under-secretary of state for external affairs from 1964 to 
1970, Cadieux was at the centre of events in Ottawa, where he was much 
more familiar with, and sensitive to, developments in Quebec and Ottawa, 
including the extent of the threat that Quebec’s ambitions posed to fed-
eral interests. From Paris, in contrast, Ambassador Léger’s concern for the 
preservation of Canada’s long-term relations with France led him to favour 
a pragmatic, conciliatory response to the crisis in Canada-Quebec-France 
relations. Léger also believed that, once de Gaulle was removed from the 
centre of political life in France, more sensible elements in the French gov-
ernment would reassert themselves.31 There was, however, more to their 
divergent perspectives on Quebec and its international ambitions. Their 
different personalities ±  Cadieux the uncompromising, highly principled 
lawyer and Léger the consummate diplomat (forever seeing shades of grey 
where Cadieux saw only black and white) ±  only added to the gulf that 
divided them.32
Cadieux is widely acknowledged to have been a fierce Canadian nation-
alist, with his nationalism rooted in a firm commitment to a long-standing 
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French Canadian vision of Canada as a bicultural country.33 Jules Léger, 
however, was no less committed than Cadieux to this vision of national-
ism. As such, they were both at odds with the emergence of a Québécois 
nationalism in their home province that threatened to undermine Can-
adian biculturalism at the very moment in the mid- to late 1960s that it 
was closer than ever to being realized. They differed, though, in their as-
sessment of how much of a threat Québécois nationalism actually posed 
to Canada. For Cadieux, the true extent of this threat was summed up 
by his experience with Claude Morin, the Quebec official at the heart of 
efforts to expand that government’s international identity, who convinced 
Cadieux that the ultimate goal of Québécois nationalism was the breakup 
of Canada.34 Léger, on the other hand, despite the deepening tension be-
tween Canada and Quebec in this period maintained a relatively congenial 
and effective working relationship with Quebec’s delegate general in Paris, 
Jean Chapdelaine, even though this relationship caused a certain amount 
of unease among their respective colleagues in Ottawa and Quebec City.35
For Cadieux, Québécois nationalism was incompatible with his sense 
of French Canadian nationalism and, since only one of them could prevail, 
he was committed to ensuring that the one that did preserved the greatest 
opportunities for French Canadians on the widest possible scale. Léger, 
though, did not believe that Québécois nationalism and his own sense of 
French Canadian nationalism were mutually exclusive; they could, in fact, 
co-exist, although doing so required the Canadian government to be more 
accommodating of the aspirations of the government of Quebec, among 
the most notable of which was the desire for its own place in the broader 
francophone world of la Francophonie.
For both Marcel Cadieux and Jules Léger, defending the national 
interest was a multilayered concern, incorporating the need to protect 
Canada’s national interests as well as French Canadian national interests. 
Ultimately, these two ardent defenders of both Canada and French Can-
ada agreed that Canada’s participation in the international community of 
French-speaking states was vital for the pursuit of Canadian national in-
terests and an important step towards fulfilling the promise of bicultural-
ism that was central to the French Canadian conception of Canada. That 
they disagreed about whether the Canadian government could accommo-
date Quebec’s participation in this community without undermining the 
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pursuit of biculturalism in Canada is indicative of the turmoil in Ottawa 
provoked by the emergence of Québécois nationalism and the related de-
mands for new powers and responsibilities from the government of Quebec 
in the 1960s. In the end, the governments of Canada and Quebec reached 
a compromise in 1971± 72 enabling Quebec to participate in the inter-
national organization later known as la Francophonie under a Canadian 
umbrella.36 This compromise vindicated Léger’s belief that Québécois and 
French Canadians could in fact co-exist in Canada, and that Québécois 
nationalism and the more aggressive provincial government that harnessed 
it for its own purposes were not an irremediable threat to Canada. More-
over, the ongoing commitment to an active role in la Francophonie of the 
Department of External Affairs and the Canadian government as a whole 
demonstrated the overlapping nature of Canadian and French Canadian 
interests in this period. Defending the one meant defending the other as 
well, the fulfillment of a long-standing French Canadian vision of a truly 
bilingual and bicultural Canadian nation.
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If the academic literature on Canadian foreign policy is to be believed, 
trade and economic policy form at best a minor part of Canada’s external 
relations and occupied very little of the time and energy of ministers and 
officials in the Department of External Affairs during the post-war years.2 
Some will suggest that this changed in 1982, with the integration of the 
trade components of the former Department of Industry, Trade and Com-
merce into External Affairs to form the new Department of External Af-
fairs and International Trade, but with the unvoiced suggestion that this 
was perhaps a retrograde step. To the academic community, foreign policy 
as practised by Canada’s diplomats is largely focused on political and hu-
manitarian issues and only rarely on economic matters.
Nothing could be further from the truth. From the outset, Canadian 
foreign policy was more a matter of foreign economic policy than anything 
else, with the political, security, and other dimensions only emerging over 
time as Canada’s role in the world matured and required a broader focus. 
The economic dimension, however, always remained a critical dimension 







and never more so than during the postwar years. The Economic Div-
ision and later Bureau occupied a large place in the department’s activities 
throughout those years and some of its ablest officials built their careers in 
trade and economic assignments.
The official on whom many modelled their careers was none other than 
Norman Robertson. Most people remember Robertson as the successor 
to O.D. Skelton, as the dominant career official of the 1940s and 1950s, 
twice under-secretary of state for external affairs, twice high commissioner 
to the United Kingdom, and ambassador to the United States. His career 
started and ended, however, as a trade negotiator. In the 1930s, he led 
the Canadian delegations that negotiated the 1935 and 1938 Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements with the United States, and, in the 1960s, he initially 
led the Canadian delegation to the Kennedy Round of General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations, before retiring and becoming 
the first director of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at 
Carleton University.3 Those officials who, in later years, sniffed at the dilu-
tion of Canadian foreign policy by the dominance of trade considerations 
were as ignorant of their history as they were of the government’s policy 
priorities. Robertson was succeeded by such able people as Jake Warren, 
Gerry Stoner, Ed Ritchie, Don McPhail, Frank Stone, Pamela McDoug-
all, Gerry Shannon, John Weekes, and others, a number of whom served 
the government later as deputy ministers.
Before I go any further, it is important to note that trade policy and 
trade promotion are ±  and largely remain ±  two different branches of gov-
ernment service with remarkably little overlap. Even before there was a 
Department of External Affairs, Canada employed trade commissioners 
to promote Canadian exports and assist Canadian exporters in distant 
markets. The government established the Department of Trade and Com-
merce in 1892 and employed the first resident trade commissioners in the 
Caribbean Islands that year. The first Canada-based trade commissioner 
was posted to Australia in 1894.4 Over the course of the service’s first hun-
dred years, most trade commissioners spent much of their careers at posts 
abroad and occasionally at home serving, for example, in regional bureaus 
in Trade and Commerce.5 Few were deployed in negotiating and imple-
menting trade agreements, although one of the earliest and most distin-
guished of Canada’s trade negotiators, Dana Wilgress, started his career as 
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a trade commissioner assigned to sell farm equipment in Omsk in Russia. 
In the 1930s, together with Norman Robertson and Hector McKinnon 
from Finance, he was part of Canada’s premier trade negotiating team. In 
the 1940s, he was head of the Canadian delegation to the negotiations that 
led to the GATT, and he served for five years as the first chair of GATT’s 
Contracting Parties. He was also, briefly, high commissioner to the United 
Kingdom, under-secretary of state for external affairs, and ambassador to 
NATO.
Over the period under review, 1945± 82, the making of Canadian trade 
policy was the preserve of a relatively small group of officials drawn princi-
pally from three departments: Finance, Trade and Commerce (after 1968, 
Industry, Trade and Commerce), and External Affairs. Additionally, be-
cause of the historical importance of agriculture in Canadian export trade, 
Agriculture officials made a large contribution. Other departments and 
agencies also participated as individual issues demanded, such as Energy, 
Mines, and Resources, Fisheries and Oceans, and Customs and Excise, 
but on virtually all issues, the core group was made up of officials from 
these three departments. Finance officials concentrated on Canadian im-
port policy; their minister was responsible for the tariff and all aspects of 
customs and related policies and Finance officials were intimately familiar 
with the vulnerabilities of the Canadian economy to import competition. 
Trade and Commerce was responsible for export policy and export promo-
tion; its officials were fully up to date on the export interests and capabil-
ities of Canadian industry. External Affairs played a coordinating role, 
finding middle ground and providing leadership. Its principal instrument 
was control over communications between headquarters and posts abroad.
Unlike Finance and Trade and Commerce officials, who came armed 
with legislation and clear ministerial mandates, External Affairs officials 
participated largely on their personal merits. While they obviously had a 
sense of broader foreign policy priorities, they rarely injected these into 
the discussions. They accepted that trade policy had to reflect domestic 
economic, political, and commercial priorities and international oppor-
tunities. Maintaining productive relations with trading partners was also 
important. But factoring in geopolitical, development, or human rights 
concerns was definitely far down the list of priorities, no matter what their 
colleagues in political divisions preferred. Occasionally, broader foreign 
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policy considerations might rise to the top, such as in the consideration of 
the accession of a number of Eastern European countries to the GATT 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but generally more focused trade and 
economic concerns crowded out foreign policy considerations and woe the 
External Affairs official who did not understand this.
To maintain credibility at the trade policy table, therefore, officials 
from External Affairs had to demonstrate that they were immune to “for-
eign policy” considerations and were prepared to contribute to the develop-
ment and delivery of Canadian trade policy on the basis of technical exper-
tise and mastery of the files. As such, the department’s trade policy officials 
were at times treated as aliens in their own ministry and by their colleagues 
abroad. When I participated in negotiating textile and clothing import 
restraint agreements in the late 1970s and early 1980s, for example, it was 
a rare ambassador who was prepared to meet with the Canadian delegation 
and provide counsel and assistance on local circumstances. More typical 
were those who got out of town before we arrived, convinced that any as-
sociation with us would taint their good relations with the locals.6 They 
appeared not to comprehend that we might be pursuing the government’s 
policy and Canadian interests, suffering instead from the well-known dip-
lomatic disease of localitis ±  a tendency to forget that it is the sending 
government that is a diplomat’s employer, rather than the receiving gov-
ernment.
Similarly, when I was responsible for Canadian import policy files at 
External Affairs in the late 1970s, I was frequently peppered with calls 
and memoranda from political divisions asking me to do something about 
those Neanderthals in Finance, Revenue Canada, or elsewhere, who were 
complicating relations with one of their foreign clients by pursuing, for 
example, antidumping or countervailing duty investigations. The idea that 
such investigations were based in Canadian law, were consistent with Can-
ada’s international rights and obligations, and reflected legitimate Can-
adian interests rarely occurred to them. For many such officers, good bi-
lateral relations were an end in themselves rather than a means to serving 
Canadian interests.7
Finally, when I served at Canada’s permanent mission in Geneva in the 
mid-1970s, one of my responsibilities was to represent Canada at meetings 
developing an Integrated Program for Commodities under the auspices of 
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the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
At UNCTAD IV in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1974, governments had adopted a 
set of resolutions that authorized UNCTAD to explore the parameters of a 
program that would stabilize world prices, and thus export earnings, for a 
list of eighteen commodities that were critical to the economic prospects of 
developing countries. The list included such products as coffee, tea, cocoa, 
sugar, and jute, all classic developing country exports, but it also included 
minerals such as copper, iron ore, phosphate, and manganese, and agricul-
tural products such as vegetable oils and tropical timber, products that were 
of considerable commercial interest to Canadian companies.
It was a fascinating assignment. Officials in Ottawa prepared detailed, 
helpful briefing material on each of the commodities, allowing me to be 
well-informed on the issues and participate actively in the discussions. But 
I also had to wrestle daily with a conundrum: conflicting instructions. Of-
ficials in External Affairs responsible for development policy and Can-
adian participation in UNCTAD wanted me to play a constructive role 
advancing the conference’s goals and objectives, while officials in domestic 
economic departments were equally firm that I should not support any-
thing that might compromise Canadian commercial interests. In short, my 
role was to engage in a damage limitation exercise: I had to be seen to be 
helpful and constructive but make sure nothing serious happened. It was 
my first introduction to the difference between values-based and interest-
based policy-making. In the end, pragmatism and commercial interests 
trumped ideals.
Juggling conflicting instructions, negotiating textile restraint agree-
ments, and dismissing the immediate concerns of political officers all 
taught me the truth of what one former under-secretary of state for external 
affairs, Allan Gotlieb, has characterized as the underlying schizophrenia 
of much of Canadian foreign policy. Gotlieb traces the tensions in Can-
adians’ desires to satisfy the visionary, romantic, idealistic side of their na-
ture while also attending to the need to deal pragmatically with challenges 
to their security and prosperity. As he notes, there is no necessary conflict 
between these two elements, as long as they are kept within a proper bal-
ance. But, he adds, if Canada’s feet are not planted firmly on the ground of 
who it is, where it fits, and what it can realistically do, the idealistic side of 
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its nature threatens to descend into bathos. We have seen a lot of evidence 
along these lines in recent years.8
Over the period 1945± 82, trade policy was largely immune from 
this schizophrenia. Despite the different ministers and departments they 
served, core trade policy officials in the postwar years were remarkably 
homogenous in their outlook. Many had had some formal education in 
economics, but their approach was very much based on practical experi-
ence and on-the-job training. Over this period, none would have described 
himself ±  and they were all men ±  as free traders. Free trade was an aca-
demic concept. Trade negotiations and trade policy were about access to 
foreign markets and protecting vulnerable Canadian industrial sectors. 
They lost little sleep worrying about the mercantilist basis for much of the 
policy they hammered out in their interdepartmental meetings. Progressive 
liberalization was desirable, but at a pace that was politically sustainable. 
Their job was to provide ministers with advice that was politically accept-
able, expanded opportunities for export-oriented sectors of the economy, 
and retained scope for Canadian-based manufacturing.
The basic contours of modern Canadian trade policy were set in the 
1930s and remained essentially the same until the conclusion of the Can-
ada± United States free-trade agreement in 1987. They were well summed 
up by Norman Robertson in a 1937 memorandum to the under-secretary 
of state for external affairs, O.D. Skelton:
Our stake in world trade and the peculiar degree of dependence 
of our industries on export markets have identified Canada’s 
real national interest with the revival and liberation of inter-
national trade.… It is true that there are a number of important 
local and sectional interests which in the short run, and perhaps 
in the longer run, stand to lose rather than to gain from the 
adjustment in tariffs and preferential margins which our col-
laboration in new trade agreements with the United Kingdom 
and the United States would involve. … this country’s general 
national interest is, for better or worse, bound up with the pros-
pect of freer international trade and that this paramount inter-
est should outweigh special and local interests which may be 
deriving exceptional advantages from an uneconomic policy.9
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If he had lived until the 1980s, Robertson might have expressed some re-
grets about the pace of liberalization, but not about its direction, the central 
role played by negotiations with the United States, and the declining one of 
the United Kingdom. These directions were already clear in the 1930s and 
remained remarkably consistent for the next five decades.
Throughout this period, ministers and their senior officials were gen-
erally on the same page, but not always. Indeed, there were a number of 
celebrated instances in which the prime minister and senior officials were 
definitely not on the same page. In the spring of 1948, for example, when 
Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King pulled the plug on the secret nego-
tiations between Canada and the United States considering the contours 
of a possible bilateral free-trade agreement, diplomats Lester Pearson and 
Norman Robertson both expressed deep disappointment. They accepted 
King’s decision, but regretted it nonetheless.10 A decade later, when the 
newly elected Conservative prime minister John Diefenbaker expressed 
a desire to shift 15 per cent of Canadian trade from the United States 
to the United Kingdom, officials dutifully prepared their analysis, which 
indicated the draconian steps required to achieve this objective, and thus 
buried one of the more quixotic policy impulses in the history of Canadian 
trade policy.11
Although Diefenbaker’s impulse was the most dramatic, it was cer-
tainly not isolated. Diefenbaker had wanted to change the fundamental 
character of Canada’s trade dependence on the United States by looking to 
Britain and the Commonwealth. Six years later, Liberal Finance Minister 
Walter Gordon was equally determined to make the Canadian economy 
less reliant on American investment capital and international trade in gen-
eral. As nationalistic as Diefenbaker, Gordon drew on the ideas of the 
interventionist left rather than on the nostalgic right. The professionals in 
the bureaucracy found this brand of nationalism just as difficult to translate 
into practical policy choices. They had seen Diefenbaker’s desire to shift 15 
per cent of Canada’s trade from the United States to Britain as impractical. 
They found Gordon’s desire to make Canada less reliant on United States 
capital and markets just as foolish.12
It is ironic that Gordon found himself presiding as minister of finance 
over the most important trade policy achievement of the 1960s, the ne-
gotiation of the Canada± United States Autopact. The sectorial free trade 
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deal further integrated the Canadian economy into the American one and 
laid the groundwork for the Canada± United States Free Trade Agreement. 
Gordon accepted that the alternatives in the automotive sector were pol-
itically unacceptable, but even he could not have imagined its success and 
long-term impact on the evolution of the Canadian economy. Simon Reis-
man led the autopact negotiations, but his team included two giants from 
External Affairs: Ed Ritchie and Allan Gotlieb.13
The trade policy community was also not convinced that Prime Min-
ister Pierre Trudeau’s desire to strengthen Canadian trade ties with the 
European Common Market and Japan and reduce Canadian dependence 
on the United States made much sense. This was one of the few significant 
episodes of a major rift among trade policy officials. External Affairs of-
ficials, reporting to Mitchell Sharp and the prime minister, took seriously 
the ideas of a Canada± Europe contractual link and deepening and broad-
ening Canada± Japan commercial ties. Finance did not. Its deputy at the 
beginning of the discussions, Simon Reisman, went so far as to claim that 
the idea had never been approved by Cabinet. He was wrong. I looked up 
the cabinet memorandum and the related record of decision, but the fact 
that he continued to hold this view for many years was indicative of the 
disdain of Finance officials for this dimension of Canadian trade policy.14
Trade and Commerce officials were less vocal in their scepticism. Of-
ficials in the Western Europe Bureau, for example, were actively engaged 
in the discussions. The mainline trade officials in the Office of General 
Relations, on the other hand, devoted their resources to more important 
matters, such as the ongoing Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations, and 
ensured that the Canada± Europe and Canada± Japan discussions focused 
on consultative rather than contractual arrangements. No serious harm 
was done to existing contractual commitments under the GATT. Years 
of semi-annual consultations provided wonderful opportunities to eat in 
Brussels, but proved totally incapable of making a difference to the com-
mercial judgment of both European and Canadian businesses, a lesson to-
day’s officials might well keep in mind. Trade policy is most effective when 
it works with basic market forces, rather than trying to change them.
As with earlier ill-fated impulses to shift Canadian trade patterns, Tru-
deau’s inclinations similarly failed to appreciate that the size, composition, 
and direction of trade flows result from the decisions of millions of private 
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producers and consumers. These decisions may be influenced by govern-
ment policy, but major shifts in preferences require heroic or draconian 
policy measures and run counter to the fundamental values embedded in a 
democratic polity with a market economy. Such policies are likely to reduce 
the prosperity of most Canadians and are unlikely to be their conscious 
choice. Nevertheless, if officials cannot dissuade the government from a 
course of action that they believe to be quixotic or unproductive, it remains 
their duty to implement the government’s decision, and officials at Exter-
nal Affairs dutifully did so in negotiating new agreements with Europe 
and Japan aimed at diversifying Canadian trade and investment patterns. 
Little came of these agreements, but they became an important part of the 
Trudeau legacy, parts of which continued to be invoked by departmental 
officials long after their lack of impact had become clear.15
For Canada, trade policy has always been one of the most important 
components of its foreign policy. Canadian trade negotiator Rodney Grey 
once observed that “for a small country surrounded by larger countries 
and heavily dependent on trade with one of them, foreign policy should, 
in major part, be trade relations policy. Of course, other policy issues are 
also vital to Canadians, but if a small country dissipates its foreign policy 
bargaining power on issues that concern it primarily as a member of the 
international community, it might not have the resources, the credibility, 
or the leverage to protect its trade policy interests.”16 Grey was right, and 
for most of its history Canadian governments accepted this reality ±  but not 
always. Grey made his observation not long after retiring in 1980, follow-
ing more than a decade of experience with a prime minister who did not 
see matters that way.
The legacy of the postwar years was the establishment of a rules-based 
international trade order as a universally accepted part of both intellectual 
and intergovernmental discourse. The success of that order proved critical 
in integrating national economies into a global economy. In terms of orders 
of magnitude, the value of international trade nearly tripled in real terms 
from 1950 to 1980.17 Even in a trade-dependent country like Canada, the 
value of trade measured as a share of total production nearly doubled. Trade 
stimulated increasing specialization and competition, and contributed im-
portantly to the rise in prosperity in the countries of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
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For a relatively small economy dependent on trade with larger econ-
omies, it is not difficult to identify what became the hallmarks of “good” 
trade policy. Nevertheless, as in so many areas, the conjunction between 
good policy and good politics often proved narrow, difficult to find, and 
hard to implement.18
As the postwar generation would have described it, good trade policy 
involved the careful integration of economic, business, legal, and political 
ideas and values into a coherent set of laws, agreements, regulations, poli-
cies, and practices, attuned to the circumstances of the moment but broad 
enough to endure. From an economic perspective, it found ways to move 
towards more open markets. Competitive markets and consumer choice 
are critical contributors to national and individual welfare and are among 
the most widely shared values in economics. They are also critical to the 
goals of the global trade regime.
Governments, of course, pursue more than economic objectives. Poli-
cies that distort market efficiencies may serve other important societal 
goals. Efforts to ensure consumer safety, national security, cultural identity, 
sustainable environments, or distributive justice may affect the operation of 
the market and the flow of goods and services across national borders. The 
challenge, therefore, was to balance competing claims and to design poli-
cies that addressed society’s most important values and pressing priorities. 
The trade policy community learned from experience that sound economic 
policies promoted broad, national interests over narrow, special interests 
in order to gain benefits for the many rather than for a privileged few. But 
they also knew that their political masters had very keen noses for the 
needs of special, particularly local, interests.
From a business perspective, good trade policy establishes a stable and 
predictable economic climate at home and abroad. It appreciates that busi-
ness thrives in an orderly setting and stagnates when there is sudden and 
unpredictable change, and it recognizes that competition only works if 
everybody plays by the same rules. Canada’s business leaders may not al-
ways have applauded the benefits of international competition and an open 
economy, but they never wavered in their commitment to stability and 
predictability and were quick to criticize policies that undermined these 
objectives, including policies that required them to adjust to changing and 
growing international competition. The record shows that, while Canadian 
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officials were sensitive to business interests, they were far from slaves to a 
corporate agenda.
The legal contribution was to insist on a rules-based order built around 
the fundamental precepts of non-discrimination, transparency, and due 
process. Only by establishing rules that treat all traders the same, that are 
widely known and uniformly applied, and that provide for the orderly and 
equitable resolution of disputes will entrepreneurs have the confidence to 
compete, invest in the future, and look beyond their own shores. Transpar-
ency, non-discrimination, and due process are the basis not only of do-
mestic law but also of international law. Canadian officials were among 
the staunchest proponents of a rules-based order, even if at times they had 
to satisfy ministers by finding ways to avoid politically inconvenient rules. 
In the 1950s, Australian officials were wont to taunt their Canadian col-
leagues by referring to them as ‘halo polishers.’
Canada’s active embrace of the GATT and multilateralism during the 
postwar years, while broadly beneficial to the country, illustrates the enor-
mous role of external factors in shaping Canadian trade policy. The nego-
tiation of the GATT in 1947± 48 proved to be a wonderful framework for 
pursuing gradual liberalization while not abandoning the internally incon-
sistent policy impulses that ministers had found so congenial ever since the 
adoption of the National Policy in 1879. GATT brought together the gov-
ernments of twenty-three countries with similarly contradictory policies 
and objectives: maximize export opportunities while minimizing import 
competition. All were fully in thrall to Lord Macauley’s famous dictum 
that “free trade, one of the greatest blessings which a government can con-
fer on a people, is in almost every country unpopular.”
GATT’s rules and bargaining method turned out to be admirably suit-
ed to countries that wanted to have their cake and eat it too. Its policy of 
gradual liberalization within a framework of general rules was tailor-made 
for Canada.19 It relied on export interests to overcome import-competing 
interests, but only a little at a time. It was not based on academic theor-
ies but on pragmatic observation. It relied on the impact of two sets of 
external factors to gradually refashion the Canadian economy: the impact 
of broadly agreed rules and procedures and the economic interests of the 
country’s most promising trading partners. The fact that the country most 
responsive to Canadian trade and policy priorities was the United States 
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reinforced the pull of geography and business judgment, resulting in the 
growing interdependence of the Canadian and United States economies.
Throughout this period, critics worried that a growing taste for inter-
national rules and institutions would undermine Canada’s ability to pur-
sue independent domestic and foreign policy objectives. All international 
agreements, of course, whether aimed at economic, environmental, human 
rights, military, or other objectives, seek to curb the full expression of au-
tonomous national decision-making. States make the reasonable calcula-
tion that their interests are better served if other states are required to be-
have in a predictable and stable manner, subject to commonly agreed rules 
and procedures to enforce them. Trade agreements are neither an exception 
to, nor fundamentally different from, the many other agreements, conven-
tions, and declarations to which Canada is party.
Between 1945 and 1982, Canadian trade officials learned well, if slow-
ly, the lesson that without the constraint of jointly agreed external rules it 
was difficult to resist domestic protectionist interests. Canadians found it 
hard to accept that a resource-based economy without secure markets for 
its products, coupled with an inefficient, import-substitution manufactur-
ing sector, provided a poor basis for sustained growth and prosperity. In 
the face of stubborn protectionism in the United States and in Europe, 
however, Canadians found it difficult to reduce foreign barriers to their 
exports or to resist the call for protection from their own manufacturers. It 
took many years, starting in the 1930s, to create the conditions that made 
“good” trade policy politically acceptable. By 1982 the results were firmly 
ensconced and paved the way for the negotiation of the Canada± United 
States Free Trade Agreement.
By 1982, Canada had one of the most open economies in the world, 
next door to the world’s largest and most dynamic market. The deployment 
of sensible trade policies had gradually provided Canadians with the pros-
perity, the jobs, and the choices that made the best of Canada’s comparative 
advantage and allowed them to reap the benefits of the best that others 
could offer. By then, Canadians were prepared to accept that their future 
prosperity depended critically on developing a more outwardly oriented 
economy.
The government’s decision early in 1982 to merge the trade promo-
tion and trade policy elements of the Department of Industry, Trade and 
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Commerce with the Department of External Affairs to create the De-
partment of External Affairs and International Trade20 seems an appropri-
ate place to stop this survey, but not without dismissing the notion that 
Canadian foreign policy became more sensitive to trade considerations as a 
result, at the expense of political and other considerations. Trade and other 
economic considerations had always and continued to form an integral part 
of Canada’s external policy. What changed in 1982 was the institutional 
basis for the development and delivery of that policy. The decision to pro-
ceed with the bilateral free-trade negotiations with the United States in 
1985 is often cited as proof that trade considerations had trumped broader 
foreign policy considerations. As a participant in much of the prepara-
tory work and in the delivery of that policy, I saw no evidence of such a 
change, nor in the subsequent decision to negotiate a broader agreement 
to include Mexico, nor in subsequent efforts to negotiate other free-trade 
agreements.21 Governments make decisions based on political factors and 
considerations that are persuasive to the prime minister and his colleagues. 
The advice tendered by the officials has an important bearing on the shape 
and detail of that policy, but not on its fundamental direction.
With few exceptions, Canada’s approach to trade policy-making over 
the postwar years was incremental, pragmatic, and cautious. More could 
certainly have been done, or done more boldly, but radical departures were, 
in the view of Canada’s trade policy practitioners, neither warranted nor 
likely to succeed. Officials in External Affairs, Finance, and Trade and 
Commerce all exhibited a deep appreciation of the basic realities within 
which Canadian government policies operate, including the capability and 
interest of Canadian firms. In Canada, trade and investment are primar-
ily private sector activities. Governments can facilitate or frustrate these 
activities, but ultimately they do not trade or invest. Those areas where 
governments have engaged directly in economic activity ±  such as crown 
corporations ±  have not provided much comfort that government can do 
better than the private sector.
The relatively small Canadian market imposed a second limitation. 
Without access to foreign markets, it is unlikely that much Canadian in-
dustrial production could have attained the competitive scale required to 
finance innovation and other desirable features. Additionally, both business 
leaders and experienced trade officials developed a clear understanding of 
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the extent to which foreign markets offered real rather than potential op-
portunities. In the case of Japan, for example, Canadian exporters long 
faced some formidable barriers involving, not only market access, but also 
costs, consumer interests and preferences, and institutional barriers. Even 
large, well-financed firms in the United States and the European Union, 
backed up by the muscle of their much bigger governments, found the 
Japanese market tough sledding in areas other than those for which there 
are no Japanese suppliers. European and developing country markets offer 
their own difficulties. Over time, Canadian firms found niches in these 
markets, but only after earning enough from Canadian and United States 
markets to finance the effort.
Within these realities, Canadian officials used the policy instruments 
at their disposal to nurture trade and industrial patterns that provided 
Canada with growing prosperity. The desired pace of adjustment, however, 
was dependent on both external and domestic factors. Externally, Canada’s 
major trading partners, particularly the United States, had to open up their 
markets to Canadian suppliers and accept the discipline of international 
rules to underwrite this market access. Domestically, governments, firms, 
and workers had to accept increasing levels of foreign competition and to 
make constant efforts to upgrade and adjust domestic production. The mu-
tually reinforcing impact of these external and domestic dimensions has 
been key to the incremental nature of this strategy.
The results were impressive. Slowly but steadily, Canada opened its 
economy to greater competition and became an increasingly adroit prac-
titioner of good trade policy. Although exceptions and challenges remain, 
the default position for Canada is clearly free trade and open markets. As 
such, Canada is better placed to tackle the next series of challenges arising 
from both globalization and deepening bilateral integration. And officials 
from the Department of External Affairs were important contributors to 
these policy developments that served to advance the national interest.
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deau and Pitfield chose what they had long 
desired: integration of the three elements 
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proved a poor fit and was soon hived off to 
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Immigration, but the trade and political 
elements found a reasonable bureaucratic 
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grounds when they suggest that the organ-
ization of the bureaucracy makes a material 
difference to the policy officials recommend 
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Trade, Finance, and External Affairs of-
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changed in 1982 was the extent to which 
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department was renamed the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, prob-
ably at the behest of his mentor, Mitchell 
Sharp, who had never liked the convention 
that relations with Britain and the rest of 
the Commonwealth, sharing the Queen as 
head of state, could never be foreign, and 
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ternal Affairs.
21 See Michael Hart, with Bill Dymond and 
Colin Robertson, Decision at Midnight: 
Inside the Canada± U.S. Free Trade Negotia-
tions (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994), for a 
detailed account of the decision to proceed 
with bilateral free trade and the role of of-
ficials in that decision.

When the Liberal Party met in April 1968 to choose a successor to Prime 
Minister Lester B. Pearson they opted for change.1 Pierre Elliott Trudeau 
was in many ways the antithesis of Pearson; he was charismatic, energetic, 
single, bilingual, and, at the comparatively young age of 48, he captured 
the minds and imagination of the youth of the 1960s. Pearson’s bowtie 
seemed antiquated compared to the rose Trudeau wore in his lapel. Most 
scholarly works and reflections by contemporaries about the years when 
Trudeau was in power in Canada have a common theme: a significant as-
pect of Trudeau’s personal philosophy was to challenge conventional wis-
dom.2 Or, as Trudeau put it himself, “the only constant factor to be found 
in my thinking over the years has been opposition to accepted opinions.”3
Both the departments of Energy, Mines and Resources (EMR) and Ex-
ternal Affairs were significantly affected by Trudeau’s desire to challenge 
conventional thinking on Canada’s energy policy and relations with the 








Successive Canadian governments since the end of the Second World 
War have believed in close cooperation with the United States as the cen-
tral component of Canada’s national interest. Though policy-makers in Ot-
tawa were careful to ensure that these relations were not too close or cozy, 
they were generally inclined to embrace an informal continentalism that 
served Canadian interests, especially oil, well. The Trudeau years, however, 
marked a significant policy reversal from seeking secure export markets 
in the United States for Canada’s oil and gas to ending exports and mak-
ing Canada “self-sufficient.” Two policy decisions had profound effects on 
Canada± United States relations during the Trudeau period: the decision to 
phase out oil exports to the United States in 1974, and the implementation 
of the controversial 1980 National Energy Program. Both policies were 
intended, not only to disengage Canada from the world oil market, by set-
ting prices internally and being self-sufficient in oil, but also to decouple 
Canada from its interdependence with the United States in the oil and gas 
trade. The question remains how and why did Canada’s oil policy change 
during the Trudeau period, and what was the role of the Department of 
External Affairs in formulating that policy?
Trudeau’s View of the National Interest
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau came to office in April 1968 determined to 
tie Canada’s foreign policy more closely and explicitly to the national inter-
est. For Trudeau and his allies, as historians Jack Granatstein and Robert 
Bothwell describe, this meant replacing the “helpful-fixer” role of Pear-
sonian diplomacy with a new focus on “an inward-looking concern for the 
national interest, for economic growth as the focus of Canadian foreign 
policy, followed by social justice and the quality of life.”4 Stung by his suc-
cessor’s change, Lester B. Pearson criticized the new direction of Canadian 
foreign policy for its narrow and traditional conception of the national self-
interest, which “merely evokes resistance from other nations, also in the 
name of national interest, and … leads to confrontation and conflict.”5 Al-
lan Gotlieb, former Canadian ambassador to the United States, explained 
in a recent interview that “national interest” meant not being crusaders 
internationally ±  not overreaching ±  and, most importantly, having no 
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“special relationship” with the United States.6 This meant pursuing rela-
tions with countries, such as Cuba and the People’s Republic of China, 
even if Washington considered them beyond the pale; diversifying trade 
relations in order to reduce Canada’s economic dependence on the United 
States; and increasing Canadian ownership of the economy, which neces-
sarily came at the expense of the United States.
In discussing Trudeau’s concept of the “national interest,” a close 
prime-ministerial advisor explained that the government “thought that we 
could pursue a policy that didn’t need to copy the Americans.”7 Trudeau’s 
view of the national interest vis-à-vis the United States, supported by some 
key members within the Liberal cabinet (and certain parts of the public), 
was that “continentalism … might have gone too far;”8 that “exemptional-
ism” might not necessarily be a good thing; that the existence of a “special 
relationship” with the United States was questionable; that Canada was too 
dependent on American trade and investment and therefore diversification 
was needed; and that Canada’s economy was too reliant on staple exports 
like oil and lumber and needed to be structurally altered to enhance sec-
ondary manufacturing. All of these ideas were greeted skeptically by most 
civil servants, much of the Canadian business community, and by many 
cabinet ministers. According to Mark MacGuigan, secretary of state for 
external affairs from 1980 to 1982, “Trudeau was always ready to thumb 
his nose at the U.S.… [He] projected more anti-Americanism to Amer-
icans in the Reagan era than was tolerable to them, and more than was 
palatable to most Canadians. In this respect, he served neither Canadian 
interest nor Canadian preferences.”9
In many ways, as Michael Hart argues in his chapter, Trudeau’s view 
of the “national interest” conflicted with how the Department of External 
Affairs had managed the Canada± United States relationship in the postwar 
period, and the rationale behind Canadian oil policy. This is understand-
able, given that postwar Canadian governments up to Trudeau tended to 
pursue the type of close relationship with the United States that Trudeau 
found problematic. In the pre-Trudeau years, and even in the initial years 
of his first government, the guiding principle behind External Affairs’ 
approach to Canada± United States trade and relations was informal con-
tinentalism. Given the importance of oil and gas to a modern economy 
and the instability of the world market, it was better, in the view of the 
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pragmatic informal continentalists, to have a policy that permitted flex-
ibility if circumstances changed.10 Most senior diplomats of the 1950s and 
1960s, including Norman Robertson, Ed Ritchie, Marcel Cadieux, and 
Basil Robinson, embraced the informal continental approach and walked 
the tightrope between economic interdependence with the United States 
and Canadian economic and political independence.11 This does not mean 
that the department’s continentalism and its conception of the national 
interest were unalterable. Indeed, in April 1972, under the direction of the 
secretary of state for external affairs, Mitchell Sharp, the department de-
veloped the idea of reducing dependence on the American market through 
domestic economic measures and by diversifying Canada’s trade, otherwise 
known as the “third option.” Increased economic self-sufficiency was a sig-
nificant component of the new domestic economic initiative, and the oil 
industry was at the centre.
As early as 1970, plans were being developed in the Department of 
Energy, Mines and Resources to enhance Canadian participation in the oil 
industry and rethink the level of its trade with the United States. However, 
driven by two key international crises ±  the 1973 oil crisis generated by the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the oil crisis 
that followed the 1979 Iranian revolution, Trudeau’s and his inner circle’s 
thinking on energy issues ripened as they sensed an opportunity to set the 
national agenda. If Canada could have all of its oil supplied internally at a 
controlled price, well below the world price, then the competitive advan-
tage gained by Canada’s industrial base, which happened to be in Quebec 
and Ontario, would be significant. In order to carry out these changes, of-
ficials had to be trusted to develop and implement the appropriate policies. 
But how did these policies differ from the previous policy direction? How 
did they challenge the conventional approach to Canadian± American oil 
policy and reflect Trudeau’s conception of the national interest?
Postwar Policies, 1947–1968
In the immediate post-war period, Canadian trade relations with the United 
States were defined by an informal continentalism.12 The general strategy 
involved two stages: first, an exemption was secured from American trade 
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and tariff policies that would normally apply to foreign countries; second, 
when the exemption began to fail, a more formal sectoral or commod-
ity agreement was often negotiated. A good representative of this view is 
Mitchell Sharp, who served as deputy minister of trade and commerce 
for much of the 1950s, before joining Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson’s 
government in 1965.13 As Sharp describes it in his memoirs, the senior 
bureaucracy attempted to balance increased economic interdependence 
with the United States and Canadian political and economic independ-
ence.14 Initially, the Canada± United States oil trade also followed this pat-
tern of informal continentalism. Throughout the 1950s and into the early 
1970s, Canada’s priority was to secure guaranteed access to the American 
market for increased oil production surplus to domestic requirements. In 
due course, Canadian exports, like all other oil imported into the United 
States, invited American trade restrictions.
Although the onset of the Cold War hastened the development of 
the Canadian oil and gas industry, it was also responsible for raising U.S. 
fears about America’s reliance on foreign oil supplies.15 During the 1950s, 
American domestic producers, concerned that cheap oil imported from the 
Middle East was flooding the American market, depressing prices, and 
reducing domestic exploration and development, argued that oil imports 
jeopardized American national security. Although United States president 
Dwight Eisenhower delayed as long as possible, he eventually succumbed 
to the pressures of the independent oil producers and their Congressional 
supporters and enacted the Voluntary Oil Import Program (VOIP) in 1955. 
As reliable suppliers during World War II and the Korean War, Canada 
and Venezuela were exempted from the protectionist program for defence 
reasons. However, when the first phase of the VOIP unravelled in 1957 
because some American companies chose not to comply with the voluntary 
limits, the program was altered and exemptions were no longer granted. 
When mandatory controls were introduced on 9 March 1959, Canada and 
Venezuela vigorously protested. Much to Venezuela’s dismay and ire, Can-
ada eventually succeeded in securing an exemption to the mandatory pro-
gram while Venezuela did not. External Affairs played a key role in secur-
ing this exemption through a “diplomatic blitz” and the efforts of Canada’s 
ambassador to the United States, Arnold Heeney, and the embassy’s energy 
counsellor, Norm Chappell.
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Heeney was Canada’s ambassador to Washington from May 1953 until 
May 1957, and again from early 1959 until April 1962, and he was well 
regarded and respected in Washington.16 Chappell had come to the em-
bassy in the early 1950s to deal with oil and gas and other resource issues, 
first as a representative from the Department of Defence Production, and 
then, as the first energy counsellor. His job was to attend technical discus-
sions and help convey the Canadian position to those decision-makers who 
determined energy policy in the United States government and industry. 
Confident in his abilities and in the personal networks he had developed, 
Heeney, with Chappell’s invaluable support and assistance, set about to 
persuade the American executive of the importance of an exemption for 
Canada.17
The exemption under the Mandatory Oil Import Program (MOIP) 
immediately became a fundamental component of Canadian oil export 
policy, and, in 1961, after much discussion and debate within cabinet, 
Canada adopted a National Oil Policy designed around it.18 External Af-
fairs, represented by A.E. Ritchie, was part of the ad hoc committee estab-
lished to develop a national oil policy and provided welcome advice on the 
potential American reaction to the various policy options put forward.19
An important provision of the National Oil Policy, one designed to pre-
serve Canada’s MOIP exemption, precluded Alberta oil pipelines from 
extending east of the Ottawa River. Thus Ontario would have its foreign 
supplies replaced by slightly more expensive Canadian oil from Alberta, 
while the eastern part of Canada, particularly the important refining area 
of Montreal, continued to import foreign oil, mainly from Standard Oil 
production in Venezuela. Oil exports to the United States were in turn 
increased to compensate Western producers for the loss of the Montreal 
market. Instead of embarking upon a policy of national self-sufficiency in 
oil, this policy represented a commitment by the Conservative government 
of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker ±  generally seen as one of the more 
nationalist Canadian governments ±  to sanction the emergence of a con-
tinental oil relationship.
Concerned about relations with other oil exporting countries that 
resented the Canadian exemption, particularly Venezuela, the adminis-
tration of American president John F. Kennedy insisted on an informal 
understanding with Canada to prevent oil exports from becoming 
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“unreasonable.” Between 1963 and 1968, officials in Ottawa and Wash-
ington negotiated regularly on agreed levels of Canadian exports. Through 
the efforts of Chappell and officials at the National Energy Board, Can-
ada often managed to exceed the limits that American officials determined 
were reasonable. The president, nonetheless, had the power to revoke Can-
ada’s exemption from the MOIP at any time, which almost happened at 
the end of 1962.20 During most of the 1960s, however, strong personal 
links and networks between Canadian and American officials prevented 
minor disagreements over the exemption and Canadian oil exports from 
becoming major bilateral irritants. Diplomats A.E. Ritchie, ambassador 
to the United States from 1966 to 1970, and Chappell played a key role 
representing Canada’s national interest in managing oil relations with the 
United States in order to preserve the National Oil Policy. Working closely 
with officials from the National Energy Board, the centre for Canadian oil 
policy until the creation of the Department of Energy, Mines and Resour-
ces in 1966, External Affairs helped negotiate and maintain Canadian oil 
export levels to the United States and deflect American pressure on Can-
ada to build an oil pipeline to Montreal. Although the significance was not 
immediately evident, a turning point for Canadian± American oil relations 
and the role of External Affairs came in 1968.
Oil Export Phase Out, 1968–1974
When Trudeau secured his majority government in the 1968 election, he 
immediately set about restructuring the bureaucracy and initiating exten-
sive policy reviews for every department. During Trudeau’s sixteen years in 
power, consistent with his personal philosophy of challenging conventional 
wisdom and accepted practices, the policy-making process and structure of 
the bureaucracy were considerably modified. The reorganization of the de-
partments of EMR and External Affairs, and the review of energy policy 
took place in two phases. The first phase began in 1968, and lasted until 
1974; the second phase began in 1977± 78. As part of Trudeau’s reorganiza-
tion of government, a host of standing interdepartmental committees were 
established to review and develop policy. The problem with such commit-
tees was that they were cumbersome; it often took a long time to come up 
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with policies, and they tended to be diluted. Thus, by 1978, a two-tiered 
policy-making system had evolved whereby the prime minister’s “pet” pro-
jects could bypass the normal interdepartmental committees.21 One such 
“pet” project was the National Energy Program, and, by circumventing 
the normal process, External Affairs was completely excluded from its de-
velopment. But in 1968 the policy reviews and the restructuring of the 
policy-making process and the bureaucracy were just beginning, and Can-
adian± American oil relations were still moving towards some kind of for-
mal continental agreement.
These existing arrangements on oil exports to the United States were 
threatened by the discovery of Alaskan oil fields at Prudhoe Bay in 1968.22
With the future of Canadian oil exports in question, Mitchell Sharp, now 
secretary of state for external affairs in Trudeau’s new government, began 
discussions with Washington for a broad continental energy agreement in 
April 1969. Negotiations were scaled down in October 1969 to focus solely 
on a continental oil policy and these talks continued sporadically into 1973 
before eventually dying out.23
Although the two governments initially approached the idea of in-
creased continental interdependence with some vigour, negotiations stalled. 
The failure rested on Canada’s refusal to make the East Coast more secure 
from supply disruptions by building an oil pipeline to Montreal to utilize 
Canadian oil. At this point, as Table 1 illustrates, it was still cheaper for 
Eastern Canada to import oil, most of which came from Venezuela, though 
that began to change in 1972, and Trudeau would not permit a policy that 
unnecessarily increased prices to Quebec and Ontario consumers.
Thus, in the initial years of Trudeau’s first term of government, despite 
his claim to challenge conventional thinking and his desire to reduce Can-
ada’s economic dependence on the United States, there seemed to be little 
outward change from previous policy. What accounts for this?
First, Trudeau was still consolidating his power within the Liberal 
party, of which he was a fairly recent member. He likely did not wish to 
move too quickly to change things.25 Second, the extensive policy review 
and departmental reorganization that was initiated in 1968 was still in 
progress. As long as Canada was willing to talk about a continental agree-
ment, it might prevent the Americans from taking drastic action against 
rising Canadian exports of oil and pre-empting possible policy options that 
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would be in the policy review. Indeed, both the External Affairs and EMR 
policy reviews and departmental reorganizations would have a significant 
impact on Canadian± American oil relations.
Much has been written about the foreign policy review undertaken 
at this time. Six glossy booklets entitled Foreign Policy for Canadians were 
published in 1970 covering six different areas of Canadian foreign policy, 
though they omitted relations with the United States. During the review, 
other affected departments were consulted and a broad range of alternatives 
for Canadian foreign policy was examined. Critics of the review called it 
incomplete and vague.26 The Nixon shock of August 1971, when Wash-
ington sought to enact a 10 per cent surcharge on imports, compelled Tru-
deau’s cabinet to request from External Affairs a special study on Canada’s 
economic policy with the United States. The result was the “Third Option” 
white paper in 1972. The main idea of the “Third Option” was to diversify 
Canada’s trade relations, thereby reducing dependence on trade with the 
Americans. It would seem, then, that External Affairs was moving in step 
with Trudeau’s view of the continental relationship and not in conflict with 
it. Yet, could Trudeau be sure the new policy orientation would be fully 
supported by officials in External Affairs?
To ensure a responsive foreign ministry, Trudeau restructured Exter-
nal Affairs and shifted its senior personnel during the first phase of re-
organization from 1968 to 1977. From the beginning, Trudeau conveyed 
a general attitude that he disliked the sense of mission and elitism at the 
“Dear Department.” To strike down this sense of mission within the 
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department, many of the most promising officials ±  such as Allan Gotlieb 
and Basil Robinson ±  were transferred to other departments.27 Some re-
turned, but others did not. Trudeau also appointed his own foreign policy 
advisor, Ivan Head, who would serve as a counterpart to President Nixon’s 
national security advisor Henry Kissinger. Despite Head’s brief experience 
as a junior foreign service officer in External Affairs in the 1950s, a pos-
ition he resigned in favour of teaching law at the University of Alberta, 
his appointment was seen as a snub to External Affairs because he came 
from outside the department and had different views.28 It also sent a signal 
to other departments that External Affairs was no longer a department 
of pre-eminent influence. This change can be seen clearly in the govern-
ment’s handling of the 1973 oil crisis. In the crisis days of the first OPEC 
embargo, EMR left External Affairs out of the discussion with the Amer-
icans. As Granatstein and Bothwell point out, the “Canadian response was 
directed by Donald Macdonald and his officials in EMR. It was pointedly 
not managed by External Affairs, even though External Affairs made a 
valiant effort to persuade cabinet to let it coordinate this most important 
aspect of Canadian foreign policy.”29 The aftermath of this struggle over 
jurisdiction between Macdonald and Sharp resulted in a cabinet decision 
in December 1974 stipulating that External Affairs must be consulted in 
advance on any major issue that could have an impact on Canada± United 
States relations.30
Although External Affairs’ influence in oil matters at higher levels was 
diminished by 1974, the restructuring of the department and the crippling 
of its personnel had not yet significantly eroded the networks between 
mid-level Canadian officials and their American counterparts. External 
Affairs played an important role in preparing the Americans, or at least 
softening the blow, regarding Canada’s decision at the end of 1974 to phase 
out oil exports. Fortunately, for Canada± United States energy relations, 
the position of energy counsellor at the Canadian embassy in Washington 
remained unchanged during the first phase of restructuring.31 Chappell 
utilized his lengthy experience and contacts in Washington to send signals 
through 1973 and 1974 to the American government and refiners that oil 
exports would be phased out. He provided stability as a constant and fam-
iliar voice and advocate of Canadian energy policies to different American 
administrations and industry representatives. Chappell finally retired in 
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1979 after more than twenty years at the embassy, underlining the end of 
the first phase of restructuring in External Affairs.
The restructuring of EMR, as with External Affairs, took place con-
currently with its policy review. However, where the alterations at External 
Affairs weakened a department on the wane, the changes at EMR were 
designed to strengthen a department on the rise. After five years of draft-
ing, and three years into the first phase of departmental reorganization that 
altered personnel and shifted policy-making from the National Energy 
Board to a new unit in EMR, the energy policy review was published in 
June 1973. External Affairs, along with many other affected departments, 
was included in the review process. Its role was to review the document 
and provide advice on how items might affect Canada± United States, or 
international, relations. During one of the final meetings in 1973, the 
Department of Finance, represented by Assistant Deputy Minister T.K. 
Shoyama, along with officials George Tough, E.A. Ballantyne, and H.L. 
Tadman, wanted to discuss an option to phase out oil exports. The idea was 
met with some coolness, though the informal minutes suggest that Exter-
nal Affairs, represented by A.E. Ritchie, D.S. McPhail, and D.W. Fulford, 
did not openly criticize the idea. The no-export option was not included 
in the final draft, yet was quietly inserted into the published document.32
The notion of phasing out oil exports so challenged conventional thinking 
on Canada± United States oil and energy relations that it would require a 
whole-scale restructuring of personnel in EMR before it would be properly 
considered and eventually implemented as policy.
Concerned that his plans to phase out oil exports might flounder on the 
opposition of officials mired in the certitude of informal continentalism, 
Trudeau restructured the bureaucracy.33 He used the Prime Minister’s Of-
fice and the Privy Council Office to recruit his own people to government 
service and promoted from within those who shared his way of thinking. 
For example, during the first phase of restructuring in EMR, Claude Isbis-
ter, the career civil servant who had worked his way up to deputy minister, 
was replaced in 1970 by an outsider, Jack Austin. Austin was personally 
chosen by Trudeau because he “was concerned about developing a state 
presence in the oil and gas industry” and he agreed with Trudeau’s vision 
of enacting social change through energy policy.34 A power struggle ensued 
between Austin and National Energy Board chairman Robert Howland 
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over whether the board would maintain a policy function or simply become 
a “rubber stamp” for EMR decisions.35 As a result of this struggle, How-
land, who had been with the board since its inception in 1959, “retired” 
in August 1973, two years before his term was to end. He was replaced 
by Marshall Crowe. Crowe, a long-time civil servant, served in the De-
partment of External Affairs from 1947 to 1961. He then worked for six 
years as an economic adviser to the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 
before returning to government. Under Trudeau, Crowe held various pos-
itions in the Privy Council Office and the Prime Minister’s Office, as well 
as serving as chairman of the Canada Development Corporation.36 He was 
also a member of the “non-group,” a team assembled by Head in 1969 
to provide Trudeau with an alternate perspective on Canadian defence 
policy.37 Crowe’s membership on this team and his appointment as the 
head of the Canada Development Corporation underlined Trudeau’s trust 
in Crowe’s commitment to the prime minister and his alternative policies. 
Despite his civil service career, there is evidence suggesting that the Na-
tional Energy Board under Crowe, during public hearings on oil exports, 
deliberately disregarded testimony and data that did not coincide with the 
Government’s goal to phase out exports.38 Perhaps then, one of the reasons 
for Crowe’s appointment was to ensure that the board fulfilled Austin’s 
unwritten mandate: decisions and reports would reflect and support EMR 
policies.39
Austin left EMR in 1974 to work in the Prime Minister’s Office, 
hoping to become president of the new state-owned oil company, Petro-
Canada, but ultimately ended up in the Senate.40 He was replaced in EMR 
by career civil servant Tommy Shoyama from Finance. Shoyama, like 
Crowe managed to maintain a senior position because he had a similar 
ideological disposition to Trudeau and solid credentials: he was a “left-
leaning Keynesian” and had been an advisor to Premier Tommy Douglas in 
the heady days of the socialist Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in 
Saskatchewan.41 Shoyama then left EMR to become the deputy minister 
of Finance after Simon Reisman, another career civil servant, “retired” in 
protest over Trudeau’s economic policies. Before leaving EMR, Shoyama 
supported the decision to phase out oil exports, a policy he had supported 
as an assistant deputy minister of finance during the 1973 energy policy 
review.
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Four months after the energy policy review was published, OPEC 
flexed its muscles and the world was hit with a shocking rise in oil and gas 
prices, making the policy review seem obsolete. Yet, there was a sense of 
opportunity among many left-wing supporters in Trudeau’s cabinet and in 
EMR. Indeed, some of the ideas contained in the review, like the creation 
of a state oil company or the phasing out of oil exports, seemed ready-made 
for the current crisis. The New Democratic Party, which held the balance 
of power in the minority parliament elected in 1972, along with consumers 
feeling the pinch in Eastern Canada, argued that now was the time to have 
a more active federal oil and gas policy.42
Responding to the crisis, Ottawa moved to control prices and increase 
its revenue through taxation and eventually announced the end of the 1961 
National Oil Policy. The price controls meant oil produced and sold in 
Canada would receive prices significantly lower than the world price. The 
oil export tax, called the Oil Import Compensation Program, initially lev-
ied a flat rate of 40 cents per barrel, which evolved into the equivalent of 
the difference between the controlled price of Canadian oil and the world 
price. For example, in September 1973, the federal government received 
40 cents for every barrel of oil that was exported, and a year later they col-
lected upwards of $6.40 for every barrel sold to the United States. The Tru-
deau government suggested that these controls and taxes were temporary, 
but prices remained controlled and a variation of the export tax continued 
to exist until after 1984.
Both Alberta, Canada’s largest oil producing province, and the United 
States were vexed by these changes. Nevertheless, despite American agi-
tation over Canada’s export tax, Canada and the United States were in 
constant contact during the crisis. Then, on 6 December 1973, Trudeau 
announced a new National Oil Policy. The new policy included provisions 
regarding pricing, continuation of the oil export tax, the creation of a state 
oil company (Petro-Canada), and support for the immediate construction 
of an oil pipeline to Montreal, among other initiatives. Although it was 
not specifically stated that oil exports would be discontinued, the stated 
principle behind the new policy was to “create a national market for Can-
adian oil” and seemed to suggest that Canadian oil would be preserved for 
Canadians.43
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Preceding the announcement of the new national policy were a Na-
tional Energy Board oil supply and demand study released in December 
1972 and an EMR supply and demand study circulated internally in Janu-
ary 1973. Energy board hearings on Canada’s oil export policy followed 
in the spring of 1974. The reports and hearings all seemed to indicate that 
Canada was running short of oil. All, that is, except the numbers from the 
Alberta government. The Alberta Energy Resources Conservation Board 
submitted data to the National Energy Board hearings that indicated over 
the next thirty years, there would be an exportable surplus of between 
700,000 and 1.8 million barrels a day. After some consideration, the Tru-
deau government nonetheless announced in December 1974 the decision 
to phase out oil exports to the United States.44 The American response to 
this incredible policy reversal was rather benign. Why?
There is little mention of the phase-out in the archival record around 
the time of its announcement, except for a brief comment made during 
Trudeau’s visit to Washington in December 1974, when President Gerald 
Ford expressed his disappointment, but also said that he understood the 
reasons for the policy. Other documents indicate that by the time of the 
announcement the United States was already resigned to Canada’s policy. 
In subsequent talks with the Canadians, American authorities sought to 
ensure that northern United States refineries dependent on Canadian sup-
plies would be given time to adjust.45 The most compelling reason for this 
calm response was that there were lengthy advance consultations and “sig-
nals” that these changes would be taking place. In the initial restructuring 
of the policy-making process and the bureaucracy, the traditional system 
of consultation with other departments still existed. Officials from Exter-
nal Affairs, particularly Chappell, worked diligently to ensure that their 
American counterparts received the appropriate “signals” that the policy 
was going to be changed. The Americans were prepared for the Canadian 
policy shift because they had been warned several times, even once by the 
prime minister himself, at least a year in advance.46 Although the Amer-
icans were disappointed at Canada’s decision to phase out exports, they 
understood its desire to conserve resources.47 A similarly benign response 
was not forthcoming six years later when, after the second phase of re-
structuring at External Affairs and EMR, the National Energy Program 
(NEP) was announced.
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The National Energy Program, 1977–1984
During the second phase of restructuring, Allan Gotlieb returned to the 
Department of External Affairs in 1977 as its under-secretary, determined 
to restore some of its fading power and influence. Part of the perceived 
weakness of External Affairs was its lack of expertise in economic issues. 
Supported by Trudeau and the clerk of the Privy Council, Michael Pit-
field, who were anxious to rationalize government operations, Gotlieb en-
deavoured to turn External Affairs into a central agency, eventually incor-
porating within it parts of the departments of Industry, Trade and Com-
merce, and Immigration.48 Gotlieb claimed that Trudeau supported the 
resurgence of External Affairs partly to respond to the growing separatist 
threat that followed the election of Premier René Lévesque and his Parti 
Québécois government in 1976. Obviously, it was not in the national inter-
est for External Affairs to be weakened with a serious domestic crisis with 
international implications emerging.49 But the reorganization was also de-
signed to transform External Affairs into a central agency, like the Privy 
Council Office or the Treasury Board, giving it the authority to coordinate 
the international activities of other departments.
Under this restructuring, the United States Division became a bur-
eau during the 1970s, and then, in 1983, an entire branch headed by an 
assistant deputy minister, whose goal was to be the office responsible for 
consolidating “all the elements of the Government’s relations with the 
United States.”50 Presumably, energy issues would be included, especially 
after the 1979 Iranian revolution initiated a second international oil crisis 
and a spike in oil prices. Yet, this is not what happened when the National 
Energy Program was developed and implemented in 1980. External Af-
fairs was not included in the process. Indeed, despite comments by Pitfield 
to the contrary, Gotlieb says unequivocally that he only found out about 
the energy program the night before it was announced “and was instructed 
to develop a plan to sell it in the United States after it was cast in concrete 
(that is, after it was unsaleable).”51 Selling it became part of his job in 1981 
when he was appointed ambassador to the United States, where he worked 
assiduously to defend the program even though he believed it was badly 
misguided. Derek Burney, assistant deputy minister in the new United 
States Branch in 1983 and a future ambassador to the Washington, agrees 
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that External Affairs was left out of the process and that this made it hard 
for officials to respond to American complaints because “it is difficult to 
defend what you do not know.”52 Here too was a message to External Af-
fairs: despite the reorganizations, the department could not be trusted to 
advise on and assist in the development of a policy that reflected Trudeau’s 
vision of the national interest and which he thought might conflict with the 
view in External Affairs. What was it about the National Energy Program 
that was such a profound source of conflict?
The primary goal of Trudeau’s National Energy Program was to achieve 
energy self-sufficiency by 1990. While this sounds like a worthy goal, sev-
eral elements in the program were particularly objectionable. Energy secur-
ity was to be attained by increasing Canadian ownership and participation 
in the oil and gas industry at the expense of the mostly American-owned 
multinational companies. Following exploration, any production on federal 
lands (Arctic and offshore areas especially) had to be undertaken by a firm 
with a minimum of 50 per cent Canadian ownership. In addition, for every 
development, past or future on the federally controlled Canada Lands, a 25 
per cent interest, or “back-in,” to be controlled by Petro-Canada or another 
crown corporation was required without compensation. Prices were still 
controlled, as they had been since the first energy crisis in 1973, but this 
time, as indicated in Table 2, they represented a more concerted effort to 
disengage Canada from the world energy market structure.53 In 1980, for 
example, when world oil prices were the equivalent of C$44.66 per barrel, 
oil produced and sold in Canada received $17.30 per barrel. For Canadian 
oil exported to the United States, the federal government claimed through 
taxation the difference between the Canadian price and world price.
From a diplomatic perspective, the American response, when it came, 
was blistering.55 Gotlieb describes in his Washington diaries the judgment 
of Republican president Ronald Reagan and his advisors: “They hate it. 
They regard it as confiscation.”56 What concerned the United States most 
was that the energy program was “blatantly discriminatory with reference 
to the operations of American companies in Canada.”57 If Canada wanted 
to preserve its resources for itself, Washington officials argued, the United 
States would be disappointed but would not object strenuously. Discrimin-
ation against American companies, however, was a whole other matter as it 
set a dangerous precedent for other countries in the world with American 
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investments. Contrary to some popular Canadian accounts, which charged 
American diplomats with heavy-handed and bullying tactics, the Reagan 
administration (at the president’s behest) pursued a form of high-pressured 
but restrained “quiet diplomacy” throughout 1981 and early 1982 in order 
to underline the program’s unfair treatment of American interests.58 As 
time wore on, changes were made to the National Energy Program that 
addressed some American complaints, although many of its interventionist 
aspects remained and would not be effectively dismantled until 1985 under 
a different government. Part of the reason for Washington’s initial negative 
reaction to the introduction of the National Energy Program can be attrib-
uted to shock and a lack of communication beforehand about the policy. 
There had been no forewarning, no softening of the blow.59
In contrast to the potentially controversial phase-out of oil exports 
in 1974, External Affairs was excluded from the energy policy process in 
1979± 80. This was due to the second phase of restructuring of the policy-
making process and the bureaucracy that had begun in 1978. While 
EMR’s earlier restructuring was relatively gradual and somewhat diffuse, 
the second phase of restructuring had a different dynamic: the changes 
were more focused and more comprehensive. Initiated in March 1978 by 
Marc Lalonde and the clerk of the Privy Council, the “Pitfield shuffle,” as 
it was soon dubbed, shifted several ambitious bureaucrats from Finance to 
EMR in preparation for a large policy initiative.60 It can be surmised that 
Lalonde anticipated taking over the portfolio after the next election.61 The 
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new deputy minister of finance was Ian Stewart, who had been a close 
Trudeau energy advisor in the early 1970s. Similarly, a completely new 
policy-making division was created in EMR under the guidance of Tru-
deau-loyalists Mickey Cohen, George Tough, and Ed Clark. All three had 
been recruited and trained by the Prime Minister’s Office and the Privy 
Council Office before they went to Finance and then onto EMR. These 
three men personally selected their new employees and reassigned those 
who did not meet their standards or reflect their views.62 The cumulative 
effect of these personnel changes was that the ideological complexion of 
EMR was gradually altered in order to reduce resistance to Trudeau’s vi-
sion of how Canada relations with the United States might be arranged.63
When Lalonde finally became minister of EMR in 1980, after Prime 
Minister Joe Clark’s brief Tory interregnum, the department was ready 
and willing to tackle the creation of a comprehensive left-leaning energy 
program that would encompass the principles of energy self-sufficiency, 
changes to pricing and revenue sharing, and “Canadianizing” the industry. 
The prospect and intellectual challenge of “redesigning an entire industry’s 
dynamics” was exciting, dramatic, and appealing.64 Lalonde and his col-
leagues were motivated and buoyed by their unwavering faith in the ability 
of technocracy and planning to address and solve pressing and troublesome 
economic issues. Gotlieb later recalled that there was also an arrogant and 
cocky attitude emanating from EMR officials because “they were running 
the world.” With the surge in international oil prices and the decline in 
American production, he explained, there was a euphoric feeling that the 
tables were turned in Canadian± American energy relations: Canada would 
be strong and the Americans were going to be weak. Now Canada had the 
upper hand and would be able to set policy and define the terms of trade.65
Under Lalonde’s direction, the policy these officials developed, reflecting 
this new attitude, was the National Energy Program. Conventional wis-
dom on Canadian oil and gas policy was definitely going to be challenged.
A small group of handpicked people within the departments of EMR 
and Finance, as well as the Privy Council Office developed the National 
Energy Program in great secrecy and announced it as a fait accompli in the 
October 1980 budget. At roughly the same time, External Affairs recog-
nized that there ought to be some coordination between EMR and Exter-
nal Affairs on international energy issues. Thus, in 1979± 80, during the 
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period of the second OPEC oil price shocks, Gotlieb, then under-secretary 
of state for external affairs, “lobbied the Cabinet to combine an energy 
policy with overall foreign policy concerns.”66 In the spring of 1980, the 
new deputy minister of EMR, Mickey Cohen, responded to Gotlieb’s 
pressure by creating an International Energy Relations Branch within 
EMR. Knowledgeable officials from External Affairs were seconded to 
EMR in order to organize the new branch. D.R. Whelan came over from 
External Affairs in August 1980 to help prepare the ground for the new 
branch, while Don Campbell arrived right around the time the NEP was 
announced in October 1980.67 However, this new branch was not included 
in the policy process for creating the NEP, nor was it asked to provide 
advice on the NEP before it was announced. The Department of External 
Affairs was also excluded from the process; thus, it did not have the op-
portunity to advise on questions that would affect Canada’s relations with 
the United States. In twelve short years, External Affairs went from con-
tributing a respected perspective on Canada± United States energy issues, 
to being excluded from a policy that had significant ramifications for the 
bilateral relationship and Canada’s national interests.
Conclusion
Trudeau had a view of the national interest and continental relations that 
challenged traditional postwar thinking on Canada’s economic and trade 
relations with the United States. This vision encompassed the following: 
reducing Canada’s dependence on the United States, increasing Canadian 
control of the economy, reducing American investment, increasing Can-
adian manufacturing, and reducing Canada’s reliance on staples. The effect 
on oil and gas policy was a shift away from informal continentalism to a 
form of economic nationalism, or from maintaining access to the American 
market to phasing out oil exports and becoming “self-sufficient.” Such con-
troversial policies could not have been developed and implemented without 
the significant changes in the policy-making process and the restructuring 
of the bureaucracy that took place during the Trudeau years.
Trudeau desired to alter the policy and decision-making processes os-
tensibly to make government more “efficient,” but the changes were also 
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designed to reduce resistance to his more interventionist policies that re-
flected his conception of the national interest. While EMR was buoyed 
by its increase in power and importance to the prime minister, External 
Affairs was destabilized and suffered low morale from its reorganization. 
It lost its influence as a voice in the development of policies that affected 
foreign relations, particularly Canada’s relationship with the United States. 
By 1980, the traditional lines of communication between Canadian and 
American officials were either ignored or no longer existed; and the strong-
er the U.S. reaction, the more the Canadians believed they had taken the 
right action.
The role of External Affairs in all of this is a good example of Trudeau’s 
suspicion of the department as it had been before he took power. Perhaps 
he feared that there was a conflict of visions: that External Affairs’ sense 
of mission and its conception of the national interest would interfere with 
his repudiation of the informal continentalism that the department and its 
diplomats had traditionally supported. Trudeau had little faith in the de-
partment’s professionalism and its willingness to adapt to and implement 
the policies of the government ±  no matter how controversial. Therefore, 
External Affairs had to be marginalized and restructured in such a way 
as to extinguish any independent sense of mission. Ultimately, Canadian 
energy policy, Canada’s relations with the United States, and Canada’s in-
terests suffered for this lack of faith.
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In Canada, the prime minister is traditionally very involved in the shap-
ing of the country’s foreign policy. Promoting and defending the national 
interest, the prime minister plays a vital role as one of its managers, at times 
in tandem with the minister of foreign affairs, at times as the key actor. 
This is due, in large part, to the parliamentary system in which Canadian 
policies are set. The principle of responsible government, which is at the 
heart of the Canadian system, solidly anchors the leadership and the au-
thority that the prime minister exercises, especially in the realm of foreign 
relations.1 In addition, some observers may argue that foreign policy offers 
prime ministers glamour and exposure, but they overlook the fact that, un-
like the United States where a foreign affairs role has an important impact 
on domestic perception of the leader, politics in Canada is essentially “lo-
cal.” What is of importance is that these relations are conducted with the 
prime ministers’ counterparts around the world, which helps to explain 
why foreign affairs fall more easily under the leaders’ purview, a phenom-
enon accentuated by summit diplomacy.2 This prominent role is reinforced 
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by a bureaucratic and political framework that feeds the prime minister 
with international issues to which attention should be paid.3
There is also a historic factor that comes into play. From 1909, when 
the Department of External Affairs was first formed, until after the Second 
World War, foreign affairs fell, for the most part, under the purview of the 
prime minister. It was not until 1946, when Louis St. Laurent took the 
reigns of the department from an ageing Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie 
King, that the position of secretary of state for external affairs was solid-
ified as a separate entity. For a time in the late 1950s, John Diefenbaker 
acted as both prime minister and his own foreign minister, but by this time 
a dual command system had already evolved, and he soon returned the 
portfolio to a minister, with whom he nevertheless worked closely.
The last quarter of the twentieth century presented unique challen-
ges to foreign policy-making as Canada’s national interests were reshaped. 
Geopolitics were redefined with unprecedented changes in the internation-
al context; new actors emerged from civil society and stateless advocates of 
extremism increasingly resorted to violence in attempts to impose their 
agenda; conflicts often involved factions within a country rather than two 
belligerents across a disputed border; and new issues emerged at the inter-
national level from economic globalization to environmental threats to the 
obligation to protect vulnerable populations from the abuses of their own 
government. Do these factors challenge the influence the prime minister 
has over Canadian foreign policy and the answers the country offers in line 
with its national interest? Or is foreign policy “governed from the center” 
as is the case in so many other policy fields?4
This analysis belongs to a body of literature that aims at understanding 
the role of individuals in policy-making processes,5 the control of individ-
uals over “uncertainties,”6 and how personal characteristics influence the 
content of foreign policy stances.7 The first section offers a closer look at 
how the international and domestic contexts were reshaped between 1984 
and 2009. It will subsequently explore how prime ministers Brian Mulro-
ney, Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin, and Stephen Harper answered this chal-
lenge.8
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A Context Redefined
Not so long ago, foreign policy was the absolute expression of regalia pow-
ers. As late as 1985, Canada’s minister of national defence, Erik Nielsen, 
strongly opposed issuing a defence green paper ±  to which Canadians could 
react ±  on the sole basis that foreign and defence policies were not matters 
to be discussed with the general public.9 Today, with the democratization 
of foreign policy, public diplomacy, and the internet, it is hard to conceive 
of such a stance. In itself, this bears witness to a new era in foreign policy-
making.
The transformation is even starker when evaluated in the longer term. 
When Louis St. Laurent was sworn in as secretary of state for external 
affairs in 1946, the Cold War had just ushered in a new environment char-
acterized by the emergence of multilateral institutions. In Canada, the 
postwar economy was flourishing and foreign policy-making was in the 
hands of people who would leave a lasting imprint, a practice today known 
as Pearsonian internationalism.
The last twenty-five years has seen the collapse of a Manichean world 
and the redefinition of international values as the Berlin Wall collapsed, 
the eastern block imploded, new countries emerged, and political uncer-
tainty undermined global stability. United States president George H.W. 
Bush hoped to redefine a “New World Order” in the early 1990s where a 
hyperpower would dominate and provide guidance and stability for world 
affairs.10 Although this geopolitical realignment ended the possibility of a 
multi-polar world, it was soon followed by the recognition of new emer-
ging players: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Their suddenly perceived 
strength forced many countries to re-evaluate policies on several accounts, 
taking into consideration the foursome as new producers, new markets, 
and as new potential security threats. At the start the new millennium 
another American president, George W. Bush, called for a war on terror as 
security dominated the foreign policy agenda. As part of the United States’ 
security perimeter, however, Canada had very few options at hand to deal 
with these weighty matters. The Canadian government nevertheless does 
its best to ensure that neither at home nor abroad is the country perceived 
as Uncle Sam’s puppet.
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One strategy Canada has often used to differentiate, without com-
pletely dissociating, itself from the United States is through its increasing 
involvement in multilateral institutions. Interestingly, most of these inter-
national forums are characterized by a regional component, allowing Can-
ada to position itself alongside the United States, rather than behind. In 
this regard, the North American Free Trade Agreement can be regarded as 
a key accomplishment. Other regional achievements include Canada’s full 
membership in the Organization of American States, and active role in the 
Pacific region, where Canada became an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooper-
ation (APEC) member in 1989. From the cultural perspective, la Franco-
phonie emerged in the mid-1980s to offer Canada another international 
forum, this time without the presence of the United States.
Membership in international organizations has enriched Canada’s 
foreign policy through a diversification of issue areas as well as its part-
nerships. At the same time, however, Canada’s increased participation in 
multilateral institutions has limited the influence a prime minister has 
on foreign policy-making. As an example, one need only remember Jean 
Chrétien’s fierce resistance to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
while on the opposition benches, a treaty which he ultimately signed once 
in power.11
Multilateralism, important as it may be, is not the only demand on the 
foreign policy-making apparatus. Starting with the Mulroney government 
in the mid-1980s, the influence of individuals and groups from civil society 
on foreign policy increased steadily. Be it through parliamentary commit-
tees, the short-lived Centre for Foreign Policy Development, ministerial 
forums under Lloyd Axworthy, A Dialogue on Foreign Policy with Bill Gra-
ham, and especially with the proliferation of the internet, Canadians’ opin-
ions on foreign issues have mattered.12 As a political consequence, prime 
ministers have had to show that they have not only heard but they have 
indeed listened to the public’s input, consequently limiting their range of 
foreign policy options. Since Stephen Harper’s election in 2003, however, 
public input on foreign policy decisions has not been solicited and policy 
formulation is once again considered by the government to be the preroga-
tive of the prime minister and his inner circle.
Up until the 2009 budget, presented by Conservative Finance Minis-
ter Jim Flaherty, all governments since Brian Mulroney have committed 
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themselves to strengthening the economy and fighting the deficit. The sub-
sequent reduction of available resources in the realm of foreign affairs, even 
under Harper’s Conservatives, has been harshly felt. The political price to 
pay for closing a few legations abroad or cutting policy analyst positions 
at headquarters in Ottawa was immensely preferable to the political costs 
associated with cuts that had a direct impact on domestic social, health, or 
higher education programs.
Against the background of these contextual changes, we must ask our-
selves, has the prime minister’s role as the ultimate foreign policy-maker 
diminished? Or has it increased?
Brian Mulroney (1984–1993)13
Brian Mulroney can be ranked as one of the most activist Canadian prime 
ministers in foreign affairs, for as historian Jack Granatstein points out, 
by “the sheer force of will, Mulroney made himself and Canada matter in 
world affairs.”14 Mulroney’s performance on the world stage, however, was 
somewhat surprising given his lukewarm attitude towards foreign affairs 
at the beginning of his first term. Even as a contender to the leadership of 
his party in 1983, Mulroney remained shy in terms of foreign policy state-
ments. He addressed the commitment capability gap the Department of 
National Defence then faced, but his speeches did not reflect a major or 
an enlightened commitment towards international questions.15 As leader 
of the official opposition, he was highly critical of Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau’s attitude and policies, which sharply increased tensions between 
Canada and the United States, particularly following Ronald Reagan’s 
swearing in as president in January 1981.16 Mulroney contended that Can-
ada should embrace a “special relationship” with the United States, prom-
ising to “refurbish” relations by introducing a “new era of civility.”17 For 
Mulroney, however, this was not an issue of foreign policy but rather was 
crucial for the health of the Canadian economy. These first commitments 
bear Mulroney’s personal imprint: they are clearly related to his own back-
ground as a chief executive officer of an American-based multinational 
company.
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Once in power, Mulroney became increasingly sensitive to a wider 
range of international issues. One of the first crises he faced was the fam-
ine that plagued Ethiopia, where the government’s actions helped define 
Canada’s reaction.18 First, the Canadian public’s response to the images of 
horror broadcast nightly on the news ±  “a quite remarkable demonstration 
of interest by ordinary Canadians,” said then secretary of state for external 
affairs, Joe Clark ±  expressed an impulse that the government felt obliged 
to match.19 The government responded by appointing David MacDonald, 
a former Tory cabinet minister, as emergency coordinator to curtail dip-
lomatic red tape that would have slowed down the relief effort.20 While 
helping to co-ordinate Canada’s relief effort, MacDonald’s appointment 
served to highlight the influence of non-governmental organizations on 
Canadian foreign policy.
Early in its first term, the Mulroney government established new for-
eign policy-making ground rules that opened up the decision-making pro-
cess. Members of Parliament and ordinary Canadians became involved in 
the shaping of foreign policy white papers through the work of the par-
liamentary committee that toured the country to hear citizens’ concerns. 
Hence, if a “birthday” can be associated with the democratization of the 
foreign policy-making process in Canada, it lies within these years. These 
new paths, while explored under Joe Clark’s stewardship, were nonetheless 
the fruit of Mulroney’s commitment and leadership.
The prime minister’s interest in African questions grew from the East 
African famine and relief efforts, and culminated with his efforts to shoul-
der the fight against apartheid in South Africa. On this issue, Mulroney 
was able to persuade both Ronald Reagan and British prime minister Mar-
garet Thatcher to support the transition to a more democratic society.21
Mulroney also intervened personally to help African leaders find common 
ground from where they could solve problems of mutual interest.22
These personal relationships with world leaders were a prominent as-
pect of Canada’s foreign policy in this decade, a process where the prime 
minister’s direct influence came to the forefront. Given the importance of 
the Canada± United States relationship, both in terms of the economy and 
in matters of security, and considering the weight this question represented 
when Mulroney led the opposition, it is not surprising that the rapport that 
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Mulroney established with both American presidents, Ronald Reagan and 
George H.W. Bush, was especially visible.
One of the major legacies that came out of the relationship between 
the American presidents and the Canadian prime minister is the Can-
ada± United States Free Trade Agreement that was signed in 1988, as well 
as its extension to include Mexico five years later. At first, while advocat-
ing the importance of trade for the prosperity of Canada,23 Mulroney was 
sensitive to the potential political backlash such a proposal could generate 
and was not eager to involve his country in such a deal.24 The Macdonald 
Commission report of 1985, which strongly advocated the implementa-
tion of a continental economy, nonetheless impressed Mulroney. It was the 
prime minister’s personal contact with Reagan, however, that got discus-
sions started and took care of the president’s last reluctance about an issue 
that raised concerns in Congress.
This personalization of diplomatic relations was another major change 
in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy. Although other Canadian 
leaders have established good personal relationships with their American 
counterparts in the past (one may think of the Roosevelt± King, or the 
Kennedy± Pearson exchanges), the establishment of regular summits be-
tween the two leaders was an unprecedented move, and in sharp contrast 
with the much cooler attitude Trudeau had shown towards the American 
presidency. As a result, during the Mulroney years, the Canadian prime 
minister enjoyed a level of access and influence at the White House hard to 
match in Canadian diplomatic history.
This is not to suggest that there were no conflicts in Canadian± Amer-
ican relations during Mulroney’s time in power. Bilateral disputes and dif-
ferences over policy remained a vivid part of the landscape. Trade disputes 
proliferated, despite the free-trade negotiations that were underway. There 
was also conflict over American extraterritoriality in Cuba, American uni-
lateralism towards international institutions, American policy in Central 
America, and American challenges to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. 
Acid rain was also an important source of conflict during most of the Mul-
roney years as it had been during Trudeau’s final term of office.
However, what characterized the Mulroney government’s foreign 
policy is how conflicts tended to be managed during the Conservative era. 
Policy disagreements with Washington were always conducted with the 
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recognition that, while some aspects of the hugely complex Canadian±
American relationship were relatively unaffected by changes in govern-
ment policy, other aspects were quite fragile and easy to damage. More-
over, relations were conducted with the shadow of the future in mind: how 
conflicts are played out today shape responses to future disagreements. An 
excellent example of this approach is how Canada responded to the invita-
tion to join Reagan’s strategic defence initiative, commonly known as Star 
Wars: the Canadian government would not be directly involved but would 
not prevent Canadian business interests from taking advantage of the con-
tracts associated with the development of the defence shield.
However important the Canada± United States friendship was dur-
ing the Mulroney years, Canadian foreign policy of the time cannot be 
summed up solely by these exchanges. It was during this period that Can-
ada became a member of the Organization of the American States, a de-
cision that Mulroney took after hearing the advice of Louise Fréchette, 
assistant deputy minister for Latin America and the Caribbean, who pre-
vailed over her deputy minister, Raymond Chrétien, who was staunchly 
opposed to this change in Canadian hemispheric policy.25 Mulroney’s per-
sonal involvement with Québec’s premiers and French president François 
Mitterrand led to the establishment of La Francophonie, in which some of 
Canada’s provinces ±  Quebec and New Brunswick ±  would play a perma-
nent and legitimate role. When the first summit was held in Paris in Feb-
ruary 1986, premiers Robert Bourassa of Quebec and Richard Hatfield of 
New Brunswick attended as virtually equal participants with Mulroney.26
During the years Brian Mulroney was prime minister, the interna-
tional and domestic contexts no doubt influenced the shaping of the Cana-
dian foreign policy. But we cannot ignore the influence the prime minister 
himself exercised over who was involved in the process, which issues were 
to take prominence, and how to conduct exchanges with representatives 
from other countries. Questions related to human rights, good governance, 
and a redefinition of state sovereignty ±  heralding the “responsibility to 
protect” ±  took on a new importance due to Mulroney’s personal interest 
in these areas.
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Jean Chrétien (1993–2003)
Some of Mulroney’s diplomatic initiatives, especially the Canada± United 
States “super-relationship,” did not please everybody. Mulroney’s political 
rivals, the Liberals, exploited what they portrayed as a too cozy connection 
that could jeopardize Canadian sovereignty. In their electoral platforms 
of 1993, 1997, and 2000, the Liberal party called for a very different for-
eign policy and Liberal leader Jean Chrétien emphasized the need to base 
foreign policy on Canadian values, openly linking foreign and domestic 
policies. His government advocated a “voluntary, independent and inter-
nationalist” role for Canada in world affairs and, like Trudeau, insisted 
on keeping its distance from the American administration. The message 
raised concerns south of the border and reassuring signals that NAFTA 
would not be renegotiated had to be sent from Ottawa.27 In 1997, the Lib-
erals seemed inspired by Mitchell Sharp’s Third Option when they talked 
of a strategic vision that looked beyond North America and towards Eur-
ope. And in 2000, the Liberals again promoted Canadian values as the 
basis of Canada’s international leadership.
Chrétien himself had some international experience as he headed, al-
though briefly, both the departments of External Affairs and Industry and 
Trade, which could have prepared him to play a major role as Canada’s 
prime foreign policy actor. However, contrary to Professor John Kirton’s 
early assessment that saw in Chrétien a “leading definer and often the de-
liverer of Canadian foreign policy,”28 my own evaluation reveals that his 
interest in foreign affairs was limited. Chrétien, like his political mentor 
Trudeau, was primarily motivated by domestic policy rather than by for-
eign affairs. The prime minister’s attitude vis-à-vis foreign policy is well-
illustrated by his decision to abolish the cabinet committee that dealt with 
foreign affairs, thereby allowing Canada’s foreign affairs ministers to pro-
mote their own initiatives. As a result, Chrétien’s foreign policy inspired 
many writings and analyses that deplored Canada’s declining influence and 
lack of clout on the world scene.
Experts, both from academia and from the observers’ realm, do not 
conclude that the Chrétien government left a rich foreign policy legacy. 
Political scientist Kim Nossal deplored Canada’s pinchpenny diplomacy.29
Jennifer Welsh, professor of international relations at Oxford University, 
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called for a more focused role and a redefined foreign policy practice.30 Mi-
chael Ignatieff, then a professor at Harvard University, questioned the value 
of multilateralism in an article published in Policy Options, a piece to which 
thirty-seven journalists, policy practitioners, and academics reacted.31 Ig-
natieff also contributed his own view by delivering the 2004 O.D. Skel-
ton Memorial Lecture advocating that, based on the values of peace, order, 
and good government, Canada should acquire “a prevention capability: to 
strengthen rule of law, improve police, conciliate ethno-religious conflict, 
create political dialogue; an intervention capability, not just peace-keep-
ers, but civilian police, administrators, water sanitation and humanitar-
ian experts; and, a reconstruction capability: from constitution-writers to 
contractors and construction engineers.”32 Others reflected on priorities, 
policy issues, and foreign policy prospects;33 and journalist Andrew Cohen 
explored “how we lost our place in the world.”34 These analyses were based 
on the need to look anew at Canada’s role in the world in a context that 
had dramatically changed, and it is not surprising to observe a perceived 
weakening of Canada’s international stature.
It was under foreign minister André Ouellet that the Chrétien gov-
ernment’s foreign policy statement, Canada in the World, was issued, tak-
ing a sharp turn in the orientation Canada would pursue in its foreign 
relations. The policy was based on “three pillars” where, clearly, prosperity 
trumped security, and “the promotion of Canadian values” completed the 
agenda. Apart from this legacy, Ouellet “made little impact on Canadian 
Foreign Policy.”35 Under his leadership, trade took precedence over dip-
lomacy. “Team Canada” banners were prominently displayed in the halls 
of the Pearson building, the headquarters of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade. This trade initiative allowed the prime 
minister to be portrayed as the captain of a united team ±  often composed 
of provincial and territorial premiers, prominent business people, and small 
business entrepreneurs ±  travelling abroad to sell Canada’s greatness. The 
appointment of Ouellet and the image of a united country was a way to put 
foreign affairs at the service of a domestic concern: national unity in the 
months leading to the 1995 Québec referendum.
After this political storm vanished, things changed, allowing Lloyd 
Axworthy, who held the foreign affairs portfolio from 1996 to 2000, to 
exercise a major influence in a new role for Canada in the world. Axworthy, 
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whose tenure was not unanimously applauded,36 touted a human security 
agenda for Canada. Human security was defined as an umbrella cover-
ing the protection of civilians, peace operations, conflict prevention, public 
safety, and good governance ±  that is, the rule of law, human rights, and 
accountability. Among the many results that came from this approach, one 
may note the issue of war affected children and child soldiers, a problem 
that brought together non-governmental organizations and government 
officials and culminated in an international conference held in Winnipeg. 
Axworthy’s agenda also supported the creation of the International Crim-
inal Court and, while sitting on the United Nations Security Council, 
Canada promoted the prevention of armed conflicts.
This list of achievements was crowned by the adoption of the ban on 
the anti-personnel landmines, informally known as the Ottawa Treaty. 
Perhaps the most visible success in recent Canadian foreign policy history, 
many saw it as an expression of the purest Pearsonian peace-seeking trad-
ition. Although the Geneva conference that reviewed the UN Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1996 failed to reach an agreement 
on anti-personnel landmines, Canada, which was not in a position to in-
fluence the outcome of the meeting, had aligned itself strongly and clearly 
in favour of a ban. As early as January 1996, Canada unilaterally declared 
a total ban on anti-personnel landmines. In the days following this an-
nouncement, it held a first meeting where eight countries, later known as 
“the core countries,”37 joined thirteen non-governmental organizations and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross to prepare a course of ac-
tion. Thus, at the conclusion of the Geneva conference, Canada announced 
it would host “an international meeting to develop a strategy for achiev-
ing a comprehensive ban on AP landmines.”38 When launching the Ot-
tawa Process, Axworthy also made a statement that took most participants 
by surprise: a treaty would be signed no later than the end of 1997. The 
following months were used to muster support for the Canadian initia-
tive, including more “like-minded” governments and non-governmental 
organizations, among them the International Campaign to Ban Land-
Mines chaired by Jodi Williams: an effective exercise of the new “public 
diplomacy.” Fourteen months after the first Ottawa meeting, fast-track 
diplomacy bore fruit when 122 countries returned to Ottawa to sign the 
convention. Axworthy continuously applied pressure in order to have more 
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countries sign and ratify the treaty before it came into effect on 1 March 
1999.39 The whole episode was presented as an unmitigated success. Chré-
tien himself may have contributed “countless hours”40 to support the effort, 
but nowhere ±  not even in his memoirs ±  do we see traces that this was his 
initiative.
Axworthy also instructed the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade to work with a host of non-governmental organiza-
tions as a means of implementing Canada’s foreign policy agenda. This was 
true throughout the Ottawa Process but was also used to gain support for, 
and contribute to, the short-lived Centre for the Development of Foreign 
Policy. Axworthy also organized a series of meetings, allowing Canadians 
from coast to coast to discuss foreign policy issues. For Canadian foreign 
policy officers, this was an abrupt cultural change in how to deal with 
foreign policy questions. Grassroots activists, not the prime minister, pro-
vided direct input.
The model of remote prime-ministerial influence survived Axworthy’s 
days. When Canada tried to improve its relationship with the United 
States in early 2001, it was the newly sworn in foreign minister, John Man-
ley, who led the way to Washington, and not Jean Chrétien. Strengthened 
by his successful stint as minister of industry, Manley was convinced of the 
importance of a powerful United States± Canada commercial relationship 
as a tool to achieve economic well-being and prosperity. Moreover, it was 
Manley who sat behind the minister of foreign affairs’ desk on the fateful 
morning of 11 September 2001, when Islamic terrorists attacked New York 
and Washington. No doubt that concepts such as the “intelligent border” 
and other aspects directly related to the new American sensitivity towards 
territorial security needed to be addressed, and it was Manley, more than 
Chrétien, who provided Canada’s input to solve these sensitive questions.
Manley’s successor, Bill Graham, was a cabinet rookie who stepped 
into his ministerial shoes, having chaired the House of Commons Stand-
ing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. In contrast to 
both Manley and Axworthy, Graham’s agenda embraced large chunks of 
policy with no clearly defined priorities; though this was partly due to the 
context in which he had to operate. In his key speeches, Graham walked 
on a tight rope: on the one hand, he tried to defend Canada’s multilateral-
ist tradition; on the other, he had to respond to newly defined post-9/11 
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challenges, without leaving the impression of taking marching orders from 
Washington. No doubt it was an uncomfortable situation. As a result, criti-
cism about Canada’s role in the world grew louder and the prime minister 
recognized the need to finally exert direct leadership. This being said, Gra-
ham did leave an important imprint on the department and on Canada’s 
foreign policy as a whole. Through his Dialogue on Foreign Policy and the 
use of internet forums, the Department was more than ever open to differ-
ent forms of policy-making democratization.
It was on questions related to Africa that Jean Chrétien left his mark 
on Canada’s foreign policy agenda. Gravely impressed by television re-
ports of the turmoil in the Great Lakes region of Eastern Africa, Chrétien 
made Africa his top foreign policy priority. In doing so, he included the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) on the G8 summit 
agenda at the Kananaskis meeting in 2002. NEPAD was a successful rec-
ognition-based partnership between the G8 and African states that aimed 
at consolidating democracy, encouraging sound economic management, 
and promoting peace and development. Canada’s commitment, leadership, 
and traditional “honest broker” role were put to work in the attainment of 
this collective commitment, despite a lukewarm reception from the United 
States. According to former New Democratic Party member of parliament 
Steven Langdon, Canada’s efforts were “so energetic … that African civil 
society groups and parliamentarians became suspicious that this was really 
a Canadian set of proposals being circulated through key African leaders” 
and not a locally supported attempt to enhance economic, political, and 
security environments on the continent.41
Even though the prime minister seemed to enjoy being involved in 
foreign affairs related questions,42 his apparent lack of interest in foreign 
policy was emphasized in a series of diplomatic gaffes: misstatements in the 
Middle East by the prime minister himself, inappropriate remarks about 
the American president by his staff, and the sending of his minister to a 
head of state’s funeral. All of this eroded Canada’s reputation abroad and 
diminished its middle power status. It is only slightly surprising then that, 
in the wake of the tragic events of 11 September 2001, President Bush forgot 
to thank Canada when he listed allies supporting the United States, even 
though Canadians had graciously hosted thousands of stranded American 
airline passengers on 9/11 and in the days that followed.43 Political scientist 
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Tom Keating’s portrait adequately sums up Chrétien’s influence on foreign 
policy: “While the rhetoric and the spirit were unequivocally internation-
alist, the tangible commitment of resources reflected a passivity not seen 
for many decades.”44
Paul Martin (2003–2005)
One cannot think of Paul Martin’s leadership in foreign affairs without 
having in mind the ungenerous nickname The Economist gave him: Mr. 
Dithers. This came after the Martin government sent mixed signals while 
simultaneously avoiding a concrete decision, before eventually declining 
Washington’s invitation to take part in an anti-missile shield initiative. 
Perhaps it was also his indecision or the lack of leadership that let inter-
departmental exchanges continue before ultimately settling on the move of 
Canada’s troops from Kabul to Kandahar. Depending on the sources one 
consults, the answer varies. Yet one thing remains clear: despite the fact 
that Paul Martin took excessive time to weigh issues, his contribution to 
foreign policy was more active than his predecessor’s or, as we will see in 
the next section, his successor’s.
Expectations were high. The experts who were critical of the Chrétien 
government’s foreign policy performance expected a lot from the incom-
ing government, and prominent academics offered their recommendations 
to the incoming prime minister in an issue of the International Journal.45
Martin came to office ready to face this foreign policy challenge. At home 
as minister of finance, he had contributed to revitalizing Canada’s finances 
and economy, providing room for new initiatives. The need for a new policy 
was not disputed, the only question that remained was how strong the 
prime minister’s leadership would be in conducting the foreign policy re-
view. In hindsight, what we witnessed was a return of the strong role played 
by the prime minister in the shaping of foreign policy. Janice Gross Stein 
and Euguene Lang in their book, The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar, 
do not hesitate in their evaluation of the foreign policy review: “The Prime 
Minister wanted this done and done quickly.”46
Martin was indeed quite sensitive to foreign policy issues. His father’s 
legacy as secretary of state for external affairs was dear to him and, as 
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minister of finance, he was at ease playing in international circles, meeting 
his counterparts at gatherings of the G8, the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), and other multilateral forums.47
More importantly, Martin sensed an urgent need to invest in foreign policy 
issues. As he reported himself: “Our foreign policy should reflect our own 
interests and values.... In order to show leadership, however, we have to 
back up our rhetoric with resources. The real problem with our foreign 
policy [is] that we talk a good game but don’t deliver.”48
Martin made it clear that, while “Canada’s role in the world is not 
simply to support a great power,”49 it was necessary to recognize the im-
portance of Canada’s relationship with the United States; and he did so in 
a more open manner than his predecessor. Martin brought back a foreign 
policy unit around the cabinet table and his key ministers, Bill Graham 
and Pierre Pettigrew, were not preaching from Lloyd Axworthy’s gospel 
of anti-Americanism. Moreover, the appointment of Rick Hillier as chief 
of defence staff sent a strong signal in terms of like-mindedness with Can-
ada’s southern neighbour. Hillier quickly introduced to Canada the “three 
block war,” where armed forces must be prepared to support humanitarian 
aid and reconstruction, patrol a ceasefire line, and engage in combat in the 
same theatre of operations. At a time when Washington conducted the 
most offensive and realist foreign policy50 of its history, it was a message 
White House officials appreciated.
Martin’s commitment towards a renewed foreign policy was admit-
tedly among his top priorities when he became Canada’s twenty-first prime 
minister in December 2003 and, in April 2005, it would bear fruit with 
the publication of Canada’s International Policy Statement. This multifaceted 
foreign policy statement covered diplomacy, defence, aid, and trade issues 
in separate booklets that were presented as one policy. The existence of an 
overarching policy that did in fact unify the silo-designed approach was 
questioned by most observers. In short, many initiatives were suggested, 
but the means to reconcile all of the objectives were few.
The statement nevertheless presented a new face to Canadian foreign 
policy at large. The prioritizing that characterized the three pillars option 
advocated in Chrétien’s Canada in the World was put to rest and the govern-
ment embraced a much larger approach that tackled all aspects of Canada’s 
role abroad. The government advocated a “3D approach” with diplomacy, 
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defence, and development working together ±  much to the dismay of trade 
officials who insisted on referring to a 3D+T strategy. The key objectives of 
the policy were to help failed and failing states, to improve Canada’s rela-
tionship with the United States, and to increase the capability of Canada’s 
armed forces; all elements that were music to Washington’s ears following 
the Chrétien government’s distant stance. To keep the usual sovereignty 
concern in check, Prime Minister Martin made sure to add the appropriate 
Canadian touch in the foreword to the policy statement: “We want to make 
a real difference in halting and preventing conflict and improving human 
welfare around the world; [this] is a doctrine of activism that over decades 
has forged our nation’s international character.”51
The policy received mixed reviews. Some academics argued that it 
brought nothing new, simply listing actions to which Canada was already 
committed. Tom Axworthy, a former Trudeau policy advisor, described 
this as “new bottles for old wine,”52 while Professors David Bercuson and 
Denis Stairs offered a more nuanced, but just as biting, analysis.53 It was 
perhaps political scientist Kim Nossal who advanced the most overarch-
ing critique. Taking his cue from the “responsibility agenda”54 outlined in 
the policy statement, he called for the “responsibility to be honest.”55 Yet 
despite the criticism, some aspects of the policy had a longer life than the 
Martin government itself. Parts of the statement were still referred to by 
officials after the Harper government was sworn in, as was the case with 
the defence policy to which Chief of Defence Staff Rick Hillier had heavily 
contributed.
Despite his short tenure as prime minister, Paul Martin was personally 
and actively involved in shaping Canada’s foreign policy. Martin wanted 
to distance himself as much as he could from the Chrétien years, and, in 
terms of foreign policy-making, there is no doubt that he succeeded. His 
practice was consistent with the active role Canadian prime ministers have 
usually played. If Martin swung the pendulum the other way, its course 
was to continue much farther with Stephen Harper coming to power.
19710: Setting the Canadian Foreign Policy Agenda, 1984–2009 
Stephen Harper (2005–2009)
Although he has twice been elected by Canadians, Stephen Harper’s rec-
ord in foreign affairs is still to be written, and it is in this context that the 
analysis of his role must be understood. First indications, however, reveal 
that, since January 2006, Harper has shaped Canada’s foreign policy with 
what some have called a one-dimensional approach. This is revealed in 
terms of his foreign policy priorities as well as his foreign policy manage-
ment.
Much of the inspiration for crafting the Harper government’s foreign 
policy apparently came from Roy Rempel’s book, Dreamland. The work 
claims that Canada’s foreign policy has eroded its sovereignty and pushed 
the country into the status of an American protectorate. Rempel suggests 
this is “because the country’s leaders have had a poor sense of the national 
interest and an ideologically skewed approach to international relations.”56
It is not only a matter of size or power; Canadian leaders have simply lived 
in a dreamland. Rempel calls for better involvement of the public to build 
a national consensus reflecting “the interests of all Canadians rather than 
the view of a select few,” to remove ideology in the building of a stra-
tegic culture, to make international policy “as non-partisan as possible,” 
and consider the building of a close partnership with the United States as 
a first priority.
In line with what Paul Martin had started, Harper has fully recog-
nized the United States as Canada’s first ally. Harper and President George 
W. Bush got along well, though the prime minister did not trumpet this 
friendship. However, there was still little evidence of any overt influence by 
Canada in Washington, as opposed to the Mulroney years. Issues such as 
the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, implemented 
in 2005, continued to be among the key topics referred to in terms of Can-
ada± United States relations. However, there were no definite indicators of 
Canada’s priorities in this relationship. Given the dismal state of the Can-
adian armed forces resources, reinvestment in military equipment cannot 
be, in itself, an indicator of an American driven agenda. Rather, the pur-
chases serve the domestic Canada First policy.
The quiet friendship with Washington is characteristic of the Harp-
er government’s attitude towards foreign policy in general. This can be 
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explained, in part, by the prime minister’s view of foreign policy which is, 
by his own admission, not high, and by the narrow width of foreign policy 
topics that interest him.57 After years of perceived neglect followed by a 
slight revival of foreign policy under Martin, observers expected to see 
clear signals coming from the new government. None came. Not only did 
the Conservative government refuse to publish a foreign policy statement 
of its own, but speeches by key ministers often provided little in the way 
of new information. Speaking before Canadian diplomats posted in Asia, 
Maxime Bernier, minister of foreign affairs from August 2007 to May 
2008, declared: “Canada’s foreign policy is anchored in the pursuit of Can-
adian interests of security and prosperity and in our respect for the values 
of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”58 Any minister 
of any Canadian government over the past twenty-five years could have 
said the same.
Where then does Canada stand? Given the one-dimensional aspect of 
Stephen Harper’s foreign policy, peace and security are priorities that im-
mediately come to mind. As deputy minister Len Edwards mentioned in 
Canada’s remarks at the UN General Assembly in 2008: “Today Canada 
is contributing to peace and security ±  and making sacrifices ±  in places as 
diverse as Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan. Each of these Canadian engage-
ments flows from a UN mandate.”59 Of these, Afghanistan takes preced-
ence, both in terms of resources and in terms of the government’s policy 
agenda. This engagement encompasses the need for a rapprochement with 
the United States while the ever-present Canadian call for multilateral ac-
tion is satisfied.
Canada’s role in Afghanistan also serves to illustrate foreign policy de-
cision-making under Harper. It was reported that the first extension of the 
mission was decided without the input of his ministers of national defence 
and foreign affairs.60 Here again, we observe a one-dimensional apparatus 
where important decisions are concentrated in the hands of experts within 
the Prime Minister’s Office and the Privy Council Office. Officials in the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade are ill at ease with 
this way of making policies, their expertise often disregarded, or simply not 
solicited. This general malaise is amplified by the lack of support given to 
public input at home and public diplomacy abroad.61
19910: Setting the Canadian Foreign Policy Agenda, 1984–2009 
This concentration of power in the hands of a select few goes sharply 
against Rempel’s call for consensus building based on wider input into key 
national interests and foreign policy priorities. It could be explained, in 
part, by the weakness of ministers who were appointed to foreign affairs 
related portfolios. At Foreign Affairs, neither Peter Mackay nor Maxime 
Bernier were considered stars. Similarly, as minister of national defence, 
Gordon O’Connor failed to fulfil the expectations he created among the 
attentive public, the serving military, and foreign policy analysts as an op-
position critic and author of the Conservative defence platform. General 
Hillier’s resignation underlines how top strategists found themselves iso-
lated and felt a lack of support from their political masters.62 The resulting 
vacuum left plenty of room for the prime minister and his close advisors 
to have a direct influence on the shaping of Canadian foreign and defence 
policy. What are the results of this influence?
It is too early to provide a final assessment of the Harper government’s 
contribution to Canadian foreign policy. Heading a minority government 
and facing a major economic crisis, however, there are few incentives for 
the government to modify its attitude. A resurgence of foreign policy as 
a key topic on the government’s political agenda before the next election 
would be surprising.
Different Styles that Matter?
Over the last twenty-five years, prime ministers have been influential in 
the shaping of Canadian foreign policy. How and to what extent they have 
been involved is of import as the context in which foreign policy is set has 
dramatically changed in response to external pressures on the national in-
terest. Theoretically, Canada’s institutional framework gives a huge advan-
tage to the prime minister who can dominate the policy-making process. 
Is this advantage strong enough to curtail these contextual pressures? To 
answer the question we have reviewed the mandates of Brian Mulroney, 
Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin, and Stephen Harper.
The first finding is that, indeed, despite changes in the political environ-
ment, prime ministers matter in foreign policy formulation and decision-
making. Even when Jean Chrétien showed a lesser degree of involvement, 
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he simply left room for strong ministers to capably manage foreign affairs. 
A second point worthy of note is that there is no consistency in the prime 
ministers’ role and influence on foreign policy-making. To illustrate and 
explain these differences, it might be useful to use a typology that relates 
the interest (high or low) of a prime minister towards foreign policy ques-
tions and his foreign policy managerial style (hands off ±  that is, leaving 
ample room to his ministers ±  or hands on ±  that is, controlling as much as 
possible of the content and of the process). Table 1 offers a portrait of the 
four types that result:
This typology brings to light an interesting reading of the period stud-
ied. First, one can see that prime ministers do not follow a unique pattern 
when they get involved in setting their foreign policy agenda and work in 
defence of the national interest: Mulroney was generally of the captain 
style; most of the time Chrétien was lenient; Martin was a commander; 
and Harper, in his first years of government, appears as a shackler. Each of 
these leaders corresponds to a type, but of course to varying degrees.
Prime ministers also tend to move from one type to another when they 
stay for some time in power. This is something Martin, with his short time 
as prime minister did not experience: he came in and stayed a commander, 
though he appeared hesitant at times. Harper has steadily shown the 
characteristics of a shackler. Both Mulroney and Chrétien, however, came 
in as lenient and, with time ±  a short time for Mulroney, but much longer 
for Chrétien ±  moved towards forms of captainship. These categories may 
help us better understand the type of influence a prime minister exercises 
on foreign policy-making; however, it is possible to imagine two prime 
ministers falling within the same type, but at sharply different levels. More 
studies are needed to refine the categories in order to better depict the 
range of possible behaviours adopted by prime ministers.
This research demonstrates that it is not only the prime ministers’ 
personalities that influence their foreign policy behaviour. It undoubtedly 
plays a role, but external factors are also part of the equation, as we have 
seen with Jean Chrétien and NAFTA. This enriches the basis of political 
scientist Margaret Hermann’s frame of analysis which, with further 
research, could enlighten our understanding of the prime ministers’ role on 
foreign policy-making.
20110: Setting the Canadian Foreign Policy Agenda, 1984–2009 
The last twenty-five years have confirmed the importance of the role 
played by the prime minister in serving the national interest. This role has 
changed according to who was holding it and, to a lesser extent, a changing 
environment. Prime ministers of the future will demonstrate how this 
trend will evolve.





Hands off Lenient Captain
Hands on Shackler Commander
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On this the one hundredth anniversary of Canada’s Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade, it is appropriate to review the role that the 
Department has played in meeting the political, economic, and cultural 
challenges of dealing with Canada’s most important bilateral relationship, 
the United States. Between the governments of Liberal prime minister 
Pierre Elliott Trudeau and Conservative prime minister Stephen Harper, 
it is difficult to imagine any major Canadian policy issue that does not have 
some degree of relevance to the relationship with the United States. This 
stands in stark contrast to United States policies where Canada is rarely 
more than a faint blip on the radar screen. That said, it is remarkable the 
extent to which the relationship has often been neglected and even mis-
managed because of a lack of focus on, or attention to, what has long been 
Canada’s most important, even if uncomfortable, relationship.
On the one hand, it may seem inappropriate to single out one federal 
department for consideration, since it is evident that virtually every gov-
ernment department and agency, including the Prime Minister’s Office 
Engaging  
the United States:  




(PMO) and the Privy Council Office (PCO) and even most provincial 
governments, has direct engagement with its counterpart south of the 
forty-ninth parallel. The PCO, for instance, has for some time played a 
direct role in the bilateral relationship. The national security advisor in the 
PCO provides advice to the prime minister on security issues; the foreign 
policy advisor in the PCO not only provides a coordinating role among the 
federal departments and agencies on bilateral relations but also communi-
cates directly with White House officials and the United States embassy in 
Ottawa.1 The daily contacts, often at a very personal level, between officials 
in those departments and agencies with their counterparts in the United 
States have reinforced the notion articulated by, among others, George 
Haynal, former assistant deputy minister for the Americas, that relations 
with the United States are in many respects not foreign relations but rather 
“inter-mesticity.”2 The role of the federal government in determining bilat-
eral policies is further complicated by federal± provincial relations and the 
fact that in a number of areas important to the relationship with the United 
States the provinces are actually sovereign, most notably with respect to 
natural resources.
The relative importance of the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade in shaping the bilateral relationship has varied over the 
years. In 1982 the Department of External Affairs, as it was called until 
1993, underwent a reorganization in part to address the bilateral relation-
ship. The role of the Department in managing these intercontinental rela-
tions, however, has to a considerable degree depended upon the importance 
that the prime minister placed on relations with the United States, the per-
sonal relationship between the prime minister and the American president, 
and the ways in which the prime minister related to the foreign minister 
and the Department as a whole. In the final analysis it is only the prime 
minister who “manages” the relationship with the United States; the rest 
of the actors, important as they are, play only supporting roles, frequently 
off stage.
Former Canadian Ambassador to the United States Allan Gotlieb 
captured the complexity of these bilateral contacts most effectively when 
he wrote in his memoirs: “The relationship is driven by hundreds of in-
stitutions and organizations in both the national and provincial capitals, 
each interacting with points of contact south of the border.” Gotlieb also 
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underscored the tendency in External Affairs to try, usually without suc-
cess, to control all aspects of foreign policy, including the activities of 
international units in other functional federal departments. His own per-
spective, Gotlieb suggested, was shared during his time in office by the 
PCO and Treasury Board; that is that there was a need for more effective 
management of the bilateral relationship.3 Thus, the history of DFAIT in 
shaping and implementing policy toward the United States since the early 
1980s is an uneven one. The Department may at times have claimed sover-
eignty in shaping the policy relationship, but rarely has it succeeded in 
making that claim a reality.
In 1982, there was no inter-departmental cabinet-level committee 
responsible for coordinating policy toward the United States. That year, 
Michael Pitfield, clerk of the privy council, initiated a reorganization of 
a number of the executive branches that impacted External Affairs. The 
reorganization included a merger of the Trade Commissioner Service and 
some policy branches from the Department of Industry, Trade and Com-
merce into the Department of External Affairs. The result was that Exter-
nal ended with two ministers, one for External Affairs and a new minister 
of International Trade. The result was considerable confusion over juris-
diction, duplicated reporting structures, and morale problems in the De-
partment. Derek Burney, then assistant under-secretary of the Economic 
Affairs Bureau, observed in his memoirs that in 1982 there were actually 
seven separate divisions within the Department that had some responsibil-
ity for relations with the United States; and those divisions reported to 
three different assistant deputy ministers, two different deputy ministers, 
and two different ministers. Yet, he also observes ±  and this was crucial for 
the development of policy during the Mulroney Conservative government 
±  that the reorganization gave the Department of External Affairs sole 
responsibility for trade policy, even if that sovereignty was at times chal-
lenged by the Department of Finance and the Department of Industry.4
Between the reorganization in 1982 and September 1983, when he 
was appointed assistant deputy minister for the United States, Burney and 
the Economic Affairs Bureau conducted, in consultation with other rel-
evant federal departments, an exhaustive review of Canadian trade policy. 
Cabinet followed up on this by establishing a task force to cautiously ap-
proach the United States on possible sectoral agreements. While this did 
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not achieve any immediate results, it did establish the basis for the more 
comprehensive free trade negotiations that followed. Once Burney was as-
sistant deputy minister for the United States, he set his mind to bringing 
together the various divisions that had a U.S. focus to develop a coher-
ent set of policies on trade policy and promotion, and political relations. 
The bureau also had primary responsibility for the Canadian embassy in 
Washington, as well as all the Canadian consulates and public affairs in 
the United States, and had coordinating responsibility with other federal 
departments on issues such as the environment, of which acid rain was the 
most contentious concern, and on energy and transportation matters.5
The Mulroney Years, 1984–1993
When Brian Mulroney and the Progressive Conservative party came to 
power in 1984, relations with the United States were clearly under consider-
able stress. There were differences of perspective between the Canadian 
and American governments on a range of issues, from energy and acid rain 
to the extraterritorial application of United States law to Canadian subsidi-
aries operating in Cuba or selling oil field equipment to the Soviet Union. 
Once in office, Mulroney also sought to alleviate some of the tensions that 
had emerged with the United States late in the Trudeau government over 
the National Energy Program and Trudeau’s peace initiative. In addition, 
the Trudeau government’s approach to arms reduction had compromised 
the good personal relationship between Secretary of State for External Af-
fairs Allan MacEachen and Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of State, George 
Shultz. Mulroney thus had to mend personal as well as policy fences. As a 
result, his commitment to strengthening the relationship pulled the Can-
adian bureaucracy in the same direction.6
Allan Gotlieb, serving as under-secretary of state for external affairs 
from 1977± 81 and as ambassador to the United States, 1981± 89, was one 
of two individuals who had a remarkable impact over the next decade in 
refocusing the attention of the Department ±  and one could also argue 
the Conservative government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney ±  on the 
United States; the other was Derek Burney. Gotlieb commented at the 
time of Burney’s appointment as the assistant deputy minister in charge of 
21111: The Department of Foreign Affairs and U.S. Policy, 1982–2005
United States affairs that he would be “more aggressive than his amiable 
predecessors,” and that Burney would also be more effective “provided he 
restrains himself from rolling over and squashing people.”7 In the fall of 
1985 Burney was promoted to deputy minister as one of two deputies at 
External Affairs. In this new role he had overall responsibility for relations 
with the United States as well as with Asia. He remained in that position 
until Prime Minister Mulroney appointed him chief of staff of the PMO 
in February 1987, where his main task was to bring order out of chaos.8
By the time that Burney moved to the PMO, a range of offices in 
the Department had some degree of responsibility for relations with the 
United States. At the peak of the free trade debate and implementation, 
there were no fewer than seven branches and bureaus in the Department 
dealing directly with United States issues. In addition to the United States 
Branch, under Donald Campbell as senior assistant deputy minister, there 
was also a United States Relations Bureau, headed by a director general, 
and a United States Trade and Investment Development Bureau (estab-
lished in 1983) also headed by a director general. In 1987, the Depart-
ment established the United States Trade and Economic Relations Bur-
eau (which replaced the Trade and Investment Development Bureau) and 
the United States Trade, Tourism, and Investment Development Bureau, 
headed by a director general. To round out the Department, there was the 
Free Trade Policy and Options Branch, under an assistant deputy minister, 
the Free Trade Management Bureau, and the Free Trade Policy Bureau. 
The two most pressing concerns in the bilateral relationship in the 1980s 
were free trade and acid rain, and the importance of both issues tended to 
drive the organizational structure of the Department.
This restructuring within the Department of External Affairs was a 
clear reflection of the increased emphasis on the United States and the 
critically important free trade negotiations. It was also, one could argue, 
a reflection of the fact that relations with the United States had become 
a political and personal priority for the prime minister. In 1989 Burney 
succeeded Gotlieb as ambassador in Washington, where he continued to 
build good personal relations with American lawmakers, the hallmark of 
the Gotlieb years. As much as one may be reluctant to credit individuals 
within any complex political and bureaucratic structure with having had 
a transformational impact, it is arguable that these two men did precisely 
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that in the course of the 1980s and early 1990s. Their success came about 
in part because they had a clear vision of what needed to be done, how to 
do it, and who needed to be influenced. Although both were professional 
civil servants and knew how to work as bureaucrats within the system, they 
were also political beings who understood the importance of connections 
in both Ottawa and Washington. They were also confirmed bilateralists 
and considered themselves foreign policy realists.
The impact of Gotlieb and Burney on policy development toward the 
United States in the 1980s and early 1990s is particularly remarkable since 
they differed to some degree from Joe Clark, who served as the secretary 
of state for external affairs from 1984 until 1991. Clark was hampered by 
the fact that he did not have the personal connections in Washington com-
parable to the relationship that had existed between Allan MacEachen 
and George Shultz, who had been friends at university. Clark also pursued 
two areas of international relations that were counter to the policies of the 
Reagan and Bush administrations, in part because he was more closely al-
lied philosophically with the multilateralists in the Department and more 
sensitive to the views of the NGO community on Canadian policy.9 One 
major divergence with the United States was Canada’s vocal opposition 
to the apartheid regime in South Africa, and the imposition of economic 
sanctions on the South African government, a policy opposed by the Rea-
gan administration. The second issue was Nicaragua, where Clark opposed 
American military intervention, advocated a negotiated settlement, sup-
ported the initiatives of the Contadora Group, and accepted refugees from 
El Salvador and Guatemala.10 Canadian policy on both issues was an irri-
tant in Washington at precisely the time that the Mulroney government 
was seeking to strengthen its relationship with the United States. Clark 
was also initially seen as cool to the free trade initiative with the United 
States, which was clearly the main policy initiative of the decade. This set 
him apart from the direction in which Gotlieb, Burney, and ultimately the 
prime minister, wanted to go.
Gotlieb expressed concern at the time that Canada appeared to be 
running a “two track foreign policy,” one under Clark, which sought to 
distance Canada from United States defence policies, and the other under 
Mulroney, which was more realistic and practical.11 One result of this dis-
connect, at least from the perspective of Clark’s critics, was that the bilateral 
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relationship was increasingly being managed primarily by the prime minis-
ter, who developed a close and effective personal and working relationship 
with President Reagan. In the 1985 foreign policy review under Clark’s 
leadership, the references to the United States were ambiguous. On the 
one hand, the document stressed that “there is scarcely an area of Canadian 
National Life not affected by our relationship with the United States,” and 
the report called for a “new, constructive relationship.” At the same time 
the report contained expressions of concern about the asymmetry of the 
bilateral relationship, as well as a tendency toward protectionism in the 
United States and what was considered the “increasingly segmented nature 
of the U.S. government system.”12 In his memoirs Mulroney is more posi-
tive in his assessment of Clark’s role than were either Gotlieb or Burney, 
noting for instance that in late 1986 with the growing concern over the 
acid rain issue, Clark and trade minister Pat Carney had organized a high 
level “think in” on Canada± United States relations. The meeting, which 
included Gotlieb, Burney, and Donald Campbell among others, was the 
first of this nature to have taken place in some time. The recommendations 
coming forth advised the prime minister to press President Reagan to in-
clude a strong endorsement of free trade in his state of the union address 
and that the prime minister also send a personal letter to the president on 
acid rain. Both initiatives proved successful.13
In Washington, Ambassador Gotlieb was in the process of revolution-
izing the nature of Canadian diplomacy in the Amercian capital with what 
has come to be known as “public diplomacy.” He was convinced that it was 
imperative to build profile, relationships, and rapport ±  not just with the 
executive ±  but with members of Congress, and especially key committee 
chairs, if Canada was to achieve its foreign policy goals. He also recognized 
the extent to which the United States Congress often used “domestic laws 
to achieve foreign policy goals.” “Foreign interests,” Gotlieb later wrote, 
“are often as affected by U.S. domestic legislation as by its foreign policy,” 
and as examples during his years in Washington he cited the Motor Car-
rier Act of 1980, the Bus Regulatory Reform Act, the ban on asbestos by 
the Environmental Protection Agency, the 1988 Omnibus Drug Bill, and 
the limitations on the size of lobsters in interstate commerce. Gotlieb’s 
view was that during the Reagan presidency on issues that were within the 
clear control of the administration, such as arctic sovereignty or defence 
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procurement, power resided in the National Security Council. For all other 
issues it was essential for the embassy to work with Congress.14
In 1984, Burney’s U.S. Branch prepared a comprehensive memoran-
dum for cabinet on the management of the relationship with the United 
States. The focus of the memorandum was, not surprisingly, a repudiation 
of the multilateralists and third option advocates in External Affairs, and 
it highlighted the damage that had been done to the bilateral relationship 
resulting from the lack of a clear and comprehensive policy framework. 
The review of Canadian policy toward the United States coincided with 
what Gotlieb described as “the most exhaustive White House inter-agency 
review of U.S. policy towards Canada in Washington’s memory.”15 With 
Burney still at External, Prime Minister Mulroney put him in charge of all 
policy preparations for the official visit of President Reagan to Quebec City 
in March 1985, what came to be known as the Shamrock Summit. The key 
issues for the summit from the Canadian perspective were trade and in-
vestment, the environment, with a focus on the tensions around acid rain, 
and defence production. At this stage there was no indication that the Rea-
gan administration was prepared to address the Canadian concern with 
acid rain, but Gotlieb vigorously lobbied White House officials to turn 
that around, gaining some support from George Shultz, National Security 
Adviser Robert McFarlane, and presidential aide Michael Deaver. The an-
nouncement at Quebec City of the appointment of two special emissaries 
to study the issue of acid rain was initially little more than a face-saving 
gesture, yet it ultimately paved the way for a significant shift in United 
States public policy with the passage of the Clean Air Act by Congress in 
1990.16
The Mulroney and Reagan governments struggled to address the issues 
of acid rain and arctic sovereignty in the mid-1980s but, important as those 
issues were, it was the free trade initiative that brought the Department to 
the fore. Clark was appointed to chair a special cabinet committee on trade 
negotiations, and Simon Reisman was appointed chief trade negotiator in 
the newly established Trade Negotiation Office, where Michael Hart and 
Bill Dymond played key roles. This is not the place for a detailed review of 
the free trade negotiations, but it is evident from the history of this period 
that it was not only the effective politicking and diplomacy in Washing-
ton by Gotlieb and Burney in particular, but also the personal relationship 
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between Mulroney and Reagan that finally resulted in Reagan administra-
tion officials moving the American machinery forward. The key players 
in the final stages not only came from External but also included Michael 
Wilson from Finance and Pat Carney from International Trade. Donald 
Campbell played a lead role in External, and Burney, working from the 
PMO, headed the delegation and also took responsibility for the prepara-
tion of the final legal text.17
The mid-1980s through the end of Derek Burney’s term as ambassador 
to the United States (1989± 93) represented the apogee of United States±
Canada relations as well as the influence of the Department of External 
Affairs on that relationship during the post-1982 years. As ambassador, 
Burney had the advantage of having developed close personal relationships 
in the United States administration and Congress prior to his appoint-
ment, although by the time he settled into the embassy George H.W. Bush 
had succeeded Ronald Reagan. Burney also had the advantage of the prime 
minister’s personal confidence. As Burney observed in his memoirs, “access 
is the lifeblood of diplomacy.”18 Burney indicated that he was also fortun-
ate to have had a number of highly talented External Affairs officers in 
the embassy, including Len Legault on trade and economic issues, Paul 
Heinbecker as the first head of the political section, and Jonathan Fried 
as congressional liaison officer. As with Gotlieb’s tenure, Burney focused 
much of his attention on Congress.19
In spite of the major bilateral focus, neither the Department nor the 
prime minister were exclusively concerned with the United States. There 
was also increased attention paid to broader hemispheric relations, to some 
extent a natural extension of closer association with United States inter-
ests. It was the Mulroney government that brought the country into the 
Organization of American States in 1989, after decades of opposition or 
indecisiveness. Within External Affairs, there also appeared to be interest 
in exploring new directions in Canadian policy and that transition bridged 
the Mulroney and Chrétien governments. As engagement with the hemi-
sphere increased, “a small band at external affairs launched a policy review 
which would provide the rationale for a radical shift in Canada’s hemi-
spheric relations.”20 Some, including then-foreign affairs critic Lloyd Ax-
worthy, were concerned that involvement in the OAS would limit Can-
ada’s latitude of action and link Canadian policy too closely with American 
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policy. Axworthy lamented: “We’re seen as a little red wagon tying itself 
to the big U.S. engine.”21 When Canada, later that year, was the only OAS 
member to endorse the American intervention in Panama to remove Man-
uel Noriega, Axworthy’s concerns appeared to have weight. Regardless, by 
mid-1989, Richard Gorham, Canada’s long-time observer to the OAS, and 
Louise Frechette, a former ambassador to Argentina, had drafted a strat-
egy paper which voiced a radical notion in the nation’s strategic history: 
Canada, it declared, is “a nation of the Americas.”22 The State Department 
was also turning towards the hemisphere, thus a Western Hemisphere re-
alignment was considered by many in Canada to be a prudent shift.23
The Chrétien Years, 1993–2003
The 1980s restructuring of the Department to reflect a more concentrated 
focus on the United States did not outlast the Gotlieb and Burney years, 
or for that matter the Mulroney Conservative government. Nor did the 
triumph of the realists/bilateralists within the Department on the free 
trade issue endure long beyond the Conservative government. Several 
factors appear to have accounted for the relative decline in attention to 
the United States files. One was the fact that the new prime minister, Jean 
Chrétien, had less interest in the bilateral relationship and fewer personal 
connections south of the border than had his predecessor. A second factor 
was that, having criticized the free trade agreement while in opposition, it 
was politically awkward for the new Liberal government to appear to cozy 
up to the United States, not least because the newly elected Democratic 
President Bill Clinton was just as strongly committed to free trade. Once 
in office, the Chrétien Liberals became silent on the issue and followed 
Mexico into the trilateral agreement with barely a whimper. Furthermore, 
as George Haynal has pointed out, following the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, there was no major issue for DFAIT to rally around. 
Allan Gotlieb later wrote that the Chrétien government gave strong 
support to the Canadian ambassador and his staff in Washington during 
the Liberal years in power, but with free trade a reality and with an 
agreement already in place on acid rain there did not seem to be the same 
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sense of urgency about getting the relationship right that had characterized 
the Mulroney years.
While Chrétien did not purposefully set out to antagonize the United 
States, he simply chose not to make the relationship a priority. The prime 
minister had a good working relationship with President Clinton but 
avoided the kind of personal camaraderie of the Mulroney± Reagan and 
Mulroney± Bush relationships. During the 1993 election campaign, Chré-
tien vowed that he would not “make friends with the president of the 
United States” and was determined that relations would be more distant 
and dignified.24 In his memoirs Chrétien indicated that his “ambition 
[was] not to go fishing with the president of the United States” and that 
he did not want to look as though he was “rushing to ingratiate himself ” 
with Clinton. The former prime minister claims to have told Clinton it 
would be good for both if the two kept some distance and that “if we 
look independent enough, we can do things for you that even the CIA 
cannot do.”25 While many felt the Chrétien era once again reignited ten-
sions between the multilateralists and bilateralists in Canadian foreign 
policy, others believe this tension is not the most accurate way to categor-
ize philosophical differences within the Department.26 Regardless, the 
Chrétien years were not the most harmonious in Canada± United States 
relations, although the bilateral relationship did not reach crisis levels 
until after 9/11. Where tensions existed between the two countries, they 
tended to be at the political rather than bureaucratic level, where normally 
it was business as usual.
During much of the Chrétien years there appeared to be no single 
individual with the drive, influence, and focus on the United States of 
either an Allan Gotlieb or a Derek Burney. Indeed, the dominant fig-
ure in Canadian foreign policy during the Liberal years was Lloyd Ax-
worthy, a committed and pro-active multilateralist with a much broader 
international agenda for Canada than simply minding the bilateral rela-
tionship. During his tenure as foreign minister from 1996 to 2000, he 
pursued policies designed to promote human security and soft power; he 
also appealed to the international community as a whole to engage in 
support of a range of multilateral initiatives, some of which ran directly 
counter to American policies. While many were quick to criticize both 
Chrétien and Axworthy for alienating the United States, others argued 
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that the prime minister and foreign minister were in fact well-liked and 
respected in Washington.27
Within the first few months of 1997, about a year after Axworthy took 
over the Foreign Affairs portfolio in a 1996 cabinet shuffle, there was a 
substantial shake-up to the structure of the Department. The United States 
Branch, which throughout the 1980s had held court along with other geo-
graphic branches, was disbanded and replaced by an Americas and Secur-
ity Branch, which had responsibility for the entire Western Hemisphere. 
While there was indeed a United States Bureau within the Americas and 
Security Branch, it soon became clear that this portfolio was too broad 
to give due attention to Canada’s most important ally. As assistant dep-
uty minister for the Americas Branch from 1998 to 2001, George Haynal 
turned his attention to the Summit of the Americas process to ensure its 
success at a time when Canada’s influence was high in the western hemi-
sphere and when External Affairs had “become the driving force behind 
a brisk new hemispheric cheerleading industry.”28 Canada spent a million 
dollars establishing the Canadian Foundation for the Americas, installed 
its first military attaché in Mexico City in 1993, began teaching Spanish 
language courses at the Canadian Forces Staff College, and External Af-
fairs funded a conference in an effort to promote “The Future of the Inter-
American Security System.”29 Indeed, the United States was no longer 
fashionable and, as Haynal describes, “sank back into the mud.”30
The United States ambassador to Canada during the early years of 
Chrétien’s first term, James Blanchard, suggested that, despite the chill in 
Canada± United States relations, policy conflicts between the two coun-
tries were the exception. Of course there were tensions, but when they did 
happen, “they tended to get all blown out of proportion.”31 According to 
Blanchard, who was in Ottawa from 1993 to 1996, Cuba and the contro-
versial Helms-Burton legislation passed in the United States was the only 
truly divisive bilateral issue. Lloyd Axworthy in his memoirs called the 
policy decision by the Clinton administration, under pressure from Sen-
ate conservative Republican Jesse Helms, a “blatant incursion of American 
extraterritorial jurisdiction into other countries’ economic relations with 
Cuba.” Axworthy was proud of the fact that “[Canada] stood up to Amer-
ican demands and in fact led the international fight against this attempt to 
impose U.S. policies on the rest of the world.”32 Blanchard recalls how at 
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a Washington dinner for him and his wife, Janet, the Canadian ambassa-
dor, Raymond Chrétien, spoke at length and with passion about the “evils 
of Helms-Burton.” Blanchard commented that the two dozen American 
officials present at the dinner were stunned: “What the hell is he talk-
ing about? And why’s he ranting about it?”33 Jean Chrétien, in his mem-
oirs, has suggested that one of Raymond Chrétien’s greatest diplomatic 
achievements as Canadian ambassador in Washington was convincing Bill 
Clinton to delay the application of American sanctions against Canada 
over trade with Cuba. Blanchard, however, downplays both the American 
initiative and the Canadian response to it: “If we didn’t have the difference 
over Cuba, the Canadian government would probably have to invent some-
thing else […] From time to time, Canadian politicians have to show their 
people that they’re overseeing a sovereign nation, not just rubber-stamping 
the policies made in Washington.”34 This, of course, is at the heart of the 
ongoing debate between the realists and romantics in Canadian foreign 
affairs.
Cuba aside, the Canadians concurred that the “number of controversial 
files [Raymond Chrétien] had to handle each year actually decreased from 
120 to 10 during his time in Washington.”35 However, some of those minor 
tensions became mired in rhetoric and threatened to quickly become rather 
intractable and tricky to manage, and, as Blanchard stated in his memoirs 
with respect to ongoing and deeply rooted agriculture and fishing disputes, 
“nothing was likely to happen, I concluded, if it didn’t happen at the top.”36
This statement is reflective of how the relationship between the prime min-
ister and the president dictates the tone of Canada± United States relations.
Canadian political scientist Kim Nossal once stated that “on numer-
ous occasions, Canadian policy has been determined, not directly by the 
American government, but by Canadian assessments that a divergent 
policy on an issue would not be worth the damage such a divergence would 
likely cause Canadian± American relations.”37 Nossal’s caution did not ap-
pear to be a concern to Lloyd Axworthy while he served at the helm of 
DFAIT. How senior officials in the Department perceived that orien-
tation, however, is more difficult to determine. Donald Campbell, who 
served as deputy minister for most of Axworthy’s tenure, was well known 
for his recognition of the importance of Canada’s relationship with the 
United States. The ministers of International Trade, whose appointments 
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overlapped with Axworthy’s at Foreign Affairs, were not all bilateralists. 
Roy Maclaren (1993± 96) was Europe-oriented; less so with Art Eggleton 
(1996± 97), Sergio Marchi (1997± 99), and Pierre Pettigrew (1999± 2003).
Axworthy’s interest in hemispheric engagement was reflected in his 
recruitment of Latin American specialist Brian Stevenson to serve as a 
special advisor in the Department, first on trade issues and then on foreign 
policy. Indeed, Axworthy’s stances on certain issues, which had a decidedly 
Pearsonian ring to them, such as Canadian support for the International 
Criminal Court, were roundly derided in the United States. His January 
1999 visit to Fidel Castro’s Cuba, despite American efforts to further iso-
late the Communist regime, and his clear intentions to utilize Canada’s 
seat on the United Nations Security Council in 1999± 2000 to attempt to 
limit the veto powers of the five permanent members, including the United 
States, also did not make him a universally popular figure with Canada’s 
neighbours to the south. A New York Times editorial stated in 1999 that, 
while Axworthy was “the most successful Canadian Foreign Minister in 
years,” he also made waves and was “the one who has most antagonized 
Washington” by refusing to declare the United States ‘the indispensable 
nation’ and promoting what many considered anti-American initiatives.38
Of course, denying these charges, Axworthy nonetheless ruffled feathers 
both in the United States and within bilateral circles in Canada. Senior 
American diplomats argued that Axworthy lacked an understanding of the 
different responsibilities each country had on the world stage, and Univer-
sity of Toronto political scientist John Kirton suggested that Axworthy’s 
soft power was really foreign policy “on the cheap” and asked whether it 
was, “a bit of a Don Quixotic foreign policy?”39 It was of little surprise 
when Canada’s National Post raised the point that Axworthy had “a ro-
mantic progressivist vision of Canada as a multicultural coalition against 
the rich and greedy West, [but] he has forgotten that Canada is a part of 
the West.”40
The debate about the change in tone in the Canada± United States re-
lationship aside, Axworthy achieved great success with the Ottawa Treaty 
to ban anti-personnel landmines, and for his role he was nominated by 
United States Senator Patrick Leahy for the Nobel Peace Prize. This policy 
initiative became the hallmark of the much-debated concept of “human 
security” and is one that diverged from the position of the United States, as 
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well as many other states with key global strategic concerns, such as India 
along the Pakistani border, China, and Russia. Axworthy’s initiative has 
been lauded as “the story of how a tiny but determined band of outsiders 
took on and defeated some of the world’s great powers at their own game ±  
diplomacy ±  says a lot about the increasing role of public pressure in world 
affairs.”41 It also says a lot about Lloyd Axworthy’s argument that, although 
the United States may be the most influential and powerful nation, “coun-
tries like Canada can set the pace.”42
During the Axworthy years as foreign minister, the Department con-
tinued to suffer from both budget constraints and a lack of the kind of re-
structuring that would have given higher profile and attention to the United 
States agenda. The assistant deputy ministers who directed the Americas 
Branch between 1996 and 2005, Michael Kergin, George Haynal, and 
Marc Lortie, were all strong individuals who viewed the United States 
as critical to Canadian interests, but their portfolio was too broad by any 
reasonable measure to ensure a focus on relations with the United States. 
Nor was the focus on the United States that had characterized the Mulro-
ney, Gotlieb, and Burney years any longer reflected in the organizational 
structure of the Department.
Financial constraints in the 1990s further weakened the Department. 
While the prime minister came to rely heavily on DFAIT for assistance 
to prop up the country’s flagging economy with its controversial but high-
profile “Team Canada” trade missions, which “crossed the globe in search 
of markets and investments,” it was not immune from massive cuts in gov-
ernment expenditures. Between 1988/89 and 1998/99, DFAIT’s budget 
was reduced in ten separate cuts by a total of $292 million.43 The impact 
on the Department was far-reaching; however, Lloyd Axworthy still per-
ceived the time as a period of opportunity as rigidities in the alliance sys-
tem were loosening, and the new administration under Clinton seemed 
open to multilateral thinking. In his words, “all countries were looking 
for new markers to steer by” and Canada had an opportunity to make its 
mark.44
With the end of Axworthy’s tenure as foreign minister in 2000, there 
was evident recognition by the Liberal government that it would be pru-
dent to pay more attention to Canada’s southern neighbour. John Manley’s 
appointment as foreign minister appeared to represent a shift in focus and 
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was a clear signal to Washington of a more positive Canadian orientation 
toward the United States. Manley’s high-profile political stature, combined 
with his former role as minister of industry, made him an attractive person-
ality to work with his American counterparts on practical issues. Even in 
the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the emergent strains in the bilateral 
relationship, Manley dealt effectively with both Secretary of State Colin 
Powell and the newly appointed head of the Department of Homeland 
Security, Tom Ridge.
The crisis of 9/11 galvanized not only Foreign Affairs but all Canadian 
federal departments into sharpening their attention on the United States, 
but some changes were already underway before the terrorist attacks. The 
departure of Raymond Chrétien (1994± 2000) from Washington follow-
ing George W. Bush’s election was inevitable after the ambassador made 
an indiscreet comment that implied that Canadians would prefer former 
vice-president Al Gore in the White House. The appointment of career 
civil servant Michael Kergin (2000± 2005) from Foreign Affairs to replace 
Chrétien as ambassador was another signal that the Canadian government 
wanted stability in the bilateral relationship, as was the appointment of 
former Deputy Minister of Industry Peter Harder as deputy minister of 
foreign affairs and international trade (2003± 2007).45
Despite all the focus south of the border, as late as 2001± 2002, the 
words “United States” did not appear in the organizational structure of 
DFAIT. The United States was still subsumed under the responsibility 
of an assistant deputy minister in the Americas branch, paralleling Asia-
Pacific and Africa, Communications, Culture and Policy Planning, and 
Corporate Services, Passport, and Consular Affairs, all of which reported 
to the deputy minister for international trade and the deputy minister of 
foreign affairs. By the following year, the branches also reported to an as-
sociate deputy minister of foreign affairs, taking them yet one more step 
away from the minister and from power. That structure did not change 
until 2005, when Peter Harder successfully pressed for the establishment 
of a North American Branch and a North American Bureau, with Peter 
Boehm as the first assistant deputy minister of the branch and William 
Crosbie as the director general of the bureau. In 2006 the Department 
added a North American Commercial Relations Bureau, with Deborah 
Lyons as director general.
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Jean Chrétien’s retirement from politics in 2003, to be replaced by 
Paul Martin in December of that year, brought to the prime minister-
ship an individual with whom both the Canadian business community and 
the Washington establishment could feel more comfortable. The fact that 
Martin believed the bilateral relationship needed immediate attention was 
reflected in his prompt establishment of an interdepartmental cabinet-level 
committee to coordinate relations with the United States, a committee that 
met weekly and one that he personally chaired. In addition, the PCO be-
came quite operationally involved in the U.S. relationship, with the result 
that DFAIT was not the primary driver on policy.
Reflective of the increasing importance of the United States was the 
release of a guide for Canadian public officials in 2004 entitled, Action-
Research Roundtable on Managing Canada± U.S. Relations. This report was 
chaired by the deputy minister for Transport Canada, Louis Ranger, and 
involved the participation of many other Canadian government depart-
ments and agencies, including Foreign Affairs. While not impacting policy 
specifically, the intent was to better understand the mechanisms and man-
agement of the bilateral relationship with the recognition that the United 
States has often approached Canada± United States relations with a differ-
ent set of assumptions and priorities. According to the report, Canadians 
dealing with their counterparts in the United States must recognize, ap-
preciate, and comprehend American perceptions of Canada and its place 
in its own strategic priorities, as well as the enormity of the United States 
political machinery and the expansive role played by Congress in policy 
development. Clearly, the Canadian government realized that it had let 
its relationship with its southern neighbour falter and that “the growing 
number of actors involved in the cross-border relationship requires stra-
tegic coordination in the pursuit of Canadian interests.”46
In 2005 the Martin government produced a new International Policy 
Statement, setting directions for Canadian defence, diplomacy, develop-
ment, and commerce. In his introduction to the document on diplomacy, 
Foreign Minister Pierre Pettigrew stated clearly: “Our priorities include 
the management of our relations with the United States, which are key to 
the security and prosperity of Canadians.” At the same time, the docu-
ment made the usual genuflection to Canada’s global role: “we intend to 
pursue,” Pettigrew wrote, “a new multilateralism that emphasizes effective 
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global governance, to strengthen Canada’s regional networks and to re-
configure our representation abroad to reflect the shifting distribution of 
global power and influence.”47
The first major section of the document on diplomacy focused on the 
North American partnership, although that title masked the primary focus 
on the relationship with Washington. The subheadings included: “Part-
nership with the United States,” “Modernizing Canada± U.S. Security,” 
“Cooperating on Shared Global Objectives,” “Environmental Partner-
ship,” and “Getting our Message Across,” before turning to the third leg 
in the North American relationship, Mexico. Building on the 2001 Smart 
Borders Declaration, the security framework that was part of Canada’s 
2004 National Security Policy, and the 2002 establishment of a bi-national 
planning group, the 2005 policy document concentrated on modernizing 
the Canada± United States security relationship in response to the per-
ceived global terrorism threat. The specific initiatives and issues identified 
included counterterrorism, the renewal of NORAD, and modernizing the 
bilateral approach to environmental challenges. The policy statement also 
committed Canada to working with the United States on a range of more 
global initiatives, including the transformation of NATO to make it a 
more effective instrument against terrorism and in support of peacemaking 
operations, promoting democracy through the Summit of the Americas 
process, supporting nuclear non-proliferation, and addressing new health 
threats. The statement also identified the goal of advancing Canadian in-
terests in the Arctic, a region that offers opportunities for both collabora-
tion and conflict with the United States.
The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has, over 
the years, appropriately sought to implement policies designed by the elect-
ed officials who have formed a series of Canadian governments. At times, 
members of the Department have had a significant impact influencing the 
direction of policy, the most prominent example in the years since 1982 
being the free trade negotiations with the United States and subsequently 
with Mexico. At other times, the Department may have seemed to have 
been slow to respond to challenges, pushed aside by competing depart-
ments, or bypassed completely by the prime minister. Yet, for all the frus-
tration of those who might wish the Department to always be the driving 
force behind foreign policy, it must be remembered that in the Canadian 
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system of government it is the prime minister and cabinet who are given 
the mandate to govern.
The debate over the extent to which relations with the United States 
should be Canada’s primary foreign policy focus, however, continues to 
elude consensus. Writing in The Globe and Mail in early 2008, former For-
eign Minister Lloyd Axworthy argued that: “Ottawa has been so preoccu-
pied with keeping in sync with these Washington missteps that we have 
lost sight of the global-sized tectonic changes that are altering power rela-
tionships. We have ignored the looming risks of nuclear proliferation and 
climate change, and abandoned the multilateral diplomacy that gave us a 
voice and influence on a wide range of significant issues.”48
On the other hand, Canadian historian Jack Granatstein, in the pages 
of the same newspaper, has contended: “Above all, given our geographic 
location, we must have close relations with the United States. The U.S. is 
our best friend, as a now-forgotten politician said 45 years ago, ‘whether 
we like it or not.’ Strong in their anti-Americanism, Canadians took a long 
time to learn this, and some never have. But unless we can learn to eat 
grass to survive, we must have access to the American market, the largest, 
richest in the world. We need Americans’ investment, and access to their 
brainpower and culture. We will need their military support in extremis. 
And the Yanks aren’t going away ±  Canada is not an island, nor can we 
hide behind psychological or trade barriers.”49
The contrast between the Axworthy and the Granatstein perspectives 
embodies a more general ambiguity or even division in Canadian polit-
ical culture over the relationship with the United States. The Department 
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, as a government department, 
has historically had the primary responsibility of implementing rather than 
determining government policies. Yet, to some extent the history of the 
Department over the past several decades has also mirrored the broader 
differences in Canadian society.
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In September 1995, the United Nations convened the Fourth World Con-
ference on Women in Beijing. Canada actively participated at the confer-
ence ±  the largest the UN had ever held ±  and in the preparatory meet-
ings leading up to it.1 Furthermore, Canada was one of 189 countries that 
unanimously adopted the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. The 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) exer-
cised a lead role in the interdepartmental process to develop Canada’s pos-
itions on the Declaration and Platform for Action. The process took place in 
an environment radically different from that of the Pearsonian era, when 
DFAIT’s predecessor, the Department of External Affairs, had exercised 
a near monopoly over the formulation and implementation of Canadian 
foreign policy.2 During the three decades preceding the Beijing conference, 
a series of factors combined to undermine the department’s pre-eminence 
in foreign policy. Of these factors, the most salient to this case are the 
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expansion of the international agenda to give greater priority to economic 
and social issues and the increased participation of other branches of the 
federal government.3 As the international agenda expanded to include new 
issues, the definition of Canada’s national interest was broadened. The in-
creased involvement of diverse branches of government made the defining 
of the national interest much more challenging as each had its own par-
ticular idea of what constituted the national interest and of how it could 
best be realized. As a result of these factors, the Canadian foreign policy-
making process became much more complex.
The chapter begins by identifying the characteristics that make 
this case unique and intriguing. Thereafter, it focuses on two themes: 
the interrelationship of external and domestic determinants, and the 
interdepartmental process to develop Canada’s positions and strategies on 
the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. Assessments of the extent 
to which the expansion of the international agenda and the increased 
participation of other branches of the federal government affected the role 
and influence of DFAIT in this case are integrated into these discussions. 
The themes are interrelated: the broadening of the international agenda 
has had a profound influence on the interdepartmental decision-making 
process and contributed to the greatly increased participation by other 
branches of the federal government. The section on the interdepartmental 
process briefly describes the actors and the interaction among them, 
giving particular emphasis to DFAIT. The relative importance of federal 
government actors, including departments and the central agencies, is 
assessed, the relevance of the governmental politics approach to explaining 
the interaction among the key players is examined, and the question of 
whether DFAIT functioned as a generalist and/or a specialist department 
is addressed.
In keeping with the general tenets of the literature on Canadian foreign 
policy, the chapter concludes that the external environment established 
parameters within which foreign policy-makers operated.4 Nonetheless, 
Canada’s positions on the Beijing Platform for Action exerted some influence 
on other areas of the country’s policies, both domestic and foreign. In terms 
of the involvement of other government actors, program departments played 
key roles, while the central agencies had little involvement. Although the 
governmental politics approach does not rule out collaboration among 
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government officials involved in the foreign policy-making process, it tends 
to see competition as a more dominant characteristic. Yet, cooperation 
rather than conflict characterized the interdepartmental work to develop 
Canada’s positions and strategies for the Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action. In this process, DFAIT functioned both as a specialist department, 
which sought to maximize gains on issues most salient to it, and as a 
generalist department, which advocated compromise on some contentious 
issues in order to secure international agreement on the best attainable ±  
rather than the ideal ±  text.
A Unique and Intriguing Case
Canada’s policies for the Fourth World Conference on Women must 
be seen in the context of the country’s participation in a long series of 
conferences and summits that the UN convened in the 1990s. The 
process of preparing for UN conferences and summits is similar. There 
are always interdepartmental committees, consultations with the provinces 
and territories, and the involvement of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). The conferences and summits of 1990s addressed many of the same 
issues; hence they involved many of the same actors, both governmental 
and non-governmental. Nonetheless, the process of developing Canada’s 
positions and strategies vis-à-vis the Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action is unique and intriguing for a number of reasons: the wide range of 
issues addressed, the number of actors, and the complexity of the process. 
The Platform for Action dealt with twelve interrelated issue areas: poverty, 
decision-making, education, human rights, health, media, violence, 
environment, armed conflict, rights of the girl child, economics, and 
mechanisms for the advancement of women. Thus the agenda was huge. 
By comparison, the Copenhagen Summit for Social Development, which 
was held the same year as the Beijing Conference, focused on only three 
sets of core issues: poverty, employment, and social integration. Summit 
participants considered their agenda to be substantial, yet it paled in 
comparison with that of the Beijing Conference on Women.
In light of the number of issue areas in the Platform for Action, over 
twenty Canadian government departments and agencies participated in 
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the policy-making process. Preparations for the Beijing conference in-
volved an even larger number of government departments and agencies 
than did preparations for the Group of Seven (G7) Summits held during 
that time period. The conference also attracted the attention of large num-
bers of NGOs, including not only women’s organizations but also labour, 
development, education, health, human rights, environmental, peace, and 
indigenous groups.
The complexity of the policy-making process contributed to making 
the case unique and intriguing. The development of Canada’s positions 
and strategies was complex because of the number of governmental and 
non-governmental actors, the number of issue areas and their interrelated-
ness, and the controversial nature of many of these issues. The tone and 
substance of the negotiations was very much affected by the macro-level 
dichotomy between religious/conservative forces and those who took a pro-
feminist approach. 
At the state level, the religious/conservative forces comprised the Holy 
See5 and its allies (most notably Guatemala, Ecuador, Honduras, Argen-
tina, and Malta), as well as fundamentalist6 Islamic states (in particular, 
Iran, Sudan, Algeria, and the Gulf states). Their anti-feminist stances were 
supported by conservative NGOs, such as Catholic Campaign for America, 
Focus on the Family, and Canada’s REAL Women. On the other side, tak-
ing pro-feminist positions, were the European Union, Canada, Australia, 
and the Caribbean countries. The vast majority of the Canadian NGOs 
involved in the Beijing process were also pro-feminist in their orientations. 
Needless to say, this polarization rendered the process of reaching consen-
sus on the Platform for Action much more arduous.
When the Beijing Conference on Women began, 25 per cent of the 
Platform for Action remained in square brackets, meaning that agreement 
had yet to be reached on one quarter of the text. Participants at the Copen-
hagen Summit for Social Development thought they faced a daunting task 
when 10 per cent of the text remained in square brackets at its onset. While 
significant, 10 per cent is still a great deal less than 25 per cent.
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Interrelationship of External and Domestic 
Determinants
The Beijing case exemplifies how intertwined the external and the domes-
tic realms can be. As is usual in Canadian foreign policy-making, the pro-
cess in this case was largely reactive. Negotiating texts were drafted by UN 
officials and sent out to countries for their reaction ±  often only a few weeks 
before the negotiations began ±  leaving little time for developing positions 
and strategies. Such tight time lines are the norm for UN negotiations.
Canada’s positions and strategies apropos the Beijing Declaration 
and Platform for Action were influenced by its experience at previous UN 
meetings. The most salient of these negotiations were the three preced-
ing conferences on women: the 1993 Conference on Human Rights, the 
1994 Conference on Population and Development, and the 1995 Summit 
for Social Development. The UN had convened the First, Second, and 
Third World Conferences on Women in 1975, 1980, and 1985, respect-
ively. Each had produced documents addressing the themes of women’s 
equality, development, and peace. Over time, the documents became 
more sophisticated and more analytical. In 1985, the Third Conference 
on Women adopted the Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of 
Women to the Year 2000, which examined obstacles to women’s advance-
ment and recommended strategies for overcoming them. The 1993 Vienna 
Conference on Human Rights declared women’s rights to be human rights 
and called for the mainstreaming of gender analysis within human rights 
regimes. The 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development rec-
ognized women’s empowerment as a prerequisite for population control 
and economic development, while the 1995 Copenhagen Summit for So-
cial Development recognized gender equality as a crucial component of 
sustainable development. Canadian officials planning for the Beijing con-
ference sought to build on and further strengthen the language pertaining 
to women’s rights that had been negotiated at these previous UN meetings.
There were both advantages and disadvantages to the Beijing con-
ference’s placement in a long line of UN conferences and summits. On a 
positive note, the lead departments ±  DFAIT, Status of Women Canada 
(SWC), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
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±  had already established patterns of cooperation to promote women’s issues 
before the Beijing conference and its preparatory meetings were convened. 
The negative consequences included conference fatigue, and often inad-
equate preparatory time. For example, the final and most important prep-
aratory meetings prior to the Beijing conference were convened in March 
1995, immediately following the Copenhagen Summit for Social Develop-
ment. As a result, there was no time to incorporate provisions agreed to in 
Copenhagen into the draft Platform for Action. Furthermore, many of the 
delegates came straight from the Summit to attend the preparatory meet-
ings; negotiations had been difficult and, among most participants, there 
was a certain amount of physical and mental exhaustion.7 The Group of 77, 
in particular, had not had time to prepare its joint positions on the Platform 
for Action, with the result that the preparatory meetings were delayed while 
their members met behind closed doors trying to reach a consensus.
Thus Canada’s positions were influenced by external developments. 
At the same time, Canada’s preparations for the Beijing Conference on 
Women influenced its policies and positions in other forums as well. At 
home the need to develop positions on the Platform for Action served as 
leverage for developing umbrella policies for advancing women’s rights. 
During the Beijing process, cabinet approval was sought, and received, for 
a formal mandate to promote women’s equality and to mainstream gender-
based analysis.8 The policy applied not only to the Platform for Action but 
also to subsequent domestic and international policies. Preparations for the 
women’s conference provided the impetus and the justification for seek-
ing cabinet approval for the mandate, but its effects were much further-
reaching.
In some cases, decisions were taken apropos the Beijing conference 
that had implications for Canada’s positions at other conferences. For in-
stance, when planning for the Beijing conference began, the lead depart-
ments agreed on objectives, not only for that venue, but also for address-
ing women’s issues in other international negotiations, including the 1993 
Vienna Conference on Human Rights and the 1995 Copenhagen Summit 
for Social Development.
While external developments very much influenced Canada’s positions 
on the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the country’s positions 
had to be consistent with Canadian legislation. The Canadian delegation 
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worked to get gender-based persecution recognized as grounds for claim-
ing refugee status because such provisions were enshrined in Canadian law. 
Canada led this campaign because its legislation offered greater protection 
to women refugees than did that of other countries. In short, Canada was 
the field leader in terms of its legislation; hence, it took the lead role in the 
negotiations on this issue.
Questions have been raised regarding whether or not Canada is ex-
erting sufficient influence in the world.9 Has it lost its status as a significant 
player on the international stage? In this case, Canada can be said to have 
punched above its weight. The Canadian negotiators achieved some ma-
jor successes, both at the preparatory meetings and at the Fourth World 
Conference in Beijing. At the 1995 New York Preparatory Meetings, for 
example, the Canadian delegation was instrumental in having the Health 
Section in the draft Platform for Action expanded beyond a preoccupation 
with sexual and reproductive rights to include a more holistic approach that 
took into account the effects of poverty. Canada also played an important 
role in ensuring that a gender perspective was incorporated into the Plat-
form for Action. In Beijing, Canadian delegates chaired a majority of the 
working groups that were established to negotiate particularly contentious 
issues such as parental rights, unpaid work, and sexual rights. Further-
more, several of the major precedent-setting advances in the Platform for 
Action resulted from Canadian initiatives. They included the definition of 
rape as a war crime and as a crime against humanity, the requirement to 
develop international, gender-sensitive classifications for measuring unpaid 
work, and the stipulation that violence and gender-related persecution are 
grounds for claiming refugee status.
Having noted the considerable gains made by the Canadian negoti-
ators, it is time to examine the interdepartmental process by which Can-
ada’s positions and strategies were formulated. This process was very much 
affected by developments in the international environment.
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Interdepartmental Policy-Making Process
As mentioned earlier, the environment in which DFAIT operated in the 
1990s was quite different from that of the Pearsonian era, when its pre-
decessor, the Department of External Affairs, had been pre-eminent in 
the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. A series of develop-
ments in the 1960s served to erode the pre-eminence of the Department 
of External Affairs. Military security was still deemed critical but the 
international agenda was increasingly concerned with economic and so-
cial issues. As a result, the mandates of far more federal departments were 
affected by foreign policy. Each of these departments sought to advance 
its own objectives by exerting influence over the direction and substance 
of Canada’s foreign policies. For instance, the Department of Trade and 
Commerce and the Department of Manpower and Immigration partici-
pated in the formulation and implementation of foreign policies relating to 
their respective mandates. As Tammy Nemeth has detailed in chapter 9, 
the primacy of the Department of External Affairs was further challenged 
when Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau took office in 1968. In an effort to 
open up the policy-making process, he created coordinating mechanisms, 
such as interdepartmental committees, to ensure that a broad range of gov-
ernment actors was included in policy debates and that competing policy 
options were presented to cabinet. Trudeau relied heavily on the central 
agencies, in particular the Prime Minster’s Office and the Privy Council 
Office, for foreign policy advice. Thus, the Department of External Affairs’ 
iron grip over foreign policy was eroded of the increased participation by 
domestic departments and the central agencies. Such trends were acceler-
ated in the post-Cold War era, when the forces of globalization intensified 
and economic and social issues became the priorities on the international 
agenda.
Although more than twenty government departments and agencies 
were involved in formulating Canada’s positions for the Beijing Conference 
on Women, three were pivotal throughout the process: Status of Women 
Canada; the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade; and 
the Canadian International Development Agency.10 SWC was the lead 
department and served as the secretariat for the interdepartmental policy-
making process. Its public servants began preparations for the conference 
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in 1992. In August 1994 ±  just over a year before the conference began 
±  the position of Executive Director of the UN World Conference on 
Women Secretariat was created within SWC. Valerie Raymond, the for-
mer director of DFAIT’s Human Rights, Women’s Equality and Social 
Affairs Division, was seconded to SWC to fill the position. Raymond had 
extensive experience, both in international negotiations and with women’s 
issues, and had already been working closely with SWC on the prepara-
tions for the Beijing conference.11 Having a Foreign Affairs official serving 
as the lead negotiator and as the chair of the interdepartmental negotia-
tions at the bureaucratic level was not unusual. Such was also the case for 
the Copenhagen Summit for Social Development, for which Marius Bu-
jold, another DFAIT official, was appointed Canadian Coordinator. The 
difference was that Bujold remained in DFAIT and was never seconded to 
one of the other lead departments.
Legally and operationally responsible for conducting Canada’s foreign 
policy, DFAIT is also tasked with negotiating international agreements 
and representing Canada at international conferences. Thus, it was not sur-
prising to see it exercising a leadership role in the Beijing process. Further-
more, DFAIT assumed the lead on matters regarding international human 
rights and peace and security, as these were areas in which it had estab-
lished expertise and they involved international treaties and covenants.
Within DFAIT, the Human Rights, Women’s Equality and Social 
Affairs Division was pivotal, and it coordinated the department’s prepara-
tions for the Beijing conference. No formal mechanisms for consultations 
were established within the Department. Instead the individuals involved 
consulted informally as the need arose, which meant at least bi-weekly dis-
cussions between the Director of the Human Rights, Women’s Equality, 
and Social Affairs Division, and the Director of the Refugee, Population, 
and Migration Division. Regular contact was also maintained with the 
Legal Operations Division. Although Valerie Raymond was formally se-
conded to SWC in 1994, her Foreign Affairs colleagues continued to re-
gard her as one of their own.
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The Fourth World Conference on Women was also important to the 
Canadian International Development Agency on several scores. The con-
ference’s three themes (equality, development, and peace) coincided with 
CIDA’s mandate, which is “to support sustainable development in de-
veloping countries, in order to reduce poverty and to contribute to a more 
secure, equitable and prosperous world.”12 Furthermore, advancing the 
well-being of women in development comprised one of CIDA’s key prior-
ities. In particular, it had a commitment:
	 •	 To	increase	women’s	participation	as	decision-
makers in the economic, political, social and envi-
ronmental spheres;
	 •	 To	improve	women’s	economic	conditions,	basic	




their concerns on gender issues in development.13
Hence the Beijing conference, which addressed many issues directly re-
lated to women and development, was important to the agency.
SWC, CIDA, and DFAIT were all key players in the Interdepart-
mental Committee on the World Conference on Women, which began 
meeting in August 1992 and was chaired by SWC. The committee func-
tioned collaboratively to develop Canada’s positions. Its recommendations 
were then given to the Secretary of State for the Status of Women and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs for approval. The full cabinet never became 
involved because the committee’s recommendations were in keeping with 
existing policy guidelines; thus, further cabinet approval was not required. 
Public servants on the Interdepartmental Committee nevertheless kept 
their respective ministers apprised of its work. While their ministers were 
generally supportive, none was directly involved in the formulation of pos-
itions and strategies.
The governmental politics approach provides a framework for analyz-
ing the nature of the policy-making process within government. According 
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to the approach, public policies result from a bargaining process in which 
diverse governmental actors interact to affect outcomes.14 Issues often come 
within the jurisdictions of several government departments and agencies; 
hence, they share responsibility for policy formulation. Since each depart-
ment has its specific areas of interest to protect and promote, they compete 
to influence policy outputs. As the governmental politics approach con-
tends, issues in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action came within 
the jurisdictions of multiple government departments and agencies; hence, 
developing Canada’s policies and strategies involved extensive interdepart-
mental consultations. Yet, in contrast to the tenets of the governmental 
politics approach, which predicts actors competing to determine outcome, 
the decision-making process within federal government circles was for the 
most part harmonious. In this respect, the case stands in contrast to several 
others of the same period. For example, during Canada’s ‘fish war’ with 
Spain, tensions arose between the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, on 
one hand, and DFAIT, on the other, over which department would assume 
the lead and over what approach should be used ±  the “quiet diplomacy” 
advocated by DFAIT or the more aggressive style taken by the Depart-
ment of Fisheries and Oceans.15 Governmental politics also featured prom-
inently during the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines as the De-
partment of National Defence and DFAIT each wrestled to control the file 
and assert primary leadership.16 Interdepartmental wrangling ±  primarily 
involving the Department of the Environment, on one hand, and National 
Resources Canada, on the other ±  was also very much in evidence when 
positions for the 1997 Kyoto negotiations for a legally binding protocol to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions were being determined.17
Three sets of factors account for the interdepartmental collegiality dur-
ing the preparations for the Beijing conference. First and most importantly, 
the issues in the Platform for Action all fell within existing government poli-
cies. Thus, most of the interdepartmental conflicts that these issues might 
have triggered had already been resolved in interdepartmental negotiations 
for previously held UN conferences and summits. Secondly, and closely re-
lated, government officials shared a high degree of consensus on priorities 
and objectives. All departments shared the macro-level goal of advancing 
women’s equality globally. Most of the key public servants had been in-
volved in previous conferences and summits; therefore, they understood the 
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precedents that had been set and the parameters within which they had to 
operate, both at home and at the international negotiations. A third factor 
contributing to collegiality was the fact that questions of finance had been 
settled in advance. While finances frequently trigger interdepartmental 
strife, they did not do so in this case, because Paul Martin, Minister of Fi-
nance, André Ouellet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Sheila Finestone, 
Secretary of State for the Status of Women, had agreed in advance that no 
additional funds would be allocated. There was, therefore, no controversy 
between the Department of Finance, on one hand, and the lead depart-
ments, on the other, over how much new commitments would cost.
Although questions of finance did not cause direct conflict among 
members of the Interdepartmental Committee on the World Confer-
ence on Women, the 1995 federal budget cast a heavy shadow over Can-
ada’s participation at the Copenhagen Summit and the final six months 
of preparations for the Beijing conference. Many of the budget provisions 
directly undermined the positions that Canada was promoting in these 
negotiations. For example, the budget dramatically cut funding for social 
programs vital to the well-being of Canadian women and for foreign aid, 
which could have been used to help empower women in Southern coun-
tries and to enhance their political, economic, and social status. It also 
slashed funding for Canadian NGOs. The budget clearly illustrated that, 
when push came to shove, the views of the Minister of Finance prevailed 
over the concerns of the lead departments. The ascendancy of the Depart-
ment of Finance is not uncommon in Canadian politics.18 The department 
that controls the federal budget exercises a formidable influence over the 
extent to which Canada can pursue diplomatic activities, military endeav-
ours, and foreign aid programs abroad.
There was some friction between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
the Secretary of State for the Status of Women, largely over questions of 
jurisdiction, which was at times exacerbated by personality clashes. The ri-
valry was, however, minor. Although André Ouellet, the Minister of For-
eign Affairs, was officially responsible for two of the three key departments 
involved in this case, he was preoccupied with issues of national unity. He 
had been appointed by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien as a political move to 
place a senior francophone from Quebec in a major portfolio, from which 
he could promote national unity in the period leading up to the Quebec 
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referendum on independence. As a result, Ouellet devoted little time to 
the Beijing conference and was generally willing to let the secretary of 
state for the status of women take the limelight. Thus, the preparations for 
the Beijing conference involved little of the “pulling and hauling” gener-
ally associated with governmental politics, at either the bureaucratic or the 
ministerial levels.
Although DFAIT is traditionally seen as a generalist department, in 
this case, it also functioned as a specialist department. The latter gives pri-
ority to achieving specific negotiating objectives that pertain directly to 
its mandate. It is reluctant to compromise on these objectives as doing so 
can result in weak provisions that are of marginal use in attaining its goals. 
Of the twelve issue areas in the Platform for Action, DFAIT gave high-
est priority to human rights, violence, armed conflict, reproductive rights, 
economic equality, and the rights of the girl child. As specialists, foreign 
affairs officials sought to maximize gains in these areas, making as few 
concessions as possible. A generalist department gives priority to secur-
ing the best overall package and as a result, it is willing to compromise 
on some issues to achieve a degree of unanimity on a negotiated text that 
reflects many of the country’s priorities. Following the March 1995 prep-
aratory meetings for the Beijing conference, where the conservative forces 
had been particularly active, there were some philosophical differences 
in approaches among federal departments. For instance, Health Canada 
sought to broaden the health agenda and to push for further gains ±  a 
position that reflected a specialist’s focus on maximizing gains in its issue 
area. At the same time, DFAIT and SWC opposed the introduction of 
new language and new initiatives for fear that doing so would trigger a 
conservative backlash aimed at rolling back the progress already achieved. 
Their approach reflected a generalist preoccupation with securing the best 
overall negotiating text.
Conclusion
The policy-making process for the Beijing Conference on Women was 
particularly complex because of the range of issues under negotiation, the 
controversial nature of many of these issues, and the number of actors. 
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With so many issues on the agenda ±  all of which were considered salient 
to Canada’s national interest ±  one might have expected a rigorous com-
petition among diverse actors to determine whose concerns received prior-
ity. Yet, the interdepartmental policy-making process was marked much 
more by cooperation than conflict. The role of DFAIT in this process was 
very different from that of the Department of External Affairs in the two 
decades following the Second World War. The international agenda had 
changed significantly. Not only was the range of economic and social issues 
under negotiation in the 1990s hugely expanded from that of the Pearson-
ian era, but these issues were subjected to far more in-depth analysis in UN 
meetings. As a result, large numbers of Canadian government actors were 
involved. In this process, the Department of Foreign Affairs played a lead 
role ±  but not the lead role ±  largely because the conference was much more 
important to the Secretary of State for the Status of Women than for the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. SWC’s leadership was further solidified when 
the chief negotiator was seconded from DFAIT. Thus, in the 1990s, it was 
the department responsible for the well-being of women in Canada ±  not 
the department responsible for conducting foreign policy ±  that assumed 
the lead in preparing for the Beijing conference. SWC nonetheless received 
strong and vital support from DFAIT in this endeavour.
Although DFAIT has traditionally been seen as a generalist depart-
ment, in this case it acted as a specialist department as well as a generalist 
department. When specific interests in the realm of foreign affairs were at 
stake, it acted as a strong advocate for them. When the interests of other 
departments appeared to threaten securing the best overall package in the 
Platform for Action, DFAIT acted as a generalist department to achieve a 
compromise position. The negotiating skills, expertise, and flexibility of 
DFAIT officials helped to foster the relatively harmonious working re-
lations among members of the interdepartmental committee and to en-
sure Canada’s success in achieving most of its negotiating objectives at the 
Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. Thus, Canada’s national 
interest was well served.
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